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Gender and labour on Cameroon’s tea
estates
Introduction
This book explores the relationship between gender and plantation
labour in Africa in general, and Cameroon in particular. Although
gender has become one of the most dynamic areas of Africanist
research today, as evidenced by a growing number of  books and
articles dedicated to the subject (cf. Imam et al. 1997; Mikell 1997;
Allman et al. 2002; Cornwall 2005; Cole et al. 2007), many works
on plantation labour in Africa seem to have under-studied or even
to have ignored issues of  gender.1
The introduction of  plantation labour during colonial rule in
Africa had significant consequences for gender roles and relations
within and beyond the capitalist labour process. One of  the major
concerns of this study is to demonstrate that these effects have
turned out to be quite ambivalent, being marked by both profound
changes and remarkable continuities. On the one hand, plantation
labour has offered young men and women an opportunity to free
themselves from existing patriarchal control in their local
communities and build up a relatively autonomous existence. On
the other, it created a new form of  patriarchal control, with
plantation workers, both male and female, becoming subordinated
to male-dominated managerial controls in the labour process. And,
last but not least, what some Western feminist scholars doing
research on female workers in Africa found difficult to understand
(Pittin 1984) is that, though gender relations on the plantations and
other capitalist enterprises continued to be characterised by male
dominance, female workers never stopped joining male co-workers
in a variety of protest actions against the control and exploitation
they both experienced in the labour process (Abdullah 1997).
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Two tea estates that were established in the Anglophone region
of  Cameroon in the 1950s, namely the Tole and Ndu Tea Estates,
are the focus of the book. A study of these estates is particularly
interesting in that one of  them, the Tole Tea Estate, employs mainly
female pluckers while the other, the Ndu Tea Estate, employs mainly
male pluckers. This allows for an examination of  any variations in
male and female workers’ modes of resistance to the control and
exploitation they met in the labour process.
This introductory chapter is divided into four sections. The first
discusses the changing conceptions of gender in Africa while the
second describes the ambivalent impact that tea plucking has had
on gender roles and relations within and outside the labour process.
The third section investigates the relationship between gender and
labour resistance on the two tea estates and the fourth provides
insight into the book’s organisation and the research methodology
used.
Gender in Africa
What is somewhat curious is that despite gender’s ascendancy in
both academic and policy-making circles in Africa, it is still often
misconstrued in African Studies as a synonym for ‘women’. I
therefore feel obliged to express here my understanding of  gender.
In brief, the term ‘gender’ refers to the social and historical
construction of  masculine and feminine roles but it also signifies
relationships between and among men and women and their relative
positions in society. Gender roles and relations have descriptive
and prescriptive elements, describing what men and women do and
how they relate, and/or what they are expected to do and how they
should relate. They depend on a particular socio-economic, cultural
and political context and are affected by other factors such as age,
race, class, ethnicity, life-cycle position and marital status. Clearly,
gender is a highly variable concept and there is nothing fixed or
monolithic about gender roles and relations (Lindsay 2003; Cornwall
2005). Moreover, while gender is socially and historically
constructed, its meaning is continually contested and always in the
process of being negotiated in the context of existing power
relations.
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Although female roles have continued to be the primary focus
of gender studies in Africa, some African scholars, like Amadiume
(1987) and Oyewumi (1997), remain suspicious of  the term itself,
seeing it as an ethnocentric concept that is ill-suited to the African
context. They argue that Western feminists’ hierarchical notions of
gender difference, as evidenced in particular by their claims of the
global existence of patriarchal ideologies and male dominance,2 did
not exist in pre-colonial African societies. They instead maintain
that in the African ‘corporate’ and ‘dual sex’ forms of  social
organisation (Mikell 1997), there is complementarity based on
separate but equally significant contributions to the well-being of
the community. According to them, cooperation rather than conflict
between men and women was a prominent feature of African
cultures: it was an inter-gender partnership that was reinforced by
colonialist and imperialist threats.
Other African scholars, like Imam et al. (1997) and Nnaemeka
(1998), caution, however, against a problematic presentation of a
harmonious pre-colonial idyll: ‘Women’s position in pre-colonial
Africa turns out to have been neither a happy complementarity with
men’s roles nor the dumb beast of  burden remarked on by the early
anthropologists’ (Imam et al. 1997: 7). Gordon (1996: 29) attempts
to arrive at a more realistic picture of gender roles and relations in
pre-colonial African societies:
Although both men and women were subject to clearly defined
obligations and rights within their households and lineages, elder
males tended to have more power over the labour and fruits of the
labour of  other household members. Women often had considerable
autonomy, however that helped dilute tendencies towards male
dominance. In some societies women had parallel authority structures
to those of men, which allowed women control over their own
spheres of  activities. Also, because in many societies husbands and
wives did not routinely pool their property or other assets, women
had a measure of economic independence and control over
productive assets.
There may be differences of opinion as to the existence of a gender
hierarchy in Africa during the pre-colonial era but there is general
agreement among Africanists that the colonial encounter impinged
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profoundly on gender identities in Africa and encouraged the
development of  hierarchical gender roles and relations. Colonial
gender ideals were ‘coloured’ by the sexual division of labour that
existed in Western nations and were vigorously promoted by
Christian missions and schools: men were defined primarily as
monogamous household providers (the breadwinners) and women
essentially as dependent and submissive housewives (Mies 1986;
Hansen 2002; Lindsay 2003). Such gender notions that stressed
women’s reproductive and nurturing roles were clearly seen in the
colonial educational system. Girls’ education lagged behind that of
boys and it was usually geared to acquiring domestic skills that would
make them better wives and mothers (Parpart 1988a: 212).
One should not overlook the fact that, besides their reproductive
labour, women in many African societies were invariably expected
to carry out a disproportionate amount of  the productive labour.
Although they usually lacked any formal control over land, women
played a prominent role in food production, a situation that led
Boserup (1970) to refer to Africa as a region of  female farming par
excellence. During the colonial period, women’s labour tasks even
intensified. Following the introduction of  cocoa and coffee into
Anglophone Cameroon in the colonial era, men became more
actively involved in farming in order to control any cash earnings.
This often led to the displacement of female food production from
the fertile lands around homesteads to areas further afield and male
attempts to secure the (unpaid) assistance of their wives in cash-
crop production (Goheen 1989, 1993, 1996; Fisiy 1992).
It would be a grave error to assume that African women tended
to meekly accept the roles assigned to them in colonial gender
discourses. Several historical studies suggest that they contested
and negotiated their roles, and were actively engaged in reconfiguring
their own identities. Colonial conceptions of  domesticity could have
led to marked constraints on the relative socio-economic
independence that women had previously enjoyed in some parts of
Africa, notably West Africa.3 Little wonder then that many of  these
women, like the Yoruba women in southwestern Nigeria, who had
always been involved in commerce, were inclined to resist the idea
that Christian women remain at home (Sudarkasa 1973; Mann
1985). In his study of the Friends African Mission in Kenya, Thomas
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(2000) argues that female students subverted the ideology of
domesticity disseminated at the mission school and strategically
used the school to ‘delay marriages and control their choices of
partners’ and move beyond the domestic sphere, using the skills
they acquired in dressmaking, needlework and cooking to provide
an independent source of income of their own.
Colonial gender ideals seem to have produced several
contradictions. For example, those that emerged during the colonial
era between the realities of  women’s contributions to household
provisioning and the inability of some men to sustain dependent
wives continue in post-colonial Africa. Colonial gender discourses
and practices tended to be complex as well, providing African women
not only with constraints but also opportunities. In her study of
women’s participation in public life in Anglophone Cameroon,
Adams (2006) convincingly demonstrates how British colonial and
missionary policies in the late-colonial period did not seek solely to
domesticate local women and create good Christian wives and
mothers but also to offer them new opportunities through education,
salaried employment, travel abroad and activism in local and
international organisations.
As elsewhere in Africa, educational and employment
opportunities and other factors contributing to women’s
emancipation have considerably increased in the Cameroonian post-
colonial state. Nevertheless, there are still striking continuities in
male dominance in the country (Endeley & Happi 2004). One
significant development, however, is that the current neoliberal
reforms in some cases seem to have undermined the economic base
of  patriarchy in Africa. While such reforms have often increased
women’s workloads, they have also increasingly made women the
household’s primary provider, as men are no longer able to claim to
be the breadwinners and to be supporting their dependent wives
and children (Gordon 1996; Jackson 2001; Silberschmidt 2001).
Unlike women, men were rarely the subject of research on gender
in Africa. Only recently have Africanists begun to address how
shifting meanings of gender have affected African men and how
understandings and practices of masculinity have been contested
and transformed in the colonial and post-colonial eras (cf. Cornwall
& Lindesfarne 1994; Jackson 2001; Lindsay & Miescher 2003).
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African male elders exercised authority not only over women but
also over younger men. Just as women, young men formed a
dependent labour force for their elders’ farms and, as long as they
remained unmarried, they could not claim a share of the compound
and its land or control their own labour. Socio-economic
transformations in the colonial period were crucial in changing
definitions of masculinity and it is now a commonplace assertion
that the new opportunities created by colonialism and
commercialisation have provided young men with the cash to assert
their autonomy.
From South Africa to Kenya and Cameroon, men who were once
forced to provide services for their elders as a route to marriage and
social adulthood are now able to earn money for their own marriage
payments themselves, generally by migrant labour but also through
independent marketing or skilled trades (Berry 1985). Young men
have always aspired to adult masculinity but adult masculinity was
only the start of  men’s gendered aspirations. In the process of
attaining senior masculinity, a married man hoped to father and
educate his children, to progressively exercise greater influence in
lineage and community affairs and to build his own house. Wage
labour speeded up the process of individual attainment of senior
masculine status, with some senior men becoming prosperous and
influential enough to be known as ‘big men’ (Lindsay 2003).
Gender and tea plucking in Anglophone Cameroon
The introduction of plantation agriculture in Anglophone Cameroon
in the colonial era had enormous implications for gender roles and
relations in the region. It was during the German colonial period
(1884-1916) that a plantation economy was established in the region
and it has remained a dominant feature of the regional economy
ever since (Konings 1993, 2011a). The vast majority of the privately
owned German plantations were located on the very fertile, volcanic
soils around Mount Cameroon in today’s South West Province of
Anglophone Cameroon. Their establishment followed the expulsion
of the original occupants of the expropriated lands, in particular
the Bakweri, into prescribed native reserves.4 Although the area
came under British mandate and trusteeship authority after the First
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World War, German planters continued to operate in the region
until the Second World War when the properties of  German planters
were confiscated and turned over to the Custodian of Enemy
Property.
After the war, a decision had to be reached on what to do with
these plantation lands. Despite Bakweri agitation for the repossession
of their ancestral lands, the British decided in November 1946 to
lease the approximately 100,000 ha of land to a newly established
agro-industrial parastatal, the Cameroon Development Corporation
(CDC). Since its foundation, the new corporation has doubled its
cultivated area from about 20,000 ha to more than 40,000 ha with
the assistance of huge loans from several well-known financial
institutions, including the World Bank, the European Development
Fund (FED), the Commonwealth Development Corporation
(COMDEV) and the (French) Central Fund for Economic
Cooperation (CCCE) (Konings 1993).
Plantation agriculture is labour intensive and the CDC – the
second largest employer in the country being only surpassed by the
government – initially employed between 20,000 and 25,000
workers. At present, it employs about 14,000 workers with rubber,
palm oil, bananas and tea as its main crops.
Just as other capitalist enterprises established in the colonial era,
the plantations in Anglophone Cameroon recruited male labour
almost exclusively for a considerable period of time. The following
factors accounted for this situation. The colonial gender discourse
tended to describe paid labour outside the home as being masculine,
and it gradually started to define men as the ‘breadwinners’ and
women as ‘dependent housewives’. Several authors have also rightly
argued that colonial officials and employers were initially inclined
to support resistance by male elders to female migration and wage
employment that could undermine the latter’s control over women’s
vital productive and reproductive labour (Obbo 1980; Moore 1988;
Gordon 1996). Some of these authors equally added that colonial
employers promptly recognised that keeping women’s productive
and reproductive labour in their communities would serve capital
accumulation by reducing male labour costs (Meillassoux 1975; Safa
1979; Wolpe 1980).
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Although these arguments assume joint interest among male
elders and colonial officials and employers in excluding women from
migration and wage labour, it should be pointed out here that the
situation may well have been more complex and certainly more
dynamic. Its complexity is demonstrated by the fact that neither
male opposition nor colonial state actions could completely prevent
women’s migration, especially to regional towns. Urban life presented
the opportunity for female migrants to escape patriarchal controls
and build up a relatively autonomous existence following a personal
crisis in their family status, such as widowhood or divorce, and/or
deteriorating economic conditions in the rural areas. Everywhere
in Africa, migration had painful consequences for women as they
had to endure the stigma of being branded ‘prostitutes’ or ‘loose
women’ for the rest of their lives (Obbo 1980; Stichter 1985). Ruel
(1960: 236-37) reported, for example, that some Upper Banyang
chiefs travelled to the southern towns of Anglophone Cameroon in
1953 to round up, with the help of  the police, women from their
own ethnic group who had been found ‘loitering’ and to repatriate
them. The chiefs, however, discovered that even when they
succeeded in forcibly returning these women to their home towns
they simply went back to the cities again.
The dynamics of the actual situation are demonstrated by
Chauncey (1981) and Parpart (1986) for the copper mines in Zambia
and provide evidence that the mine owners favoured employing
only single men until the 1940s. However by 1944 these same owners
agreed that married men’s greater stability and productivity more
than compensated for the extra costs involved in housing and feeding
the latter’s wives and children. As I have shown elsewhere, the
German plantation owners and, above all, the CDC management
in Anglophone Cameroon became increasingly committed to a
policy of encouraging male workers to bring their families to the
estates with them in an effort to reduce the high labour turnover
and increase productivity. Interestingly, some of  the CDC workers’
wives also found employment on the estates on a casual, seasonal
or even permanent basis (Konings 1993).
Labour migration to the plantations enabled young men to escape
from the control of their elders, earn an income of their own and
pay their bridewealth. Initially, most workers had no other intention
than to sell their labour for a fairly short period of time, according
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to a pattern they themselves chose. Having achieved their goals,
they were eager to leave the plantations and return to their home
towns, either temporarily or permanently. Most of  the plantation
inspection reports from the British mandate period seem to agree
that the payment of bridewealth was indeed one of the most
important goals of the plantation labour force (Konings 1993: 61).
Plantation labour thus became the medium by which young men
could speed up their attainment of  adult masculine status. Later
on, when workers became more deeply integrated into the capitalist
mode of production and started working for longer periods,
plantation labour became a vehicle for reaching senior masculine
status and, in some cases, particularly after being promoted to the
level of  supervisor or higher, for attaining the much-cherished status
of ‘big man’.
From a gender perspective, the establishment of two tea estates
in Anglophone Cameroon in the 1950s signified a landmark in
regional plantation production. While plantation agriculture
continued to rely mainly on male labour, the two newly established
tea estates brought about a radical break with this traditional labour
recruitment pattern, in particular regarding plucking, which is the
central activity in tea production. From the very start, one of the
estates recruited predominantly female pluckers and the other
predominantly male pluckers.
The first estate, the Tole Tea Estate, was created in 1954. It was
owned by the CDC until it was privatised in 2002. It is situated,
like most other CDC estates, in the present South West Province
and has continued to employ mainly female pluckers. The second
estate, the Ndu Tea Estate, was set up in today’s North West
Province in 1957 and was owned by a multinational enterprise, the
Estates and Agency Company Ltd (EAC) until 1977 when it was
taken over by the CDC. Since the German colonial era, this region
had been a supplier of male labour to the southwestern plantations
(Konings 1993). When it was established, the Ndu Tea Estate was
the only large-scale plantation in the North West Province and has
continued to employ mainly male pluckers.
This striking gender difference in the labour forces employed on
these tea estates is by no means accidental. It is the outcome of the
bargaining process between estate managers and the male elders of
10
Gender and Plantation Labour in Africa
the local communities about two potentially conflicting factors: on
the one hand, the managerial preference for female pluckers and,
on the other, the existing patriarchal control over women’s vital
productive and reproductive labour in the local communities.
There has long been a demand for female labour on tea estates
throughout the world (Kurian 1982) and tea estates were, in fact,
among the few capitalist enterprises during colonial rule that gave
preference to female labour. The rationale for this was, apparently,
the managerial belief that, compared to men, women were naturally
more suited to performing certain tasks (they had ‘nimble fingers’),
were more docile (they were said to be used to subordination) and
cheaper (their income was defined as supplementary to that of the
so-called breadwinner, i.e. the husband) (Elson & Pearson 1984).
This managerial demand, which formed a direct threat to patriarchal
control over female labour, proved more successful on the Tole
Estate than on the Ndu Estate. This was because colonialism and
capitalism had had a more disruptive effect on social formations in
the South West Province than on those in the North West Province.
Consequently, patriarchal opposition to female employment on the
newly established tea estates was less vehement in the South West
Province than in the North West Province.
Historical accounts of  the South West Province clearly show
that the local communities in this area were exposed much earlier
to education, Christian churches and capitalist enterprises and with
more effect than those in the North West Province, and these far-
reaching transformations were to form a severe threat to the
authority of  male elders and patriarchal controls. Moreover, the
introduction of  plantation agriculture in the South West Province
had a disruptive effect on local communities, resulting in large-
scale expropriation of land and a steady flow of migrant labour,
especially from the North West Province to the South West
Province. Furthermore, chieftaincy was typically a weak institution
in the segmented societies of  the South West Province, often as a
result of it being a colonial creation (Geschiere 1993), and it lacked
the bargaining power needed to defend the interests of the local
community against the colonial state and plantation owners. When
the Tole Tea Estate was set up in 1954, the CDC management was
not dependent on the goodwill of the local chiefs to supply land or
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labour. Despite the still existing, but somewhat weakened, patriarchal
dominance in their communities, these chiefs were in no position
to contest the managerial decision to employ female pluckers as
they had no authority over the CDC estates. In addition, by the
time the Tole Tea Estate was established, female employment on
the southwestern plantations was no longer a new phenomenon.
The gradual employment of workers’ wives had been followed by
the recruitment of  women who lived in villages near the estates.
The serious shortage of labour on the CDC estates in the early
1950s encouraged the management to recruit even more women. It
is certain that the managerial decision to employ female pluckers
on the estate strengthened the process of female labour migration
from the North West Province.
Compared to the South West Province, there was a later and
lower degree of educational, missionary and capitalist penetration
in the North West Province. When it was set up in 1957, the Ndu
Estate was one of the few capitalist enterprises in the regional
economy. As a result, local institutions and value systems underwent
less erosion and the ideology of  patriarchal dominance continued
to be pervasive in local communities. Chieftaincy, in some cases
both reinforced and distorted by the delegation of labour
recruitment and revenue collection tasks for the Germans and British
respectively continued to be a powerful institution in the centralised
states of  the North West Province (Nyamnjoh 2003; Warnier 2009).
It was still capable of resisting any serious capitalist onslaught on
local value systems and patterns of  authority. Unlike the CDC
management, the EAC management depended heavily on the
goodwill of  local chiefs and elders for land and labour. During the
negotiation process, the Chief of Ndu strongly opposed a managerial
proposal to employ female pluckers on the estate. He instead insisted
on employing local male labour as a strict precondition for the setting
up of the estate in his area of jurisdiction – an action intended not
only to stem ongoing male migration to the southwestern estates
but also to forestall the construction of  labour camps that were
common there. In this way, the chief  hoped to safeguard patriarchal
control over women’s productive and reproductive labour as well
as to ensure male workers’ continued integration into the local
community and their loyalty regarding the traditional code of ethics
and authority.
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The social division of labour has, in practice, never been as rigid
as depicted above. On the Tole Estate, management experienced
chronic difficulties in attracting a regular and adequate supply of
female pluckers. In peak production periods, therefore, some male
workers on the estate who were inexperienced at tea plucking were
instructed to temporarily assist the female pluckers. An increasing
number of  permanent male pluckers were then also taken on. As
for the Ndu Estate, the chief eventually agreed with the
management that some women might be employed for specific
activities, particularly weeding on a casual or temporary basis,
provided this employment would not affect their productive and
reproductive roles in the local community. In the early 1980s the
chief ’s successor – a university graduate – finally allowed the CDC
management to recruit women as permanent tea pluckers on the
estate.
The creation of the two tea estates in Anglophone Cameroon
effected important changes in gender roles and relations. They
increased women’s participation in the capitalist labour market,
promoted the process of their escape from patriarchal controls and
offered them the opportunity to establish an autonomous existence.
Clearly, female labour migration undermined patriarchal controls
in local communities more than male labour migration, since the
male elders lost control of  women’s vital productive and
reproductive labour. It also led to a reversal of  existing labour
migration patterns. In the past, young men used to migrate to the
southwestern plantations while women were expected to stay at
home to carry out their productive and reproductive tasks. With
the creation of  the tea estates, women started migrating to the Tole
Tea Estate in the South West Province while men had the chance
to work at the Ndu Tea Estate in their own region of  origin. Male
workers remained integrated in their local communities and could
therefore realise their ideal of acquiring adult and senior male status
(and even, in some cases, the status of big man) through local
employment.
As will be shown later in this book, the women who were hired
by the Tole Tea Estate tended to be older unmarried, widowed or
divorced women who, rather than becoming dependent on family
elders for their survival, preferred to migrate to the estate where
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they could be sure of a regular monthly income.5 These women,
who continued to receive less respect than married women and were
often branded as ‘loose’ women, became de facto household heads
with children to support and thus challenged the colonial gender
discourse of male breadwinners and dependent women. In sharp
contrast to male workers, female workers were facing a series of
gender inequalities, such as continuing productive and reproductive
problems outside the workplace and discrimination in the workplace
by male co-workers, managerial staff  and trade unionists.
Gender and labour resistance on Anglophone
Cameroon’s tea estates
Plantation labour appears to have ambivalent consequences for male
and female workers. On the one hand, it enables them to escape
from the control of male elders in their local communities and build
up a relatively autonomous existence, which means they have a
high stake in plantation labour. On the other hand, however, it
subordinates them to a new form of  patriarchal control, namely
managerial control, and offers them relatively low rewards for their
(hard) labour. Their poor conditions of  service clearly pose a severe
threat to the realisation of  their ideals. While young men strive to
achieve adult and senior status, women aspire to become
breadwinners themselves. Female workers are typically subject to
more intensive managerial control and exploitation in the labour
process than male workers: the exercise of managerial control is
male dominated and female workers tend to experience gender
inequalities and discrimination in the labour process. Women also
tend to receive less pay than men, enjoy fewer training possibilities
and chances for promotion, and are fired in times of crisis and
reorganisation. This book explores whether male and female workers
are inclined to resist control and exploitation in the labour process.
There used to be a firm belief  in management circles, especially
on tea estates and in so-called ‘world market factories’ in developing
countries (Kurian 1982, 1989; Bandarage 1984; Joekes 1985; Heyzer
1986) that women were more docile and submissive than men
because they had become accustomed to patriarchal controls in their
local communities. Clearly, this managerial view that sees women
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as passive creatures in a male-dominated society runs the risk of
distorting women’s actual roles in these societies and ignoring
common domestic struggles (Stichter & Parpart 1988).
Various accounts indicate conflicts between husbands and wives
over land, labour and capital. Kaberry (1952: 146) reports that
women in the North West Province of  Cameroon were often at
odds with their husbands over their earnings from sales of food,
with the latter insisting on their traditional entitlement to women’s
cash earnings. African women have also regularly engaged in informal
and collective modes of resistance to male abuses of power (Cohen
1980; Scott 1985; Isaacman 1990). Individual, informal actions have
included refusing to cook or have sexual intercourse, withdrawing
domestic and agricultural labour, temporarily or permanently
returning to the parental home, spreading gossip about their spouses,
migration, calling the supernatural, and manipulation (Parpart
1988a). Collective actions by women have occurred in different
areas of Africa, including Cameroon (Ardener 1975; O’Barr 1984;
Parpart 1988b). Some of  these women’s ‘wars’ in the North West
Province, called anlu, fombuen and ndofoumbgui, have been
documented (Nkwi 1985; Diduk 1989; Shanklin 1990; Fonchingong
& Tanga 2007; Fonchingong et al. 2008). These were manifestations
of collective resistance by women to male abuses of power and
colonial and post-colonial onslaughts on women’s access to land
and control of  the agricultural labour process.
Some scholars agree with international management that female
workers are less inclined to resist control and exploitation in the
labour process, albeit for different reasons (Safa 1979; Berger 1983;
Elson & Pearson 1984). They argue that women’s entry into the
capitalist labour process has not freed them from their productive
and reproductive roles outside the workplace. Female workers are,
therefore, inclined to identify themselves primarily as ‘mothers,
wives and daughters’ rather than as ‘workers’ and to be less
committed to workers’ organisation and action. Although it cannot
be denied that female workers’ domestic responsibilities and family
attachments may form a certain obstacle to active participation in
workers’ organisation and action, the theory has serious flaws. As
was already mentioned, the majority of  the Tole female pluckers
do not have husbands and so cannot afford to regard their work on
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the estate as secondary or rely on a male breadwinner. Being
household heads, most are highly dependent on their own income
from wage work and are therefore likely to view themselves as
workers and to participate as far as possible in formal and/or
informal actions to improve their conditions of  service. Married
female pluckers are equally likely to do so. They cannot depend on
their husbands’ wage income because many male workers refuse to
make any substantial contribution to the upkeep of  their families.
There are also a growing number of empirical studies that provide
proof that female workers identify themselves primarily as workers
and participate in actions aimed at improving their living and working
conditions. Berger (1983, 1992) showed that women working in
factories, particularly in the garment and textile industries, were a
very militant and politically active force in South Africa, while
Presley (1986) reported that Kikuyu women who were employed
on settler farms were involved in labour protests from the 1920s
until the 1960s. Through an uninterrupted series of  work stoppages
and strikes that were usually aimed – like the protests of South
African female workers – at improving wages and working
conditions, these women gained confidence in the power of their
collective efforts, which was reinforced by the heightened political
militancy of post-war Kenya. Research on the agro-industrial
plantations of Bud in Senegal (Kane 1977; Mackintosh 1989),
Nigeria (Jackson 1978), Tanzania (Mbilinyi 1988) and Malawi
(Vaughan & Chipande 1986) demonstrates that female workers were
engaged in different forms of  action.
There are various divisions between and among male and female
workers, but this has never prevented pluckers on Anglophone
Cameroon’s tea estates from displaying a large measure of  solidarity
and engaging in common actions to protect their mutual interests.
One such division between male and female workers is based
on the pervasive ideology of  male dominance in society. This is
evidenced, for example, by male workers’ attempts to gain benefits
from the male-dominated management in the workplace at the
expense of women, their reluctance to work under female
supervision, and regular harassment of  female colleagues. Gender
discrimination and male abuse of power inside and outside the
workplace have frequently been opposed by female workers. For
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instance, female pluckers at the Tole Tea Estate have forced the
management to replace male supervisors with female ones in the
female-dominated plucking section. As research on gender in Africa
has clearly demonstrated, such a gender cleft has never prevented
men and women from cooperating in the well-being of their
communities and joining in struggles against external enemies.
Studies on female workers in Africa have confirmed that they were
willing to engage in common actions with their male counterparts
in defence of their mutual interests (Abdullah 1997).
There are also divisions among male and female workers based
mainly on age, education, occupation, marital status and ethnic and
regional origin. Ethnic and regional heterogeneity could potentially
be a source of conflict in the workplace in Africa, with rivalry being
sparked by suspicions of favouritism in hiring and promotion or
due to disagreements with supervisors or co-workers. Nevertheless
and as has been shown elsewhere, there have been few incidences
of serious, protracted ethnic clashes on the estates in Anglophone
Cameroon (Konings 1993, 1998). Ethnic, regional and other
divisions have never prevented male and female workers on these
estates from undertaking joint actions against their employers. Their
solidarity appears to have been promoted by the sharing of similar
living and working conditions, a lingua franca (Pidgin English) and
good communication on the estates.
Male and female workers have been engaged in various modes
of resistance against their control and exploitation in the labour
process. Crisp (1984: 57) identified three broad types of  labour
resistance that are relevant to labour actions on Anglophone
Cameroon’s tea estates as well. On the basis of  three main criteria,
namely visibility, inclusiveness and scale of  resistance, and duration,
he distinguished between:
• Informal actions. Informal actions are intermittent, on an
individual or small-scale basis and happen in a covert
manner. Since the publication of  van Onselen’s (1976)
book on labour protests in the mining compounds of
Rhodesia, there has been increased attention in African
labour studies to the wide variety of  informal modes of
resistance inside and outside the labour process, ranging
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from desertion, absenteeism, malingering, sabotage, theft,
the smoking of hemp and the excessive use of alcohol, to
more positive examples such as the development of an
individual, anti-employer work culture and the adoption
of  religious beliefs as forms of  resistance to the capitalist
mode.
• Collective actions. Collective actions such as strikes, riots,
demonstrations and go-slows are more inclusive, overt and
of specific duration. They usually give workers a feeling
of  power and control over their own lives. The history –
and often the mythology – of  past collective actions may
shape contemporary workers’ struggles.
• Institutional actions. Institutional actions, such as union
actions, are collective, normally overt and require
continuous commitment. State and management have
always tried to emasculate the threat inherent in trade
unions and have devised various strategies to transform
trade unionism from being a vehicle of labour resistance
into an instrument of  labour control.
Similar to Ghanaian miners (Crisp 1984), Anglophone Cameroonian
tea-estate workers have repeatedly taken the initiative against
management and the state, moving between informal, collective
and institutional modes of resistance depending on the perceived
economic and political environment. This has forced management
and the state to respond with new strategies of control.
Since the first days of estate tea production, the trade-union
leadership and the Labour Department have constantly instructed
workers that their trade union was the normal intermediary between
workers and management. As a result, workers usually turn to the
union in the first instance for representation and defence of their
interests. Female workers turned out to be as keen as male workers
to support union actions but their level of participation in union
affairs has always been conspicuously lower than that of their male
counterparts as a result of  the patriarchal union structure and
women’s multiple productive and reproductive responsibilities
(Pittin 1984; Parpart 1988b; Abdullah 1997). One should, however,
bear in mind that support for the union by both male and female
workers has never been unconditional. They have expected union
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leaders to act promptly and actively during individual and collective
disputes and to produce results. When such expectations were not
realised, workers began to bypass the union and resort to alternative
modes of  resistance, such as informal and collective actions.
It was particularly after the serious national economic crisis that
hit the CDC in the mid-1980s and the subsequent structural
adjustment measures that the existing contradictions between the
union leadership and the rank and file became more pronounced.
The union leadership, composed mainly of  male clerical and
supervisory staff, has tended to be less militant than the
predominantly illiterate and less well-educated workers. Union
leaders have been more inclined to play the ‘responsible’ role in the
field of industrial relations propagated by the colonial and post-
colonial state, relying chiefly on peaceful negotiations with the
management to defend their members’ interests rather than on
militant strike actions.
During the crisis, the CDC management and the state put
enormous pressure on the union leadership and shop stewards to
postpone their representation and defence of workers’ interests and
to cooperate closely with the management in the overriding task of
economic recovery. In the end, the union leadership proved to be
prepared, albeit somewhat reluctantly, to assist the management in
planning and implementing two principal strategies for economic
recovery, namely cost reduction and an increase in productivity.
The first strategy involved drastic cuts in overheads, including a
serious curtailment of workers’ wages and fringe benefits as well as
frequent transfers and layoffs of  workers. The second strategy
involved the tightening of managerial control over the labour process
and increases in task work. Confronted with a dramatic deterioration
in their conditions of  service and intensified managerial control,
the workers rapidly lost whatever confidence they still had in the
union leadership. Although they never abandoned their informal
and collective actions altogether, there was nevertheless a growing
tendency among them to become survival-oriented in the climate
of insecurity with intensified managerial control and alternative
means of  income generation becoming precarious. Increasing
numbers of pluckers began to acquiesce to whatever stringent
economic recovery measures management introduced for the sake
of  merely keeping their jobs.
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The CDC tea estates were privatised in October 2002 and
renamed the Cameroon Tea Estates (CTE). Contrary to government
expectations, the privatisation of the tea sector has failed to increase
the quality, output and sales of  tea or to improve the workers’
conditions of  service. Significantly, the unions were not consulted
on the privatisation and the new management even refused to enter
into meaningful negotiations with the union leaders about the
introduction of drastic changes to the labour process, including the
intensification of managerial control over the labour process, huge
increases in task work, a 50% slash in wages and the non-payment
of  various fringe benefits. Given this situation, male and female
workers were no longer interested in keeping their jobs at all costs
and started resorting to a variety of  informal and collective actions,
notably protracted strikes.
Organisation of  the book and research methodology
Having set out the most important themes that will be explored in
this book, I will now explain how it is organised and how the research
findings that it is based on were arrived at.
The book starts with a general chapter on the history of tea
production and marketing in Cameroon. It describes how tea in
Cameroon is almost exclusively produced on agro-industrial estates
and represents only a marginal share of total cash-crop production.
Rising costs of production and relatively low labour productivity
have badly affected its competitiveness on the world market.
Structural adjustment measures and the privatisation of  the tea
sector have apparently largely failed to change this situation and
the tea is therefore mainly sold locally and in the neighbouring
countries through formal and informal (smuggling) channels.
The main body of  the book is composed of  three parts. The first
two examine whether there have been any variations in the roles
played by Tole female workers and Ndu male workers respectively
both within and outside the labour process. The focus here is on
the main characteristics of the labour force on the two estates,
workers’ control and exploitation in the labour process, gender
relations and relations with their communities of birth, and the
various modes of  labour resistance, in particular informal, collective
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and trade-union actions. The final part describes the secretive,
corrupt privatisation of  the two tea estates that gave rise to a
dramatic deterioration in already precarious living and working
conditions and unprecedented labour militancy.
The present study is based on several fieldwork periods in
Anglophone Cameroon between 1985 and 2005 and is part of a
larger project on plantation labour in the region (Konings 1993,
1998, 2011a). Various research methodologies were employed.
Firstly, I consulted primary and secondary sources in libraries,
archives, departments and ministerial offices. The valuable materials
on plantation labour at the National Archives of Buea (BNA), the
Provincial and Divisional Delegations of Labour in Buea, Limbe
(Victoria) and Nkambe, and the CDC archives in Limbe-Bota were
particularly useful. Secondly, I interviewed (in English or Pidgin
English, the lingua franca in Anglophone Cameroon) considerable
numbers of workers, managerial staff members, union leaders,
government officials and other informants. And finally, I observed
the daily activities taking place on both estates. I was assisted by
some local research assistants who were familiar with the research
areas and proved to be extremely helpful in tracing relevant
informants and gaining their confidence.
Notes
  1. Some notable exceptions include, for example, Mackintosh (1989),
Mbilinyi (1991) and Jain & Reddock (1998).
  2. Patriarchy has been defined in various ways. Used in its broadest sense,
it refers to a form of  social organisation in which there is a structural
dominance of  men over women. It may take different cultural forms
and expressions and be subject to changes over time. See Bozzoli
(1983) and Gordon (1996).
  3. For a different situation in Uganda and other East African countries,
see Bantebiya-Kyomuhendo & McIntosh (2006).
  4. For the Bakweri, see, for instance, Courade (1981/82), Geschiere
(1993), and Ardener (1996).
  5. Sender & Oya (2007) also argue that there is a significant relationship
between labour market participation and female divorce or
widowhood in rural Mozambique.
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Production and marketing policies on
Cameroon’s Tea Estates
Introduction
This chapter provides a brief historical review of tea production
and marketing in Cameroon. The first section argues that tea
production in Cameroon has some distinctive features. First of  all,
it started quite late in the colonially established plantation economy
in the area and then remained concentrated in the Anglophone part
of the country for a long time. As a multinational enterprise, the
Estates and Agency Company Ltd (EAC) was initially involved in
regional tea production before the Cameroon Development
Corporation (CDC), the huge agro-industrial parastatal enterprise
that had been operating in the region since 1946/47 came to gradually
monopolise tea production until 2002 when the sector was
privatised. The second section of this chapter discusses how locally
produced tea was not competitive on the world market due to its
high production costs, which resulted in local producers being
compelled to sell an increasing proportion of their output on
domestic and West and Central African markets.
Tea Production in Cameroon
Anglophone Cameroon has always been the centre of tea production
in Cameroon. The political history of the region since European
occupation has, however, been complex (Ngoh 1996, 2001; Konings
& Nyamnjoh 2003). It belonged to the German Kamerun
Protectorate from 1884 to 1916 and was occupied by British forces
during the First World War. After that, it became a British Mandate
and subsequently a British Trust territory until independence and
reunification in 1961. Being part of what was variously called the
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‘Cameroons Province’ or ‘Southern Cameroons’ during the British
era, it was then integrated into the administrative system of Nigeria.
The 1954 Nigerian Constitution, which outlined the framework for
a Federal Nigeria, gave it a quasi-federal status and a limited degree
of  self-government within the Federation of  Nigeria. It attained
full regional status in 1958, which placed it on parity with the other
regions in the federation. In a United Nations-supervised plebiscite
in 1961, it voted for reunification with Francophone Cameroon and
joined the Federal Republic of  Cameroon. Following reunification,
the Southern Cameroons was renamed the Federated State of  West
Cameroon and the former French Cameroon was called the Federated
State of  East Cameroon. Eleven years later, in 1972, the Federation
was abolished and replaced by a unitary system of government,
namely the United Republic of  Cameroon.1 The erstwhile Federated
State of  West Cameroon was divided into two provinces: the South
West Province and the North West Province.
A large number of large-scale private plantations were
established during the German colonial period, mainly around Mount
Cameroon in the present Fako Division of  the South West Province
(Epale 1985). German planters cultivated a variety of  crops,
including cocoa, rubber, palm products, kola, tobacco and coffee.
Apparently, they also considered growing tea on a plantation basis.
Rudin (1938) mentions that a tea seed bed was constructed in the
famous Botanical Gardens in Victoria (present-day Limbe) on the
coast. However by the end of  the German colonial period, no tea
estate had yet become operational.
After the First World War, the British authorities allowed German
planters to go on producing until the Second World War but never
encouraged them to grow tea. During the interwar period, the only
British contribution to tea development was the creation of an
experimental farm at Tole, a village on the slopes of  Mount
Cameroon near Buea, that used seeds from the Victoria Botanical
Gardens. Covering only 66 acres, the estate did not constitute an
economically viable unit and the original plants grew into trees as
little was done with them. Of great significance, however, is the
fact that the 1928 planting formed the basis for the subsequent tea
cultivation in the area, with most of the original trees being used
for their seeds.
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The Second World War boosted local tea cultivation. Tea growing
came to be considered a ‘war effort production’ and helped alleviate
the local tea shortages caused by the war. To this end, tea production
at Tole was expanded for some years and although this renewed
interest was important during the war period, production
nevertheless remained modest, with output rising from a few
thousand pounds in 1943 to £26,208 in 1947 (Bederman 1967).
The Second World War also encouraged tea cultivation indirectly.
The confiscation of  German-owned plantations at the start of  the
war led to the founding of the CDC in 1946. This newly created
parastatal was to become the first agro-industrial enterprise in the
country engaged in tea production and it eventually acquired a
monopoly in domestic tea production. Compared to the corporation’s
other crops, notably rubber, palm oil and bananas, tea has always
been a minor crop (Konings 1993: 51-53).
After its foundation, the government ordered the CDC to produce
tea on the Tole Tea Estate, which had started during the Second
World War. In early 1948, however, the CDC’s management decided
to discontinue production until Tole was economically viable and
it was not until 1954 that it started redeveloping the estate as part
of its policy to diversify estate production.
While the local authorities continued promoting local tea
development, they became somewhat sceptical about the CDC’s
renewed involvement in tea production. Basung (1975) provides
ample proof of the favourable conditions for tea production in the
region. Following the British Cameroon’s attainment of  a limited
degree of self-government in 1954, the local authorities even asked
the Nigerian Federal Government to allocate land for development
projects in the area, including the establishment of  tea estates. At
the same time, however, they had come to realise that the CDC
barely had the funds and experience required to successfully engage
in tea production, and they therefore rejected the corporation’s
redevelopment efforts and strongly recommended that foreign tea
companies be invited to reactivate the Tole Estate:
The Executive Council notes with particular regret that there is a
danger that the corporation’s investment in Tole will be wasted. The
council also notes the following considerations:
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(a) the prospects of the corporation securing additional capital
in substantial quantities and on favourable terms appears slight,
especially in the present market conditions.
(b) such capital as the corporation receives can all be usefully
employed in the development of crops with which the
corporation has considerable experience, i.e. bananas, oil palm,
rubber, cocoa and pepper; and
(c) the corporation has no reservoir of  experience in tea estate
management, and in all circumstances will be better advised
to concentrate its scarce capital resources upon the crops in
which it has got experience.
Accordingly, the Executive Council urges the corporation to give
consideration in its meeting at the end of March to inviting private
enterprise to carry on at Tole farm where the corporation has left
off. In this connection, the council notes that Mr John Arbuthnot,
MP, who recently visited the estate and who himself  has tea interests
in Ceylon, considered that either his own, or some other, company
might very well be interested in operating the estate with possibly a
separate Cameroons company in which the Southern Cameroons
Production Development Board would be a shareholder. I am to
say that the Southern Cameroon Government would welcome such
an arrangement, which would clearly be of benefit to the people of
the territory, and would save the development so far carried out at
Tole.2
In the end, however, the Federal Government of  Nigeria sided with
the CDC management, arguing that its tea development plan would
contribute to the diversification required in the corporation’s
production and to its long-term economic viability. The government
went on to allocate the funds required to continue the redevelopment
of  the Tole Estate,3 which was back in business by 1958 after ten
years of suspended production. In the same year, a tea factory was
completed that processed 12 tonnes of tea in its first year of
operation (see Table 2.1) and by the beginning of  the 1960s, the
estate had reached its planned target of 320-340 ha.
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Anxious to promote tea development in the area, the government
decided to investigate the possibility of creating estates outside the
southwestern plantation region. Towards the end of  1956, it invited
an eminent tea specialist, Dr T. Eden, to tour the Bamenda
Grassfields (today’s North West Province) and report on the tea-
growing potential of the region. His report was favourable but was
predicated on the future development of communications between
the Bamenda Grassfields and the coast. It concluded that ‘fairly
extensive areas’ of land, mainly in the eastern part of the Bamenda
Grassfields, were quite suitable for growing tea.4 During Dr Eden’s
investigations, a lease for 1,600 ha was granted by the chief of
Ndu, a small town between Kumbo and Nkambe in the eastern
part of the Bamenda Grassfields, to a multinational enterprise, the
Estates and Agency Company Ltd (EAC), which launched its
activities in January 1957. At the time, it was the only large-scale
plantation in the Bamenda Grassfields,5 an area of 416 ha that had
been planned between 1957 and 1961, prior to the opening of a
factory on the Ndu Estate in 1962.
After independence and reunification in 1961, the new political
leaders were also interested in increasing tea production in an
attempt to accumulate capital and diversify agricultural production.
Several specialists were commissioned to conduct survey missions
with a view to finding sites suitable for implementing tea projects
although initially these missions were confined to Anglophone
Cameroon. Mr Lhomme-Desages, a consultant from the Institut
Française du Café, du Cacao et Autres Plantes Stimulantes (IFCC), was
the first expert to investigate a number of sites in both federated
states and his report was important for future developments in the
country’s tea production (Lhomme-Desages 1964). On the basis of
his findings, the Federal Government invited a German company,
the Agrar- und Hydrotechnik GMBH, to undertake a feasibility study
in 1966 on the setting up of a tea estate at Djuttitsa near Dschang
in the Bamileke area (Njike 1983; Konings 1986b).6 The conclusions
were positive and construction of  the estate began in 1977. It is
the only tea estate in the Francophone part of  the country. Just as
the two tea estates in the Anglophone area, the Djuttitsa Tea Estate
used to be owned by the CDC.
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Table 2.1 The CDC tea estates’ cultivated area, production and trading accounts,
1947-1995
Source: CDC Annual Reports and Accounts, 1947-1995
 
 
YEAR 
 
AREA 
CULTIVATED 
(Ha) 
 
CROP 
PRODUCTION 
(Metric tonnes) 
 
CROP 
TRADING 
ACCOUNTS 
(FCFA mil lion) 
 
    
1947  12  
1948  1  
1954 69   
1955 49   
1956 61   
1957 85   
1958 108 12  
1959 153 24  
1960 243 46  
1961 333 84  
1962 344 102  
1963 344 149   
1964 344 189  
1965 320 319  
1966 320 428  
1967 322 478 155.1 
1968 386 662 184.8 
1969 387 445  
1970  628  
1971 331 603 297.0 
1972 322 711 246.0 
1973 322 796 279.2 
1974 325 872 301.7 
1975 326 935 346.1   
1976 326 975 344.0 
1977  1,003 510.0 
1978  1,710 1,113.1 
1979  2,015 1,200.6 
1980 1,083 1,950 1,190.0 
1981 1,149 1,882 1,288.6 
1982 1,233 2,131 1,702.6 
1983 1,382 1,801 1,421.5 
1984 1,505 2,103 1,784.0 
1985 1,465 2,299 2,625.0 
1986 1,508 3,206 3,214.0 
1987 1,507 2,797 1,855.0  
1988 1,507 2,882 1,466.0 
1989 1,507 2,452 1,474.0 
1990 1,509 2,407 1,927.0 
1991 1,509 2,941  
1992 1,509 3,351 2,676.0 
1993 1,512 3,417 1,350.0 
1994 1,512 3,903 1,593.0 
1995 1,574 3,568 2,274.0      
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The management of  the CDC and the EAC seemed equally interested
in expanding tea production. For example, in 1964, the CDC
management requested that a team of experts, under the leadership
of  Mr R.J.M. Swynnerton from the Commonwealth Development
Corporation (COMDEV), draft a development plan for the
corporation, including a tea development programme. This was to be
included in the corporation’s application for long-term loans from
the World Bank and other international financial institutions.
The most salient recommendations in the Swynnerton Mission
Report on tea production were that there should be a considerable
expansion of production from 320/340 ha to about 1,200 ha in the
period of the plan (1964-1975) and that smallholder schemes
connected with the CDC estates and its factories be introduced.
The latter was not a new idea in the history of tea production in
Cameroon as both the CDC and the EAC had previously proposed
such projects in the Bamenda Grassfields.7 However the Swynnerton
Mission advised the CDC management to adopt a smallholder
programme as an essential element of  its development policy. This
was not altogether surprising as Swynnerton himself had been the
architect of tea smallholders’ schemes in Kenya (Heyer 1981; von
Bülow & Sörenson 1988). These recommendations were eventually
incorporated to a large extent in the CAMDEV I programme (1967-
1974), the corporation’s first long-term development programme
that was executed with substantial loans and credits from the World
Bank, the IDA and the FED (Konings 1993). Three tea projects
were included: a 200 ha smallholder tea project at Bulu, a village a
few miles from the Tole Estate, with output to be processed by the
Tole tea factory; and two agro-industrial estates each of  400 ha
near Kumba (one at Tombel and the other at Essosong).
This programme was a complete failure and the three schemes
had to be abandoned because the locations chosen proved unsuited
for tea cultivation and the economic conditions for tea production
had meanwhile deteriorated:
On the whole, it appears that economic conditions for tea production
have been deteriorating noticeably in the last few years following
the high increase in production costs, while tea prices remained
stationary and will probably not rise in the long or medium term.
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Under these circumstances, only projects of a comparatively large
size, implemented by using planting material obtained from cuttings
yielding more than two tonnes of  dry tea per ha, would permit to
ensure a satisfactory return.8
In 1968, the CDC management estimated the cost of production
for 1 kg of  tea on an estate of  400 ha at FCFA 264, which far
exceeded any expected market price of  FCFA 205. It was rightly
concluded that production on estates of limited size was no longer
profitable. Interestingly in the light of these economic conditions,
field studies conducted near Bangangte and Mbouda in the Bamileke
area in that same year (1968) recommended a focus on smallholder
production rather than estate production in the study area, on the
assumption that production costs on smallholder schemes would
be lower than on estates.9 However, it soon became clear that these
schemes could not be implemented because the local population
strongly opposed tea cultivation as it would compete with their
robusta coffee cultivation, which was less labour intensive and more
profitable.
Field studies conducted in the Santa area of the Bamenda
Grassfields in 1969/70 adopted an approach different from that
chosen for the Bangangte and Mbouda areas. They envisaged two
projects: one large-scale estate and one smallholder scheme. This
plan eventually had to be abandoned too because it proved
impossible to locate an unoccupied site in the Santa area that would
allow the development of an estate of adequate size.
After the founding of the United Republic of Cameroon in 1972,
there were no new developments in local tea production until 1977
when the CDC gained a monopoly on production in the country. It
was asked by the government to take over and run the Ndu Estate
and to set up a new tea estate at Djuttitsa near Dschang. The EAC
had been forced to sell its estate to the government at the end of
1976 as a result of managerial, financial and marketing problems as
well as serious labour unrest (see Chapter 9).
Understandably, government calls on the CDC to set up a tea
estate at Djuttitsa were widely seen as problematic. First of all,
many observers were puzzled as to why the government had decided
to grant the CDC a vast land concession (1,660 ha) for tea production
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in an area that was so densely populated (250 inhabitants per km2
in 1976) and vitally important to national food and coffee
production. Few believed that the wage employment created in the
area would compensate the local peasantry for the loss of their
lucrative farming activities. Secondly, the profitability of  the new
estate was seriously in question because of the continuing high
production costs and relatively low productivity on the Cameroonian
tea estates. And thirdly, the new estate was going to be set up at a
time when the Tole and Ndu Estates were facing major marketing
problems (Njike 1983; Konings 1986b). The Djuttitsa tea project
was still implemented, however, with the assistance of some of the
international financiers in the CAMDEV II programme, the
corporation’s second long-term development programme (1978-
1982), in particular COMDEV, FED and the CCCE. The
construction costs for the estate and factory were estimated at FCFA
3.272 billion. The project was completed in 1985/86 with a total
area planted of 444 ha. At that time, the CDC management was
still planning to expand tea production, subject to good market
prospects, and undertook tea trials in the Santa and Nkambe areas
of the Bamenda Grassfields to this end.
This brief historical review of tea production in Cameroon shows
that tea has remained a relatively minor crop. In the 1990s total
annual output of tea varied between 3,000 and 4,000 tonnes (see
Table 2.1) but this accounted for only a tiny proportion of  total
domestic cash-crop production (Table 2.2). Other African tea-
producing countries, like Kenya and Malawi, have always produced
considerably larger quantities of  tea (Table 2.3) and also have well-
established smallholder schemes. For example, there were no fewer
than 199,535 smallholder outgrowers of tea in Kenya in June 1984
who were cultivating 56,173 ha of tea (Betz 1989).
There used to be only two tea smallholders in Cameroon, both
of  whom delivered their produce to the Tole Estate. The first was
Mr Lyonga, a Bakweri, who was a former senior CDC staff  member.
In 1975 he set up a two-hectare experimental tea plantation at
Likomba, a village about 12 km from the Tole Estate, gradually
expanding his farm to 25 ha without any technical assistance from
the CDC. He employed 35 labourers and had an average annual
output of 36 tonnes, which gave him a gross annual income of
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FCFA 7.5 million in 1987. The second was Mr Bame, a Ngemba
from the Bamenda Grassfields, who had previously been a senior
overseer at the Tole Estate. In 1981 he established a one-hectare
experimental tea farm at Buganju Bush, a village close to the Tole
Estate, and planned to expand it to 5 ha. He began harvesting in
October 1986 and sold 65 kg of  tea to the Tole Estate between
then and January 1987.
The lack of interest in smallholder tea production in Cameroon
can easily be explained by the fact that it has never received very
much assistance from the government or the CDC. In addition, tea
is in competition with the long-established food and cash crops in
the region and is a labour-intensive crop that requires substantial
capital inputs. CDC managerial staff  once claimed that an
investment of  more than FCFA 1 million was necessary to produce
one hectare of tea.
Table 2.2 Cash-crop production in Cameroon, 1985/86
Source: Ngu (1989: 125).
 
CROP 
 
CULTIVATED 
AREA 
(Ha) 
 
 
OUTPUT 
(Metric 
 tonnes) 
 
Cocoa 426,120 118,320 
Coffee 341,045 97,152 
Cotton 89,232 115,544 
Bananas 3,410 74,000 
Palm Oil 68,939 91,000 
Rubber  18,469 
Tea 960 2,114 
Tobacco  2,262 
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Table 2.3 Tea production in selected countries, 1983
Source: Rote (1986: 154).
A significant recent development has been that a member of the
Anglophone elite started investing in large-scale tea production in
the first few years of the new millennium. Alhadji Baba Ahmadou
Danpullo, a Mbororo-Fulani business tycoon, has since created a 4,000
ha tea estate – the so-called Ndawara Highland Tea Estate – and a
modern tea factory in the Boyo Division of  the North West Province.
This privately owned tea estate has led to a massive land expropriation
of  local peasants and Mbororo-Fulani graziers. Following the
privatisation of the CDC tea estates in 2002, the Ndawara Highland
Tea Estate became part of  the Cameroon Tea Estates headed by
Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo (see Chapter 10).
Tea Marketing in Cameroon
The bulk of  Cameroonian tea used to be sold on the London Tea
Exchange, with the remainder being sold locally or in Nigeria. In
1966, the CDC decided to sell as much tea as possible in Cameroon
and in the neighbouring Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique
Centrale (UDEAC) countries after an UDEAC agreement placed heavy
duty (60%) on all imports from countries outside the UDEAC zone.
The Muslim areas of northern Cameroon and the Muslim nation of
Chad consumed most of  Cameroon’s tea. In sharp contrast to the
 
COUNTRY 
 
 
OUTPUT 
(Metric tonnes) 
 
India 587,800 
Sri Lanka 179,300 
Indones ia 92,600 
Kenya 119,700 
Uganda 3,200 
Tanzania 15,600 
Malawi 32,000 
Japan 102,700 
Turkey 70,000 
USSR 143,000 
Argentina 37,000 
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CDC, the EAC, which also owned tea estates in India and Sri Lanka,
continued selling most of the Ndu tea on the world market. Having
been rated on several occasions as one of the best teas in the world,
Ndu tea had no difficulty finding buyers on the world market.
The EAC was forced to review its marketing policy in the early
1970s. One reason for this was the drop in tea prices on the world
market, which had been stable since the end of  the 1950s. It was
not until 1975/76 that tea prices on the world market began
increasing steadily to a level where they were extremely favourable
between 1979 and 1984 (Cowen 1986: 373-274). A second reason
was the almost doubling of production costs owing to huge increases
in the costs of labour, fertilizer and oil. As a consequence, Ndu tea
was no longer competitive on the world market and these adverse
economic conditions led the EAC management to concentrate on
the same markets as the Tole Estate.
Unfortunately, a growing gap started to emerge between supply
and domestic/regional demand. The market in Cameroon was unable
to absorb the increasing output from the Tole and Ndu Estates,
and the market in Chad was often inaccessible. Chad’s early
withdrawal from the 1966 UDEAC agreement and its subsequent
lengthy civil war made tea imports from Cameroon difficult, at least
those through formal trading channels. Both the Ndu and Tole
Estates were thus regularly saddled with large stocks of unsold tea,
which led one of  the EAC directors to lament in 1974:
We have large unsold stocks in the warehouses. The company is
now having to cut deep into its prices to continue the outflow of
tea to its main markets. Tea is the only commodity in the world
market today which fetches a 14% lower price than it did in 1970
and the cost of production has at least doubled, while the world
production has continued to increase their depressing price levels.10
And, the 1983 CDC Annual Report noted: ‘The tea market was
stagnant (and the year ended with a stock of 523 tonnes) as a result
of the war in Chad’.
From 1986/87 onwards, there was a deepening crisis in the
Cameroonian economy that brought the CDC to the verge of
collapse and badly affected its tea trade. The sharp fall in commodity
prices and the rapid slide in the value of the US dollar against the
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CFA franc were largely responsible for this (Konings 1996a). As a
result, Cameroon, which had registered a phenomenal growth rate
of  7% in its GDP until 1986, was forced to adopt a structural
adjustment programme (SAP) in 1988. The CDC’s net loss rose
from FCFA 3.853 billion in 1987/88 to FCFA 4.685 billion in 1988/
89.11 Tea had formerly sold at FCFA 1,500 per kg but its price
dropped to FCFA 625 in 1987, far below the cost of  production.
While the 40% rise in the value of  the CFA franc against the US
dollar made locally produced tea  even less competitive on the world
market, the post-colonial state’s apparent lack of  control over cheap
tea imports from East Africa created problems for its domestic
market.12 In 1987 the corporation had about 1,000 tonnes of unsold
tea in stock.
In line with the structural adjustment programme, the
government was no longer inclined to render financial assistance to
its ailing agro-industrial parastatals (Konings 1996a, 2011a). On
the contrary, in 1989 it asked the CDC management to sign a
Contract Plan that would force the corporation to meet certain
efficiency standards and be self-supporting and profit-making.13
Since then a series of measures have been taken by the CDC
management to improve the corporation’s marketing position. These
include:
• raising labour productivity, by increasing task work,
intensifying managerial control over the labour process and
introducing technically advanced farming techniques;
• lowering production costs by cutting workers’ wages and
fringe benefits and switching from costly oil/gas to
firewood supplied by the corporation’s own fuel
plantations;
• reducing marketing costs and promoting sales and using
larger chests rather than small packets and frequent
advertising campaigns.
These steps, together with a ban on cheap imports, have helped to
stimulate local tea sales and many government institutions now
regularly order local tea. However, most of the tea is bought by
large Muslim traders from northern Cameroon who smuggle it into
Chad and Nigeria.
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The government, which is highly dependent on French support
and aid, managed to obtain a FCFA 7 billion low-interest loan from
the CCCE for the ailing company in June 1992 on condition that
the corporation reorganised the tea sector and improved its
marketing of tea. In late 1992 an agreement between the CDC and
COMDEV was announced that transferred the management of the
three tea estates to COMDEV for a ten-year period. COMDEV
would run the tea sector as an autonomous enterprise and pay
royalties of  FCFA 80 per kg for any tea sold.14 However in the end,
the government refused to ratify this agreement for political
reasons.15
From 1992 onwards, persistent rumours circulated in Anglophone
Cameroon that the government was about to either sell, shut down
or privatise the CDC. While World Bank sources confirmed that
external financiers were putting pressure on the government to do
so, the government continued to deny the rumours (Konings 1996b).
However, the government issued a decree on 15 July 1994
announcing the privatisation or liquidation of a first batch of 15
public enterprises, particularly in the transport and agro-industrial
sectors. The CDC was one of  the most conspicuous victims of  this
decree and the announcement of its privatisation caused commotion
among Anglophones as they perceived this enterprise as the ‘lifeline’
and ‘pride’ of their region (Konings 2009a, 2011a, 2011b).
Widespread civil-society protest in Anglophone Cameroon was one
the principal factors responsible for the continued postponement
of the privatisation of the whole or parts of the enterprise and it
was not until October 2002 that the government finally sold the
CDC tea estates to a South African consortium, Brobon Finex PTY
Ltd. The estates were then renamed the Cameroon Tea Estates
(CTE). This privatisation exercise seems not to have brought about
the expected increase in tea production and sales due to blatant
mismanagement and an unprecedented degree of labour protest
against intensified managerial control and exploitation in the labour
process (see Chapter 10).
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Part I
The Tole Tea Estate
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3
Female workers
Introduction
The construction of  the Tole Estate in 1954 marked a turning point
in the history of the CDC. It was the first estate to produce tea.
And even more important, it was the first estate to recruit
predominantly female labour. Although female employment was no
new phenomenon on its estates, estate work had remained virtually
a male preserve. In this chapter I shall address the following issues:
(i) Why did the management prefer female labour to male labour on
the estate? (ii) Which category of women tended to sell its labour
power to the management? (iii) What was the management’s
remuneration for the women’s work? And (iv) how did the female
workers cope with their ongoing productive and reproductive roles
at home?
Managerial option for female pluckers
In 1952, just two years before the redevelopment of  the Tole Estate,
Phyllis Kaberry published her classic study Women of  the Grassfields.
Though focused on the Bamenda Grassfields, her findings seem
largely applicable to the present South West Province as well.
Throughout her book she emphasises the contradictory position of
women in society.
On the one hand, there is the general recognition that women
play an indispensable role in society as child bearers and food
producers. Women are themselves fully aware that they are in some
ways the ‘backbone of the country’. They take great pride in their
skill and competence as farmers as well as their responsibility for
feeding and caring for the household. Men are often the object of
derision, being referred to as incompetent, even worthless, unable
to care for themselves and too irresponsible to take care of their
children. One of the women told Kaberry:
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A woman is an important thing. A man is a worthless thing indeed,
because a woman gives birth to the people of  the country. What
work can a man do? A woman bears a child, then takes a hoe, goes
to the field, and is working there; she feeds the child (with the work)
there. A man only buys palm oil. Men only build houses (Kaberry:
1952: 150).
The men did not hesitate to confirm women’s vital role in society.
One day Kaberry questioned the chief of Nso about the rationale
for the following customs: the existence of a ‘cry-die’ of four days
for a woman and only three for a man; the planting of four cocoyams
at the birth of  a girl and only three for that of  a boy. The chief
answered:
A woman is a person who gives birth to a person. Women are very
important people. Women are like God because they give birth to
the people (Kaberry 1952: 150).
In contrast to all this, women also appeared to be subordinated to
patriarchal dominance. Kaberry found that women exercised
considerable freedom in the management of land and the crops
which they produced, but they did not own the fields (see also
Goheen 1993, 1996). They were normally accorded access to land
and other means of production in order to fulfil the economic roles
expected of them, but this access was conditional and could be
withdrawn. Their access to land depended on their acceptance of
the feminine roles and labour obligations assigned to them by the
male household heads. If  a wife persisted in efforts to leave her
husband, she would be stripped of  her land rights in the husband’s
village and forced to separate from her children. Although women’s
productive and reproductive roles were of vital importance to the
family and to society at large, they were expected to obey male
orders and to accept male decisions. When questioned on this matter
by Kaberry, the councillors of  the chief  of  Nso replied:
Yes, a woman is like God, and like God she cannot speak. She
must be silently. It is good that she should only accept (Kaberry
1952: 152).
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Of course, this does not mean that women were without power
individually and collectively to resist male abuse of  power. For
example, women’s control over the household food supply
demonstrated men’s day-to-day dependence on the women’s work
and good nature.
These contradictions in women’s position may not be as puzzling
as they appear at first sight. Control over women’s vital productive
and reproductive labour constituted the basis of  men’s prestige,
power and wealth in society. Goheen (1993) writes in this regard:
Women grew the food crops and were expected to provide the
necessities of  daily life from their farms. Women’s productive labour
freed men to participate in (lucrative) trading networks; their
reproductive labour increased the size of the household and thus
the status and the labour force of the male head. Any surplus value
women produced over and above that required for household needs
and petty barter was in the hands of  men, who retained the profits.
It is therefore not surprising that with the introduction of the
capitalist system men tended to strongly resist female migration
and employment. They tried instead to intensify the exploitation of
female labour by seeking women’s assistance in local cash crop
production (Bukh 1979).
Despite the existence of strict patriarchal controls over female
labour, the Tole Estate management decided to recruit female
pluckers in 1958 when a number of the tea bushes planted had
reached maturity. There are a number of  factors that appear to have
influenced managerial decision:
(1)The then expatriate managers were hardly familiar with
gender roles and relations in Africa. However, they were
often acquainted with, and had been employed on, tea
estates in India and Sri Lanka, where plucking was done
mainly by women. If women in Assam were plucking tea,
why could women in Cameroon not do so?
(2) Due to the high employment rate of women on tea estates
in Asian countries and elsewhere, tea plucking had to a
large extent come to be identified as ‘women’s work’.
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(3) On the basis of the Asian experience, there was a general
belief in international management circles that female
pluckers tended to be not only cheaper, but also more
productive and more subservient than male pluckers
(Kurian 1982; Elson & Pearson 1984; Heyzer 1986). The
idea of  enjoying these benefits on the Tole Estate must
have been particularly attractive to management.
(4) At the time the Tole Estate was opened, there were already
some women working on the CDC estates, usually on a
casual or seasonal basis. These were mostly the wives of
estate workers and women from the surrounding villages.
(5) And finally, the management was confronted by a serious
shortage of male labour on the plantations during the 1950s
due to the spread of local coffee and cocoa production.
This gave the impetus to a larger recruitment drive among
women (Gwan 1975: 178). In 1957 it was reported that
the rapid changeover from subsistence farming to cash crop
farming in the banana areas of  Victoria and Kumba, and the
coffee areas of Bamenda Province, has affected the labour
market. Workers from these areas who previously sought
wage-earning employment on plantations now work for
themselves or their families .... An increasing number of
women are taking up light employment of an agricultural
nature. And for them the main centre at the moment is the
Tole Tea Estate which employs some 400 women in light
weeding, pruning and plucking.1
Not unexpectedly, managerial efforts to recruit an adequate supply
of female labour proved rather disappointing for a considerable time
(see below). Gradually, however, the number of  women who were
willing to work on the estates increased. Evidently, this was because
plantation labour was one of the rare jobs opportunities in the
capitalist sector for illiterate and lowly educated women eager to escape
the ‘back-breaking’ work and patriarchal controls in the local
communities (Obbo 1980).
The estate labour force rose steadily up to the mid-1980s, when
the economic crisis gave rise to mass layoffs (see Table 3.1). In
1988 the estate employed 1,604 permanent workers, 63% of  them
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being female workers. Table 3.2 shows that female workers are
concentrated almost entirely in the field; only a small minority are
employed in the tea factory as sorters and packers, in the child care
centre, clinic or office. A clear division exists between the
predominantly illiterate female pluckers and the educated female
office workers and nurses. The latter tend to look down upon the
pluckers and treat them rudely when they visit the office or clinic.
This is a continuing source of conflict.
Ethnic/regional origin of female workers
The Tole Estate is located practically at the heart of  the Bakweri
area. Apparently, managerial recruitment efforts among the Bakweri
women initially yielded poor results. Like the men in the Bamenda
Grassfields, Bakweri men tended to oppose
their wives’ violation of the African tradition (by abandoning food
production) and they consider it to be humiliating when their wives
earn more money than they themselves (for it tends to make them
more autonomous and more disobedient) (De Vega 1971: 85).
Unlike the men in the Bamenda Grassfields, Bakweri men also had
some more specific reasons for resisting women’s employment on
the estate. Plantation production had had some devastating effects
on Bakweri society. It had caused the loss of  most of  its lands.
From the time it was seized, the Bakweri have been protesting in
various ways against this expropriation and agitating for the return
of their lands (Courade 1981/82); Konings 2011a and b). Bakweri
men are therefore most reluctant to sell their labour power to the
expropriators of their ancestral lands or to allow their wives to work
on the estate. In addition, plantation labour had caused a tremendous
increase in divorce rates. Bakweri women tended to divorce their
poor husbands and marry or cohabitate with the more affluent
migrant workers (Ardener 1962). It is hence not hard to understand
why Bakweri men tried to prevent their wives from working on the
estate: a wage income would enable their wives to repay the
bridewealth and lead inevitably to an increase in divorce rates!
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Bakweri women themselves, too, often demonstrated little
interest in working on the estate, because they and their husbands
were benefiting in one way or another from the adjacency of the
estate. Some of them were letting rooms and renting out land, or
selling food and drink to the estate workers. Others were illegally
squatting on the estate’s uncultivated lands. And still others were
pilfering tea and firewood from the estate.
Table 3.1 Tole Tea Estate labour force, 1965/66-1990/91
______________________________________________________________
YEAR                                         NUMBER OF WORKERS
______________________________________________________________
1965/66                                                            790
1968/69                                                            778
1974/75                                                         1,129
1975/76                                                         1,329
1976/77                                                         1,232
1977/78                                                         1,106
1980/81                                                         1,415
1981/82                                                         1,315
1884/85                                                         1,639
1985/86                                                         1,526
1986/87                                                         1,546
1987/88                                                         1,578
1988/89                                                         1,276
1989/90                                                         1,217
1990/91                                                            974
______________________________________________________________
Source: Tole Tea Estate Office.
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Table 3.2 Gender distribution of  workers at the Tole Tea Estate, 1988
Source: Tole Tea Estate Office.
Bakweri women who did seek employment on the estate did so
mostly on a casual basis, especially during the seasonal peaks in tea
production, to obtain some cash. Table 3.3, however, shows that
the number of  women seeking employment on a permanent basis
is rising. During my fieldwork on the estate in 1986, a Bakweri
managerial staff member explained this rising trend as follows:
The Tole Tea Estate management had been able to convince the
people in the neighbouring villages that it was more advantageous
to work permanently on the estate than to steal the estate’s produce
and firewood.2
___________________________________________________________________________
 
SECTION                             MALE  FEMALE  TOTAL LABOUR  
 WORKERS WORKERS  FORCE 
                                ___________     ___________ 
 
                                                 No         %            No             % 
___________________________________________________________________________
 
Office                                   14     64             8   36                         22 
Clinic/Child Care Centre       5     30           12      70                         17 
Workshop/Stores             98        96             5    4                        103 
Building/Maintenance             50      93             4       7                          54 
Factory                                   71   92             6            8                          77 
Field                                    363  27         968        73                    1,331 
___________________________________________________________________________
 
TOTAL                                601    37       1,003     63                    1,604 
___________________________________________________________________________
 
Monthly Paid Workers            82        65.5         43     34.5                    125 
Daily Paid Workers               519    35      960      65                    1,479 
___________________________________________________________________________
 
TOTAL                           601    37   1,003 63                    1,604 
___________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3.3 Regional composition of  the labour force at Tole Tea Estate, 1969
and 1986
Source: De Vega (1971); and Tole Tea Estate Annual Report 1986.
This claim seems to be falsified, however, by managerial reports of
a recent increase in theft by the local population. A more likely
reason for the rise in female employment on the estate is that the
Bakweri men have become less opposed to it during the economic
crisis, as it supplements the family income. They are badly in need
of cash, because the cooperatives are no longer able to pay them
for the delivery of  cash crops due to liquidity problems.
______________________________________________________________________________
REGION                                                1969                                          1986 
                                             ____________________          ________________
                                                      No %   No  %  
______________________________________________________________________________
 
NORTH WEST PROVINCE 
 
Menchum                            215          27                   415      25 
Momo                                               170             21.8          478     29 
Mezam                                                56                7                  134       8 
Donga-Mantung                 39        5                      80              5 
Bui                                                         2                     0.2 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
TOTAL                   482        61.0               1,107    67 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
SOUTH WEST PROVINCE 
 
Fako                 37       5             199      12 
Ndian                      69              9                    134          8 
Manyu          68       8.5             100         6 
Meme              62             7.5            53         3 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
TOTAL               236       30.0               486   29 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
FRANCOPHONE CAMEROON      19        2              27          1 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
OUTSIDE CAMEROON         57          7        56           3 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
GRAND TOTAL         794       100        1,676    100 
_______________________________________________________________________________
0.2
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When first confronted with the problem of procuring an adequate
supply of  local female labour, the Tole Estate management was
forced to recruit mainly Nigerian women. This occurred at a time
when there was widespread resentment to the dominant position
of  Nigerians, especially the Igbo and the Ibibio, in the regional
economy (Kleis 1980; Konings 2005). These strong anti-Nigerian
feelings, together with the government’s subsequent implementation
of  a stringent Cameroonisation policy, forced the large contingent
of Nigerian male workers on the CDC estates to leave. In these
circumstances, the management’s ongoing employment and
recruitment of  Nigerian women was frequently criticised. After being
charged again in 1968 with violating the government
Cameroonisation policy, the management’s defence was as follows:
At Tole Tea a number of  Nigerian women, who formed the core
of tea pluckers, have been working as casual labourers for over
three years. It was then hoped to attract Cameroonian women to
Tole to replace them. This hope did not materialise and a decision
was taken to absorb them permanently with effect from March
1966. There is absolutely no truth whatever in the allegation of
attempts by Nigerian women to prevent the employment of
Cameroonians at Tole Tea Estate. This corporation is now facing a
shortage of  women tea pluckers at Tole. A recent drive to recruit
150 pluckers to cope with the flush period has met with little or no
response.3
From the end of the sixties onwards, however, the contribution of
Nigerian women to estate labour declined drastically as a result of
the increasing flow of women from Anglophone Cameroon to the
estate (see Table 3.3). The 3% of  Nigerian female workers now
remaining consists mainly of women with a long career on the estate.
The present North West Province has ever since been the main
supplier of  female labour to the estate (see Table 3.3). In contrast
to the South West Province, it has a relatively high population
density, virtually lacks ‘modern sector’ employment, and can boast
a long tradition of predominantly female agricultural production.
The employment rate of northwestern women on the estate is
therefore higher than that of southwestern women, and it has risen
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from 61% in 1969 to 67% in 1986 (see Table 3.3). The majority of
northwestern female workers on the estate hail from two divisions,
the Momo and Menchum Divisions. These are relatively inaccessible
areas where Fulani cattle grazing and male coffee planting have
threatened women’s access to land for food production and have
increased their work load (Fisiy 1992).
It is noteworthy that ethnicity has never been an issue of
protracted, overt conflict among female or male workers. One
reason for this remarkable phenomenon, which seems to be
characteristic of all CDC estates (Konings 1993), is the persistent
policy of the CDC management, as well as of church and union
leaders, to mobilise and organise workers on a multi-ethnic basis.
This policy has evidently created a certain measure of understanding
for one another’s socio-cultural background and fostered bonds of
companionship and friendship. A second reason is the generalised
use of Pidgin English, which helps overcome any barriers of
communication. A third reason is that the workers themselves
express a clear preference for ethnically mixed living and working
arrangements (see also Ardener et al. 1960; DeLancey 1973; and
Kofele-Kale 1981). During my fieldwork the majority of workers
expressed the belief that frequent contact with people from other
ethnic groups and cultures might broaden their horizons and enrich
their lives. Some workers also claimed that there would be fewer
disputes and less competition and jealousy on ethnically mixed
estates than in living quarters based on ethnic affiliation, and less
fear of witchcraft. The most important reason, however, would
appear to be their sharing of similar living and working conditions
on the estate, which is a classic example of an ‘occupational
community’.
Although workers of different ethnic origins usually get on well
on the estate, ethnic consciousness and organisation has by no
means disappeared. Workers from the same village and region
continue to maintain particularly close ties and to organise on ethnic
basis for recreational and saving purposes and for mutual assistance.
Mixed marriages are still rare on the estate (2%). Ethnic rivalry
arises occasionally in suspicion of favouritism in hiring or promotion
or in disagreements with foremen and co-workers.
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Case no. 3.1 A complaint of  ethnic favouritism in employment
in 1986
Mr Johnson Bituaka is a native of Ndop in Mezam Division. He
was employed as a watchman at the tea factory. After he and two
of his colleagues at the factory had lodged a complaint with the
Labour Office at Buea concerning their conditions of  service, Bituaka
was punished by the Acting Estate Manager, Mr V.K. Ngha, a man
from Wum, and transferred to the field as a plucker. Interestingly,
his colleagues, both hailing from Wum, were not transferred.
His former post was given by Mr Ngha to another Wum man. This
man was later arrested for stealing tea from the factory. Mr Ngah
then assisted his Wum brethren in raising money with a view to
hiring the services of  a lawyer for the thief ’s defence.
Bituaka alleged that Mr Nga had recently (i) locked out all the pluckers
who had arrived at work late, except those from his own region,
and (ii) promoted one of his tribesmen to the post of Assistant
Overseer, even though the other candidates were more senior and
more qualified.4
Case no. 3.2 A complaint of  the stirring up of  ethnic
sentiments by the trade union
In November 1967 the Tole Tea Estate was in a ‘state of  confusion’
after two Banyang men, Mr Emmanuel Ojong (Chief Staff Nurse)
and Mr Philip Bissong (Office Clerk) had ‘betrayed’ the workers.
They were accused of having reported to the police that some people
in the camp were selling wine without a licence. The union secretary,
Mr Aloysius Niba, appeared to have said that consequently all the
Banyang working on the estate should be transferred.5
Demographic characteristics of female workers
The female workers exhibit a number of  distinct features (see Table
3.4). They tend to be relatively old: 60% of the women are above
35 years of age. Most of them are illiterate (78%). As older women,
they never had the opportunity to benefit from the enormous
expansion of educational facilities for women following
independence and reunification (Clignet 1976; Cooksey 1982).
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Table 3.4 Demographic characteristics of  Tole Tea women in 1986 (percentages)
Source: Konings, P., Survey among Tole Tea Women, 1986.
AGE 15-25 years 7.5 
 25-35 years 32.5 
 35-45 years 41.0 
 45-55 years 17.0 
 55 years and older 2.0 
  ____ 
  100.0 
   
MARITAL STATUS never married 9 
 married 32 
 widowed 27 
 divorced/separated 25   
 free union 7 
  ___ 
  100   
   
NUMBER OF CHILDREN none 5.5 
 one 8.0 
 two 9.5 
 three 16.0   
 four 19.5 
 five 17.0  
 six 11.0 
 seven 9.0 
 above 7 4.5 
  ____ 
  100.0 
   
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL illiterate 78.0 
 primary education 20.5 
 post-primary education 1.5 
  ____ 
  100.0 
   
RELIGION Presbyterian 46 
 Roman Catholic 38 
 Baptist 6 
 Independent churches/sects      4 
 African beliefs 6 
  ___ 
  100 
   
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT 0- 5 years 17.0 
 5-10 years 19.5 
 10-15 years 39.0 
 15-25 years 19.5 
 25 years and above 5.0 
  _____ 
  100.0 
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Many female workers are unmarried (68%). A minority has never
been married and the remainder is either divorced/separated,
widowed, or residing in ‘free unions’. Even some of the married
female workers live on their own, their husbands living elsewhere.
Interestingly, most of  the non-married women did not preclude the
possibility of marrying (again) in the future. Only a few women
said that they preferred to live without a man or to engage in ‘free
unions’, even though many ‘had experienced untold hardships and
sufferings during marriage’. While female workers tend to be
unmarried, they are still likely to be heads of households with
children to support. Only 5.5% of all the women, married and
unmarried, claimed to be childless: 53% of the women had between
one and four children, 41.5% had more than four children. Children
continue to be a source of pride, prestige, labour, and socio-economic
security in old age. Childlessness is a disaster, often leading to a
divorce, and is often attributed to witchcraft.
Female workers tend to be committed to work: 63.5% have been
employed on the estate for more than 10 years. This supports Safa’s
thesis (1979: 447-448) that women, who are heads of households,
are likely to develop a strong commitment to their work role and to
become highly stabilised.
Above all, the vast majority of the women are Christian (94%).
The remaining 6% claimed to still adhere to the religion of their
ancestors. In practice, of  course, this distinction between ‘Christian’
and ‘pagan’ is overdrawn, for most women are still strongly rooted in
local religious belief  systems. Allegations of  witchcraft are still rife in
the camps. Some women are suspected of  being witches; others are
well-known ‘witch-doctors’ or ‘spiritual leaders’ trying to eradicate
witchcraft from the camps. One of  the most renowned spiritual leaders
in the camps is Mrs Magdalene Mondoa, who is called ‘Madam Jesus’.
She claims that God has given her several visions as well as the
power to detect and destroy witchcraft. She acquired a national
reputation in 1985/86 when she was invited twice to Yaoundé to
advise President Biya.6 Unlike male workers, female workers tend
to join Christian associations. These appeal to women because they
render religious and material support to women in need and distress
and create leadership positions for women. The absence of any
Muslim women in the estate labour force must be attributed to their
seclusion (Pittin 1991).
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These features present us with a clear picture of the kind of
women likely to be employed on African plantations (Stichter 1985;
Bujra 1983, 1986): illiterate, Christian, and ‘husbandless’ (cf.
Bryceson 1980: 23). While they usually enter the labour market at a
later stage in their life-cycle, especially after getting divorced or
widowed, they tend to demonstrate a strong commitment to their
job during their working career, being responsible as household heads
for the upkeep of  families.
The managerial decision to engage female employment on the
estates enables these women to escape from patriarchal controls
and find an alternative means of  survival. In societies where land is
still overwhelmingly controlled by men, marriage is one of the most
important avenues for women to obtain relatively secure usufruct
rights (Davison 1988). Dissolution of a marriage, whether through
death or divorce, therefore creates a crisis in a woman’s existence.
It deprives her of her right to land, thus endangering her means of
survival.
In most local communities in Cameroon, a widow was previously
inherited by her deceased husband’s heir. If  she accepted him as
her new husband, she continued to enjoy her previous land rights.
If  she refused, she was normally forced to leave the compound of
her family-in-law, though an exception was usually made for widows
who had passed child-bearing age (Guyer 1985). This situation
prevailed until 1966, when a new marriage law was enacted which
denied any claims of the heir to the widow and her ‘property’
(Melone 1971). A widow is now legally free to decide what she
wants to do after her husband’s death. The new law has fostered a
steady increase in the number of widows who refuse to marry the
heir. If  they decide to leave, they lose any land rights and can no
longer expect help from their families-in-law. They are then obliged
to either request land from their own families or look for alternative
means of  survival.
Divorcees also form a vulnerable group in society. During the
pre-colonial and colonial period there was an inseparable link in
many ethnic groups between divorce and the repayment of the
bridewealth. In 1964, however, a change in the existing legislation
made getting a divorce no longer conditional upon repayment of
bridewealth. Nevertheless, receivers of bridewealth can still be sued
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for (partial) repayment. Consequently, the family continues to bring
strong pressures to bear upon a woman who is determined to divorce
her husband. Divorcees may be deprived of access to land and are
often compelled to migrate to avoid family claims and secure an
income of their own.
Young, single women are usually expected to work as unpaid
labour on the family farms. However, they might be given the use
of some land by the family head or her mother to acquire some
income.
The majority of the divorcees and widows on the estate told me
that they had decided to migrate and seek wage employment because
of an unsatisfactory marriage, lack of family support, conflicts over
land following the dissolution of their marriage, insufficient land
and income to feed themselves and their children, and accusations
of witchcraft. Some young, educated female workers, however, said
that they simply refused to accept their ‘traditional’ role of
dependents performing unpaid family labour and preferred instead
to build up an autonomous existence.
Case no. 3.3 A young, single female worker
Rose is 27 years old and originates from Momo Division. Soon
after completing her primary education, she had two children from
two different men. Both of  them refused to marry her. Her mother
gave her some land, but she did not derive sufficient income from
her farm to feed herself  and her children. She then decided to migrate
to Limbe. Unfortunately, she could not find any suitable job there
and prostitution was her principal means of  survival for about two
years. She was quite happy to later be offered a job as a plucker on
the estate.
Case no. 3.4 A divorced female worker
Mary is 43 years old and hails from Manyu Division. She suffered a
lot during her married life. Her husband was constantly drunk and
bluntly refused to contribute to household expenses. He even forced
her to hand over part of  her small income from petty trading. When
she had the nerve to complain, he beat her severely. After 15 years
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of miserable married life, she could no longer endure the situation
and decided to leave him. One of her friends took her along to the
estate, where she was given a job as a plucker.
Case no. 3.5 A widowed female worker
Priscillia is 47 years old and comes from Menchum Division. After
the death of her husband she decided to stay on with her family-in-
law. However, she soon came into conflict with her in-laws about
the land she cultivated. Her relationship with the in-laws deteriorated
further when one of her brothers-in-law fell seriously ill. She was
then accused of having bewitched him and was forced to leave the
compound. She called upon one of  her brothers in the South West
Province who was employed at the CDC banana estate at Ekona.
Her brother managed to get her employed at the neighbouring Tole
Tea Estate.
There are also a number of female workers on the estate who deserted
their husbands without obtaining a divorce. Their husbands have
often tried to reassert control over them by getting them dismissed
from the estate:
I am the husband of  Martha Ashu and the head of  the family. I
wish that the services of  my wife with the estate will be terminated
with immediate effect. My reason of writing this letter has resulted
from domestic matters which I do not want to reveal to you.7
Some of the husbands even appealed to the local administrators
for assistance in the dismissal of  their wives. In response to one of
these appeals in 1976, the Divisional Officer of Buea demanded
the termination of  the employment contracts of  Mrs Elisabeth
Abibang and Mrs Prisca Ecumuwan, both of them pluckers at the
Tole Estate:
I have received a complaint from the husbands of above named
ladies that they absconded their marital homes and fled to your
estate and took refuge under your employ. It is to be noted that
these are married women with children. They have left their children
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and husbands to be suffering without any cogent reasons. In these
circumstances, therefore, I am hereby soliciting your usual co-
operation to cause the appointment of  these ladies terminated
forthwith and they be asked to report to my office on the 16th of
August 1976 without the least delay. Failure to report to my office
on the above mentioned date, a warrant of arrest will be used against
them. As a guide line, I will wish to suggest to you that before any
lady is employed on your estate, she must first of all produce a
genuine duly signed divorce certificate that she is not a married lady.
This is a cardinal point which has to be taken into consideration for
the employment of women on your estate so as to bring a stop to
unpleasant situations of this nature.8
The Provincial Delegate of Labour, however, rejected this demand
on the grounds that it had no backing in law and instead advised
the husbands to refer the matter to the law courts.9
There are also a few female workers who divorced their husbands
during their working career on the estate. They became estranged
from their husbands, who were employed elsewhere. Of late this has
become an urgent problem: management’s frequent transfers of
workers during the present economic crisis have separated many legal
spouses. The estate manager claimed this was often the unintended
consequence of the fact that the female workers had either not
properly informed the corporation of  their marital status or had signed
a contract with the corporation using their maiden names.10
The position and social status of the unmarried female workers
differs from those of  the married female workers. Unmarried female
workers tend to be relatively free from customary patriarchal
controls, but they are still held in low regard, being labelled as ‘loose
women’ or ‘prostitutes’. Married female workers, on the other hand,
who form a minority among the female labour force on the estate
(32%), are more respected, yet they are subjected to considerable
male controls. These controls may be manifest in ‘old’ and ‘new’
forms on the estate. First, there is the persistent fear among husbands
that wage employment will make their wives too ‘headstrong’ or
independent. Deep conflicts may arise when the wife earns more
than the husband. Secondly, there is a marked tendency towards
reduction of household responsibility by husbands, who insist that
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according to African ‘tradition’ women are responsible for the
maintenance of  the family (Stichter 1985: 148). And thirdly, there
are still some husbands who claim that they are entitled to their
wives’ wage income. Men originating from the Bamenda Grassfields
in particular maintain this claim. Kaberry (1952: 146) had already
mentioned the husbands’ appropriation of their wives’ cash earnings
as an important strategy of  establishing male control over women:
Women can keep small sums of  money, but the question of  rights
to money becomes crucial when larger sums are at stake – Bamenda
men insist on the husband’s rights to cash earnings.
These husbands may afterwards return part of the money to their
wives for household expenses.
The unmarried female workers also tend to maintain fewer links
with their birthplace than married female workers. Obviously, their
escape from patriarchal controls impedes their access to land and
their contacts with their kin in their birthplace. Their ‘exit-option’
from wage employment is usually not a return to their home town
but rather an often precarious and insecure switch to petty trade in
the urban centres. However, I observed during my fieldwork that
married female workers are also hardly able to keep up intensive
contact with their family members. Geographical distance and a
six-day working week are serious obstacles to regular
communication. Most female workers visit their home towns only
during the annual leave period, or on special occasions such as the
funerals of close kin. Some regularly remit a certain sum of money
for the upkeep of their parents and any children of their own whom
they have left behind in the home town to learn the local language
and customs (a considerable number of children in the camps do
not master any language but Pidgin English), and for the
development of  the home area. And finally, it may also happen that
they take a young daughter of one of their relatives along to the
estate to look after their small children and help in the household
(see below).
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Remuneration of female workers
Most studies of  wages and conditions of  service in the plantation
sector agree that remuneration of field workers for their arduous
labour is abysmally low. In her book on plantation labour in Africa
in general and Zimbabwe in particular, Loewenson (1992: VIII)
expresses her bewilderment at the paradox of  modern plantation
agriculture, namely the coexistence of ‘corporate wealth and labour
squalor’:
Driving through plantations, it is easy to be impressed by the visible
signs of efficient production. Hillsides are lined with precise rows
and crops are robust and abundant. Large-scale production seems
a model of agricultural development. But is it? Hidden from the
casual view are the conditions of  the real producers, the farm
labourers. At what cost to workers does this ‘efficient’ production
take place? Where does malnutrition, ill health and social poverty
feature in the balance sheets of plantation production?
This general picture of low remuneration and poverty applies to a
large extent to female workers on the estate as well. However, one
should make certain qualifications. First of  all, one should compare
the income of  female pluckers with that of  other low-income groups.
Their income might be more secure (a regular monthly income) and
higher than that of  many petty traders and peasant farmers. In the
mid-1970s, Virginia DeLancey (1978: 11) compared the average
incomes of  wage-earning and non-wage-earning women on the Tole
Estate, the latter of whom are engaged mainly in petty trade and
food farming. She found that the wage-earning women had double
the cash income of the non-wage-earning women: they also had
higher savings levels and, significantly, invested heavily in their
children’s education. Secondly, one should not forget that any wage
employment, however lowly paid it may be, tended to be regarded
as a ‘privilege’ during the economic crisis because of the mounting
unemployment and non-payment of  cash crop farmers.
Female workers initially were paid less than male workers (see
Table 3.5). Apparently, the management wanted to implement the
system of unequal payment for men and women that prevailed on
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Asian tea estates (see above). This was justified on the somewhat
spurious grounds that female workers needed less time (7 hours) to
complete their daily task than male workers (8 hours).11 In 1967,
however, a Federal Labour Code was promulgated which prohibited
employers from paying men and women differently for equal work.
Estate management then introduced equal rates for male and female
workers.
On 15 July 1968, the government issued Decree no. 68/DF/
272. This important decree guaranteed minimum wages for
agricultural and non-agricultural workers throughout the country,
with effect from 1 August 1968; moreover, it established three wage
zones at different levels of wages in the country (Lecaillon &
Germides 1977). A bilateral agreement between the CDC
management and the union, however, preserved a uniform wage
structure on all the CDC estates: wage and salary rates throughout
the corporation were to be those of  Zone II of  the Primary Sector.
Table 3.5 Rates of  pay of  daily rated employees on CDC estates, 1 October 1963
Source: Personnel Circular no. 5, Rates of  Pay – Daily Rated Employees
effective from 1 October 1963, Bota: CDC Personnel Division, 30
November 1963.
______________________________________________
CATEGORY  DAILY WAGE/ 
OF WORKERS                          SALARY (FCFA) 
____________________________________________________________________
 
General labour                                                135 
Female workers                                  118 
Art isan s     
 - Class III                     320 
 - Class II                      450 
 - Class I                        615 
 
Assistant Overseer    
 - male                    198 
 - female                                         171 
 
Headman      
 - male                156 
 - female              130 
 
Timekeepers          173 
Checkers                          145 
____________________________________________________________________
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In 1969, the government installed a tripartite board, the so-called
National Joint Bargaining Board for Collective Agreements and
Wages, which was charged with the responsibility of  drawing up a
standard nationwide classification of occupations and fixing the
minimum wage/salary rates for each of the established categories
of workers (Le Faou 1985: 118). In October 1970 it adopted a
classification of  workers containing 12 categories. Tea pluckers were
put in Category 1. After sustained workers’ protests, however, the
Board was forced to reclassify tea pluckers in Category 2 (see
Chapter 6). In 1971, it fixed minimum wage rates for each of the
established categories of  workers. Consequently, Category-2
workers, like female pluckers, earned in 1985 a basic monthly wage
of  approximately FCFA 25,000-28,000 (see Table 3.6).
Substantial upward and downward deviations from the basic
wage may occur, however. Completion of  the daily task set by the
management entitles a worker to the daily basic wage; non-
completion of the task is punished by pro-rata payment, that is, the
worker is paid below the daily basic wage, the exact amount
depending on the proportion of the task he/she has been able to
complete. In addition, management has introduced a (graduated)
production bonus which rewards the worker for each kilogramme
of  tea leaves plucked above the norm (see Chapter 6).
The two wage sheets presented in Table 3.7 give us an indication
of the incomes of female pluckers in 1986 and 1991. They clearly
show that female pluckers have enjoyed no wage increases during
the period 1986-1991 in spite of a considerable rise in the cost of
living.12 Instead there have been drastic cuts in their income, as a
result of  the corporation’s unprecedented financial crisis.
During the period of crisis, the management regularly appealed to
the workers to make sacrifices for the sake of  the corporation’s survival
and eventual recovery. On 6 January 1990, the union agreed with
management upon the curtailment of certain fringe benefits enjoyed
by the workers (see below) and the introduction of a compulsory
savings scheme.13 As a consequence, workers who earned less than
FCFA 100,000 a month were obliged to contribute 15% of  their
basic wages and seniority bonus to this savings scheme. These
savings were to be refunded in full - though without interest - at the
time the worker permanently left the corporation for whatever reason.
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Table 3.6 Monthly salaries for the primary sector, Zone I, on 1 July 1985 (FCFA)
Source: Eben (n.d.: 36).
Note *: Each category is divided into 6 grades (échelons) which take into
account merit and seniority.
Notably, despite their relatively low – and declining – incomes,
female workers tend to make large voluntary contributions to the
credit union. It is evident from Table 3.7 that some women
transferred not less than a quarter of their gross monthly wages to
the credit union. These are indeed substantial amounts of  money.
Even though women, and especially unmarried women cannot really
afford to extract such huge amounts from their monthly wages, they
still do so in order to cover lump sum expenditures, such as health
care, school fees and clothes.
Previous studies of saving among CDC workers in general and
Tole female workers in particular have also underscored the great
importance these workers attach to saving (Warmington 1958; M.
DeLancey 1977, 1978; and V. DeLancey 1978). As in other CDC
estates, there is a large variety of  savings institutions on the Tole
Estate.
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
CATE-                                                                        GRADE (ÉCHELON)* 
GORY   _____________________________________________________________________
              A   B   C             D           E               F 
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
I           24,069        24,369       24,681        24,984     25,289        25,594 
II            25,526        25,911     26,668     27,199     27,741      28,278 
III           27,659         29,380     30,476     31,832     33,182       34,538 
IV          32,781       37,617      42,465       47,245        52,160       57,002 
V          54,025       58,760       63,489          69,534      72,947        77,664 
VI          74,973     79,535      84,099      88,660      93,229        97,792     
VII         80,822           86,207       91,602      96,987     102,371    107,767  
VIII      107,767      119,899   132,005  144,127     156,255      168,371 
IX       159,483        170,956   182,457   193,935  205,414        215,909 
X         178,454     193,145   207,847   222,538   237,240        251,931 
XI         251,931     264,520   277,124    289,723  302,317      314,917 
XII       314,917       327,516   340,110    352,698      365,303     377,902 
_____________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3.7 Monthly wages of  two tea pluckers at the Tole Tea Estate in 1986
and 1991 (FCFA)
First of all there are several kinds of ‘meetings’, of which the
‘country’ meeting, the neighbourhood meeting and the meeting of
friends are the most popular. These meetings consist of  group of
workers either of  the same sex or of  both sexes. The members elect
a president, a treasurer and a secretary each year. They meet at least
once a month, often on the first Sunday after ‘pay day’. The meetings
usually start with a discussion of current matters of importance to
the group and end with purely social activity. In most cases an
_____________________________________________________________________________
                                                            1986      1991 
_________________________________________________________________
 
Category                             2E                  2E 
Hourly Wage Rate            114.01              114.01 
Hours  Worked                         192               189 
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
Normal Wage                   21,890             21,548 
Public Holiday                           1,824                           917 
Overtime (150%)                                        1,757 
Bonus/Allowance (Plucking Bonus)      2,800              2,040 
Seniority Bonus                                    3,589                 3,583 
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
Gross Taxable Wag es       30,979             29,990 
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
Pension Fund              919                               839 
Compu lsory Savings                3,955 
T.P.S. PAYE Tax                       762               714 
Surtax                            257                      250 
Council Tax                              88                   164 
Land Bank Tax                            1,615                     799 
Union Check-off                                 210                         215 
Car/Motor/Bicycle Allowance                       2,800 
Contribut ion for Palm Oil           3,730 
Hospital Maintenance Fees                  1,680 
Credit Union                            7,085            8,400 
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
Total Deductions                      13,749            19,749 
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
Net  Payment            17,230                    10,241 
_____________________________________________________________________________
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important part of the meeting is the depositing of money by
members into the ‘meeting bank’. Each meeting has its own rules
concerning the contributions of its membership: in some meetings
a fixed amount has to be saved, in others the members themselves
determine each time what they can afford to save, and in still others
there is no obligation to save each time the members meet. Savings
are subsequently deposited into a savings account in a commercial
bank. Generally speaking, the meeting is ‘broken’ once a year, the
deposit removed from the savings account and the individual savings
(with interest) returned to the members, usually in November, so
that they may use the year’s savings for Christmas expenses, such
as new clothes and the joint purchase of a ‘Christmas cow’ to be
slaughtered and shared out for Christmas dinners. The members
like to express their solidarity to the outside world. Female members
do so by wearing the same wrappers.
These meetings remain popular among the workers, for they allow
them to borrow money relatively easily and quickly in times of need,
often up to the entire amount of  one’s savings. Interest rates though
are usually higher in meetings than in credit unions.
One of the ‘country’ meetings on the estate whose membership
is exclusively female is the ‘Walana Wa Ndinga Wapwe’ (literally:
Bakweri women of Joy Association). This meeting of Bakweri
women has branches in several towns of  the South West Province.
Its members meet every Sunday. They are required to contribute
FCFA 300 to the ‘meeting bank’ and an extra FCFA 50 to the
‘bereavement bank’. They may borrow up to a maximum amount
of  FCFA 50,000. Interest rates charged are 10% a month.
Another popular saving institution on the estate is the njangi.
This is a rotating credit association composed mainly of a group of
women of  the same or different ethnic origin who trust each other.
About 58.5% of  the women interviewed claimed to be njangi
members. They usually meet on pay day or soon after, either with
or without the social gathering common at the ‘meetings’. They
have agreed that each will pay a fixed amount every month into a
common fund. This contribution is usually higher than in meetings.
On an agreed occasion, one of the members will receive the entire
fund until each member has had her turn. When everybody has had
her turn, the njangi is ‘broken’, but usually the process starts again
with the same members.
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The credit union was introduced on the estate in 1974. Its
membership has grown rapidly: from 200 members in 1974 to 1,450
in 1987 (94% of  the estate’s labour force in that year). It is the only
institution into which savings are deposited without first passing
through the hands of  the saver. Soon after its creation the
management agreed to introduce a ‘check-off ’ system, i.e. a system
whereby a worker authorises the employer to automatically deduct
a certain amount of his/her wages for transfer to the credit union,
and to recover credit union loans from defaulting members. Loans
are provided at low rates of interest, though not always promptly
enough to meet an emergency.
Notably, although women constitute 65% of  the credit union
membership on the estate, they do not own more than 51% of the
credit union shares and savings (see Tables 3.8 and 3.9). This must
be attributed to the fact that male workers are able to contribute
higher amounts to the credit union than female workers, as they
tend to spend less on household expenses such as food, and to occupy
the best paid jobs on the estate. Conversely, male workers also tend
to borrow more often from the credit union than female workers:
55% of the beneficiaries of loans, granted by the credit union during
the period 1983-1987, proved to be men (see Table 3.10). Men are
allowed to draw more loans from the credit union than women
because of  their higher savings. They are also less reluctant than
women to spend part of  their savings on long-term investments
and the purchase of ‘luxury’ goods, such as radios or bicycles, because
they still hold their wives responsible for the maintenance of the
household.
Women, on the other hand, tend not to apply for credit union
loans except in times of extreme need, especially for the purchase
of food and the payment of school fees and health care. Men also
tend to have easier access to credit union loans than women, because
the credit union leadership has been dominated by male workers,
partly due to their higher educational achievements. In 1988 women
had only two representatives on the credit union board, one acting
as secretary and the other as treasurer - evidently functions that are
usually assigned to women.
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Table 3.8 Membership Tole Tea Co-operative Credit Union, 1983-1987
Source: Compiled from Tole Tea Co-operative Credit Union Membership
Register.
Table 3.9 Distribution of  shares/savings in the Tole Tea Co-operative Credit
Union, 1983-1987 (FCFA)
Source: Compiled from data supplied by the Tole Tea Co-operative Credit
Union.
______________________________________________________________________________
 
YEAR                             MALE  FEMALE  TOTAL MEMBERSHIP  
                                ___________     ___________ 
 
                                                 No         %            No             % 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
1983                                333     35           619   65                         952 
1984   364     35           676      65                      1,040 
1985           366        35           679  65                      1,045 
1986           385      35           713    65                      1,098 
1987                                 508   35           942      65                      1,450 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
 
YEAR     MALE  FEMALE  TOTAL AMOUNT  
                   ___________________     ___________________ 
 
                Amount        %            Amount             % 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
1983           46,586,155      49           48,455,365   51                        95,041,520 
1984   55,863,753     49           58,143,905      51                      114,007,658 
1985           68,212,669        49           70,996,859  51                      139,209,529 
1986           77,963,387      49           81,144,586    51                      159,107,973 
1987       83,859,121    49           87,281,940      51                      171,141,061 
______________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3.10 Beneficiaries of  loans granted by the Tole Tea  Co-operative Credit
Union, 1983-1987
Source: Compiled from data supplied by the Tole Tea Co-operative Credit
Union.
Table 3.11 Purpose of  loans granted by the Tole Tea  Co-operative Credit Union,
1983-1986
Source: Compiled from data supplied by the Tole Tea Co-operative Credit
Union.
Table 3.11 sets out the reasons for the loans granted by the credit
union during the period 1983-1986. It shows that not less than 89%
of all the credit union loans were taken out for the purpose of
education, health, or consumer goods. This illustrates the importance
______________________________________________________________________________
 
YEAR                             MALE  FEMALE  TOTAL NUMBER OF  
   BENEFICIARIES  
                                ___________     ___________ 
 
                                  No         %   No   % 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
1983                                739     60           491   40                    1,230 
1984   576     49           601      51                    1,177 
1985           662        51           639  49                    1,301 
1986           359      59           248    41                       607 
1987          760   58           554      42                    1,314 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
TOTAL             3,096 55      2,533   45                    5,629 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
PURPOSE OF LOANS          No % Amount (FCFA)     % 
______________________________________________________________________________
Education                 1,575  36      136,317,000    35 
Health                  1,238     28     86,011,000     22 
Consu mer goods   1,238    25     78,648,000   20 
Building            359         8          76,168,000      19.5 
Farming                 64       1.5          8,329,000     2 
Others (marriage, t rading)        63     1.5        6,881,000      1.5 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
TOTAL                    4,417          100.0       392,345,000      100.0 
______________________________________________________________________________
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the predominantly illiterate workers attach to the education of their
children, as well as the inadequacy of  the medical services provided
by the estate and the regular lack of  cash for food and clothing.
Some of  the women interviewed told me that they suffered ill
health and old age, but could not stop working as they were
determined to send their children to secondary school or even
university. A relatively small number of  women had been able to
invest some of their savings in a house, land, an off-licence bar on
the estate, or trade. Such investments serve not only as a kind of
social security for retirement and old age, but also as an important
alternative means of capital accumulation.
After saving part of their wages and paid their taxes, female
pluckers are left with about FCFA 10,000-20,000 (see Table 3.7).
A substantial portion of  the remaining cash is spent on pay-day.
This day is a real feast day on the estate. It is in fact the only day in
the month that workers can afford to have a good time and spend
‘freely’. Directly upon receiving their wages, women flock to the
‘labour club’ and the numerous off-licence bars on the estate,
drinking, merry-making, and dancing till everyone is tired or drunk.
Some women buy clothing from itinerant traders who sell a variety
of  goods in the camps on pay-day. Others buy meat, a food item
workers normally cannot afford, and snacks for children. At the
end of the day women have spent a lot of cash. This leads to the
almost universal buying of food on credit throughout the remainder
of  the month, and thus widespread indebtedness.
The management does not deny that the women receive low
cash wages, but it stresses that the variety of non-cash benefits
supplied by the corporation, such as accommodation, medical care,
and ‘chop farms’, supplement their incomes. These services were
free of  charge until 1 February 1990. Workers were then asked to
contribute to most of  the services, to help reduce the corporation’s
costs during the economic crisis.
On the one hand, workers are inclined to appreciate the provision
of accommodation on the estate, for rents are quite high in
Cameroon, particularly in the urban centres. On the other hand,
they point to various shortcomings provided.
First, there is a serious shortage of  dwellings. In 1987/88 the
estate employed 1,578 workers, but it owned not more than 760
dwellings spread over three labour camps, namely Tole Old Camp,
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Tole New Camp, and Saxenhof. As a consequence, the allocation
of  rooms has often been surrounded by bribery and corruption.
This is hardly surprising, for workers who could not be
accommodated in the camps were forced to hire rooms themselves
in the neighbourhood at exorbitant rents, varying from FCFA 3,000
to 5,000, without receiving any rental allowances from the
corporation. From 1 February 1990 onwards, accommodation in
the camps has no longer been free of charge; workers, classified in
Categories 1 to 3, must contribute FCFA 1,000 a month to their
accommodation and pay in full for the electricity and gas supplied
by the corporation.
Second, the dwellings provided are quite small. Their size is about
20 square metres. They have wooden walls and cement floors; their
roofs are covered with corrugated zinc sheets. Such accommodation
is simply too small for families with a large number of children and
dependents. Moreover, the residents hardly enjoy any privacy: the
walls are so thin that one can hear one’s neighbours.
Third, the quality of the accommodation provided leaves much
to be desired and needs urgent improvement. Camp houses are in a
deplorable state. However, the management claims that there are
no funds to maintain the houses during the economic crisis.14 The
sanitary conditions in the camps, too, are now below standard. There
are only 24 latrine/shower blocks in the camps, which does not
suffice to serve the large population. Moreover, most of  these blocks
appear dirty and unkept. Both the sanitary workers and the ‘camp
committees’ seem to neglect their duties. One of  the main
responsibilities of these committees is to look after cleanliness in
the camps. At present, however, they seem to have stopped
mobilising the camp population for regular clean-up campaigns.
Workers and their families also formerly enjoyed free medical
care. The estate has a clinic at Tole Old Camp and an aid post at
Saxenhof. One of the four doctors employed by the CDC visits the
clinic twice a month. I was told by the head of the clinic that 400 to
500 patients call at the clinic each week. The most frequent diseases
in the camps are, in descending order, diarrhea, malaria, intestinal
worm infections, pneumonia, arthritis, dysentery, and measles. A
number of these diseases result from poor sanitation, poor personal
hygiene, and poor nutrition. The clinic’s maternity ward handles
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between 150 and 200 deliveries a year. The clinic has an ambulance
to transport the sick to nearby hospitals. Even though medical care
used to be provided free of charge, the workers have never been
fully satisfied with the medical services provided. The clinic suffers
regular shortages of  essential drugs. Workers are therefore often
forced to buy drugs in neighbouring towns at considerable cost.
Moreover, some medical staff members lack the necessary
qualifications, tend to be rude to the workers, and refuse to attend
to calls in the late afternoons or nights unless they are paid overtime.
As a result, quite a number of women prefer to deliver in the
excellent maternity ward of the Roman Catholic clinic at Buea, in
spite of the costs involved. Dissatisfaction arose when management
started charging for medical services supplied. These charges include
a registration fee at an annual rate of  FCFA 1,080, payable by the
worker and all his/her household members, a monthly contribution
of  FCFA 2,100 for medical care, and a consultation fee of  FCFA
500. These are indeed substantial charges. Nevertheless, medical
services have apparently not been improved, for workers continue
protesting against the lack of  drugs.15
A long-standing policy of the CDC management has been to
allocate land freely to the labour force for food cultivation, the so-
called ‘chop farms’. In practice, however, individual requests for
land have often been declined by estate management. Consequently,
some workers try to acquire land themselves in the nearby villages.
During my fieldwork I found that only 57% of the female workers
had been allocated land by estate management (see Table 3.12).
Table 3.12  Tole Tea women and access to land for food cultivation
Source: Konings, P., Survey among Tole Tea Women, 1986.
_____________________________________________________
 
TYPE OF LAND ACQUIRED                     % 
________________________________________________________________________
 
CDC land                                           57 
Rented land                                           23 
Family land/ land given freely                 5 
Landless                                        15 
________________________________________________________________________
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The majority of the remaining female workers (23%) had rented
land from local peasants. As land in the vicinity of  the estates tends
to be scarce and expensive, most land hired by these women was
quite small, fragmented and often located at considerable distance
from the estate. Some female workers (5%) had been extremely
lucky to acquire land for free from relatives or friends. However, a
substantial number of women (15%) had failed to hire land, and
were therefore compelled to buy food from the local markets. These
women can only afford to buy cheap, low-protein food like garri,
which may give rise to malnutrition.
Not surprisingly, most of  the women who did acquire a plot of
land in one way or another said they experienced difficulties in
combining wage work with farming. Their normal working day is
eight hours, but during the peak season they are often obliged to
stay in the field for 11 hours. During the peak season, they have
hardly any time to go to their ‘chop farms’.
There is no doubt that the provision of  ‘chop farms’ forms a
welcome addition to the workers’ income. But it should also be
acknowledged that it causes an enormous increase in the women’s
daily work load (see Table 3.13). After completing their arduous
tasks on the estate, women first go to their ‘chop farms’ and then
begin the daily household chores. Married women seldom expect
any help from their husbands. No wonder this dual work load can
result in serious physical and psychological breakdowns. After some
years of plucking, women tend to suffer from backache, which is
called ‘duty disease’ on the estate. Time for relaxation and recreation
is scarce in the lives of these women.
Tole Tea women: Wage workers and mothers
It is often maintained that wage work is not compatible with
women’s continuing responsibility for child bearing and child rearing
(DeLancey 1980, 1981). In this connection, it is argued that,
compared with independent economic activities such as farming
and trading, wage employment lacks the necessary flexibility: women
have to start work each day at the same hour and are obliged to stay
in the workplace until quitting time.
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Table 3.13 Daily activities of  female pluckers
This argument has some validity. It cannot be denied that wage
employment may create more obstacles to women’s reproductive
role than independent economic activities. This is, of  course, one
of  the reasons that African women often prefer informal sector
employment to formal sector employment. However, the argument
fails to take into account that there might be factors in a particular
socio-cultural setting that reduce role incompatibility. This is
certainly the case at the Tole Estate.
______________________________________________________________________________
 
TIME                                    MONDAY-FRIDAY 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
5.00 a.m.  -   6.00 a.m.      Prepare and  serve breakfast ; dress children ;  
 walk to the estate 
6.30 a.m.  -   3.00 p.m.          Tea plucking 
8.00 p.m.  - 10.00 p.m.    Serve food;  put chi ldren to bed; prepare food  
 for breakfast; go to bed after bathing 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
                                         SATURDAY 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
5.00 a.m.   -   6.00 a.m.   Prepare and  serve breakfast ; dress children ;  
 walk to the estate 
6.30 a.m.   -   12.00 a.m.    Tea plucking 
12.00 a.m.  -    4.00 p.m.  Have a snack; work on chop farm; collect firewood;  
                                        walk back home 
4.00 p.m.    -    6.00 p.m.    Wash clothes 
6.00 p.m.    -    8.00 p.m.    Bath children; serve a snack to the family;   
 put the children to bed  
8.00 p.m.    -  10.00 p.m.    Have a rest before going to bed 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
                                    SUNDAY 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
7.30 a.m.     -    3.00 p.m.        Sweep the house and the kitchen; prepare and  
 serve breakfast ; iron clothes for going to church  
 or to Muea market (on ce a month); 
                                          collect water; prepare, cook, and serve food 
3.00 p.m.    -     4.00 p.m.  Iron the remaining clothes 
4.00 p.m.    -     5.00 p.m.    Have a rest  
5.00 p.m.    -     8.30 p.m.      Prepare and  serve a snack after having bathed  
 the children ; prepare food for the next day; go to bed 
______________________________________________________________________________
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First of all, child care on the estate, like everywhere in Africa, is
not only the concern of the household. Once the child is weaned,
relatives, neighbours and friends may look after the child during
the mother’s absence. The period of  breast-feeding may therefore
be the most problematic.
Second, Cameroonian legislation and CDC policy create relatively
favourable conditions for working mothers on the estate. The 1967
Federal Labour Code, as well as the national social insurance laws,
provide for maternity and family benefits. Women receive 14 weeks
maternity leave at full pay (extended to 20 weeks if the birth results
in maternal ill health) as well as maternity allowances. They are
entitled to a family allowance of  FCFA 1,800 a month for each
child, which is paid by the National Social Insurance Fund through
the office of the CDC.16 In addition, the Labour Code stipulates
that for 15 months following the birth of the child the woman be
granted a break of  one hour per day.
The management does not allow the women to take their nursing
children to the field, though a few women do it all the same. Usually
the women go home during breaks (if they are not too far away) to
tend to their children or give a quick feeding. It is, however, not
uncommon to see other children bringing hungry babies to the resting
mothers during breaks (DeLancey 1978: 8).
The estate provides a crèche in Tole Old Camp, at a cost of
FCFA 1,000 a month. Children are admitted on the following
conditions: They should be between two months and five years of
age and be brought to the crèche along with food and napkins. Twice
a week they are served some beverages by the estate. The building
contains some baby-cots and beds, a playpen, and some furniture.
Two women look after the children in the crèche. They have never
received any training. Some of  the children who were enrolled in
the crèche went on in 1987 to a newly opened, privately run, nursery
school in the camp.
Significantly, relatively few children attend the crèche and the
nursery school. In 1987/88 there were 48 children in the crèche
and 85 children in the nursery school. The workers seem never to
have been satisfied with the services rendered by the crèche and
the nursery school, and they prefer to use other methods of child
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care. In October 1990, the workers accused the crèche attendants
of ‘child abuse and general carelessness’ and launched an appeal to
the government to take over the existing, below-standard, nursery
school.17
Most women continue to rely on relatives, friends or neighbours
for the care of their pre-school children. Quite a few women had
taken along a young relative specifically to help around the house
and care for the children. Very few women said that they have to
pay cash for child care. They usually provide food, shelter, clothing,
pocket money, and often school fees. This probably amounts to a
larger total sum than if they would simply employ someone to do
the job, but it also gives them more control over, and greater
flexibility in, scheduling the child care duties. In addition, it is often
expected that those who are earning money should try to help other
relatives better themselves by assisting them in getting an education
or occupational training or by giving them opportunities to find
future employment.
Generally speaking, female workers seem to manage in their
reproductive role on the estate. This does not mean that problems
are absent. The mothers with the youngest children face more
difficulties than those with older children, and they tend to stay
home more often. The estate management usually displays a certain
degree of  ‘understanding’ for the problems of  its female workers.
If a child is sick and requires extra attention, the management takes
a ‘lenient’ attitude towards the mother’s absence from work. Clinic
hours are held each morning, and mothers are allowed to bring a
sick child to the clinic for treatment at that time. If the illness is not
severe, the child will be treated, after which the mother must return
to work with no excuse. However, if the child is very sick and
requires the mother’s attention, the mother will be given ‘excused
duty’ and may stay home to care for the child while earning full pay.
Problems are also likely to occur when the mother is not able to
find someone to care for the young children.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to show that plantation work plays a
rather ambivalent role in the lives of  female workers. On the one
hand, it has positive meaning. It enables illiterate and unmarried
women in particular to escape from patriarchal controls and achieve
a relatively autonomous existence. As household heads, they are
highly dependent on wage work for the reproduction of their families,
and they display a high commitment to their job. This commitment
is further strengthened by the fact that they maintain few links with
home and are often deprived of  land rights. On the other hand, it
has negative consequences. It is very tedious and poorly paid, and
it is unlikely to foster much job satisfaction. It requires so much
energy and time that the women have difficulty coping with their
other roles outside the workplace. Above all, it fails to provide them
with a suitable income, and it offers few prospects for promotion or
social advancement. These negative features are hardly conducive
to labour productivity and pose problems of labour control.
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Management of  female workers
Introduction
Tea plucking is labour-intensive. The establishment of  managerial
control over the labour process is, therefore, essential for an increase
in productivity and the quality of work. According to Friedland et
al. (1981: 8), the labour process should be conceived
not simply as the physical organisation of work but as the meeting
ground of the two major social categories: wage labour and capital
.... The relationship between workers and owners/managers pivots
on the production of value by one category (labour) and the
appropriation of that value by the other category (capital).
The existence of exploitative relations of production in the labour
process poses the problem of control. The management can only
appropriate and maximise the surplus value produced by labour by
subordinating workers to its authority over the labour process and
intensifying their labour productivity.
In the first section of this chapter I shall briefly describe the
physical organisation of work on the estate. In the second section I
shall outline the most important strategies employed by management
and the state to establish control over female pluckers. I shall argue
that control over the labour process involves a new form of  gender
subordination: the giving of orders is mainly a male prerogative
while the role of  women is defined as the carrying out of  orders.
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The physical organisation of production
Tea is a crop which requires labour inputs all year round. Tasks in
the field are the most labour-intensive, and the most important
operations are:
• Planting. Tea is a perennial crop with a productive life of
more than 50 years. The quality of  seedlings is of  decisive
importance for the total returns a tea estate aims to generate.
The traditional source for the Cameroonian estates were
seedlings grown in nurseries and transplanted when they
were between 1.5 and 2 years old. At present a new
procedure is being applied. This involves the large-scale
multiplication of vegetatively propagated (VP) clones from
mother bushes selected on the basis of yield capacity and
other important characteristics (Eden 1965; Gyllström
1977). It has been shown that such VP cuttings have given
two to three times greater yields than those obtained from
seedlings. On the CDC estates the bushes are planted
together, making it possible to create a flat, raised surface
at the top of the bushes, often called the ‘plucking table’.
Output starts three years after planting and full maturity is
achieved after 5 to 7 years, depending on planting material.
• Maintenance. This includes weeding, fertiliser application,
and pruning. At present weeding is usually done by applying
chemicals. Weeding requirements are virtually eliminated
when a dense plucking table has been established. Pruning
of the tea bushes has to be done regularly so as to maintain
the yields and keep the plucking table at a manageable
height. It is a tedious and delicate job which is carried out
by experienced workers.
• Plucking. The most labour-intensive and most important
task on the estate is the plucking of the flush, or the
immature leaf, that appears on the bush. The amount of
flush depends on the variety of the bush (whether it is
high-yielding, as in the case of the vegetative propagation
variety, or the normal tea seedling with a lower yield).
Whatever the nature of the bush, however, the yield at
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any particular time is also influenced by the level of rainfall.
Thus there are seasonal variations in the flush, and
corresponding shifts in the demand for plucking labour.
On the tea estates in Cameroon, there are two peak seasons and
two slack periods of  tea plucking. The two peak periods are: April-
July and October-December. The slack periods are: December-April
(coinciding with the dry season) and July-October (the period of
heavy rains). During the peak seasons top pluckers can pluck more
than double the daily norm and, consequently, earn incomes well
above the basic wage. During the slack periods, however, many
pluckers experience great difficulties in completing the daily task
(and earning at least the basic wage) (see Chapter 3).
There are many systems of plucking (Kurian 1989: 302). The
most common systems in use on the tea estates in Cameroon are
fine and coarse plucking. Fine plucking refers to picking only the
top two leaves and the bud. A coarse pick takes in more leaves.
Fine plucking yields higher quality tea than coarse plucking.
The standard of plucking preferred by the management has an
impact on both the labour demand and on the degree of  supervision
required. Fine plucking tends to lower the amount of leaf brought
in, as greater care has to be taken to pluck only the finest leaves.
This involves stricter supervision both at the point of  plucking and
in the weighing and sorting procedures.
The choice of a standard is complicated and it reflects the
perspective of the management on the economics of estate
production. If favourable prices are expected on all kinds of tea,
this could result in a higher degree of  coarse plucking. However, if
high prices are especially to be had for ‘finely plucked’ tea, then a
greater effort is made to attain the high plucking standard even if
this is at the cost of the quantity of leaf plucked. The CDC
management started selling most of its tea to Northern ‘middlemen’
(see Chapter 2). The latter’s demand for large quantities of  lower-
quality tea, together with the management’s determination to
maximise output and reduce production costs during the economic
crisis, tended to lower the standards of plucking on the estate.
Plucking requires both training and skill. It is gradually learnt on
the job. Poor plucking techniques may damage the tea bush and
lower the yields.
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• Checking and weighing. After plucking, the green leaf is
delivered to a collection centre, where it is checked and
weighed. Subsequently, it is transported to the factory.
Tasks in the factory are less labour-intensive. The processing of  tea
involves the following stages:
• Withering. The green leaf  is spread evenly on platforms for
18 hours and hot air is blown over it. This process is
designed to reduce the moisture content by about forty
per cent.
• Rolling and sifting. The withered leaf is passed through
mechanical rollers, which break the leaf cells so that their
juicy content can start fermenting. The rolling machine
can handle about 20 kg of  leaf  in 30 to 40 minutes. After
rolling, the leaf is sifted to separate the fine from the coarse
pieces. The coarse tea is returned to the rolling machine.
• Fermentation. The rolled and sifted tea is then taken to the
fermentation room. In this well-ventilated, cool but humid
room, the leaf  is placed in trays for fermentation. Nothing
is added to the leaf; it ferments naturally. The fermentation
stage lasts 1 to 3 hours.
• Firing and drying. To prevent over-fermentation, the
fermented leaf  is heated in a dryer. During this process,
which takes about 15 to 20 minutes, all but 4 to 6% of the
remaining moisture is extracted from the leaf. The dry tea
now has 20 to 23 per cent of the weight of the original
green leaf.
• Sorting and grading. The sorter extracts tea stalks and
separates the coarse tea once more from the fine grain. All
the coarse tea is cut into smaller pieces and sorted again.
The grader is comprised of six large sieves which separate
the finished tea into sizes ranging from very fine to very
coarse. The bottom tray collects what is called tea dust,
whilst the tray next to the bottom contains the highest
quality tea (which is sold locally as Blue Label). For tea
connoisseurs, this is the Broken Orange Pekoe Fannings. The
third tray from the bottom has the Broken Orange Pekoe (sold
as Yellow Label); the fourth tray from the bottom has the
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Broken Pekoe Souchong (leafy); and the fifth tray from the
bottom, or the second from the top, has Broken Pekoe
(stalky). The top tray collects the coarsest grade which is
marketed in Cameroon as Red Label and enjoys great
popularity.
• Packaging and packing. Each grade of  tea is stored separately
and is also packaged and packed separately. All the tea is
sold either in bags of several sizes, or tins, or plywood
chests.
Generally speaking, there is a clear division of labour on the estate,
both in the field and in the factory.
In the field the women are usually responsible for the plucking
of the tea, whilst the men do what the management and the male
workers alike consider to be the heaviest jobs in the field, including
pruning the tea bushes, fertilising, planting new fields, and nursery
establishment and maintenance.
In the factory women are very few in number (see Table 3.2).
They are responsible mainly for the ‘lightest’ and ‘least mechanical’
jobs, particularly sorting, grading and packeting. Factory machines
are operated exclusively by male workers.
Whilst the sexual division of labour in the factory is more or less
‘fixed’, that in the fields is in practice more ‘flexible’. This flexibility
is closely connected with the central position of plucking in estate
operations and the seasonal shifts in the demand for labour in the
plucking section.
During the periods of high flush, all available labour is mobilised
by the management for plucking. If  the female pluckers are unable
to complete the work, male workers with less experience in tea
plucking, such as weeders and pruners, are asked to assist, as well
as a number of casual workers, especially women from the
surrounding villages. During the slack periods, when the flush is at
its lowest, female workers are often assigned other jobs in the field,
like weeding and even road construction.
In the past, the management has also been forced to hire a number
of permanent male pluckers, because of inadequate supplies of female
labour (see Chapter 3). These men usually resent plucking, which is
looked upon as ‘women’s work’ on the estate. They have little choice,
however, for there are hardly any other job openings on the estate.
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Managerial strategies of labour control
Management has been greatly concerned with establishing control
over the female pluckers, who occupy a crucial position in the labour
process. To this end it has constantly devised and revised various
strategies of labour control, assisted by the state authorities who
have a common interest in the maximisation of output and capital
accumulation.
The creation of a male-dominated command structure
One of the principal managerial strategies has been the creation of
a clear-cut hierarchical command structure on all the CDC estates
(Konings 1993, 2011a). The Tole Estate differs in some respects
from other CDC estates because its hierarchical organisation is a
‘bearer of gender’ (Whitehead 1979: 11). Although the majority of
estate workers are women, the principal order-givers are invariably
men. This means in effect that after having escaped from patriarchal
controls in their local communities, female workers become
subordinated to a male-dominated command structure in the
workplace.
Gender hierarchy on the estate, in fact, is still quite pervasive.
Whilst this is to some extent explicable in terms of  men’s previously
greater access to training, that is not a sufficient explanation. The
fact is that qualified women have frequently been passed over for
further training and promotion. Evidently the management must
have felt that giving orders was a male prerogative and that the
incorporation of patriarchal controls into the workplace would
create a more effective system of control over female workers than
the elevation of  women to managerial positions.
The top stratum of the hierarchy is still exclusively occupied by
men. It consists of the estate manager and field assistants. The estate
manager is responsible for the administration of the estate. He is
assisted by a few (senior) field assistants who oversee various
sections of the estate. Through the provision of attractive conditions
of  service the top stratum is set apart from the lowest levels of
estate management and the labour force: besides the high salaries,
it is entitled to a wide range of benefits, including spacious, well-
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furnished bungalows located at a distance from the labour camps,
household servants, annual bonuses, cars and car loans, generous
leave, travelling and outstation allowances, and excellent medical
treatment inside and outside the country. Such benefits, of  course,
considerably augment their real incomes and widen the gap between
high and low income groups on the estate. During the severe
economic crisis, however, there have been severe cuts in their
benefits.1 It is likely that these cuts will have some negative
consequences for their work motivation and loyalty towards the
corporation.
The middle stratum, the supervisory staff, has been subject to
certain changes in gender composition. The top positions in the
middle stratum, the senior overseers and overseers, were formerly
monopolised by men, but the lowest positions in the middle stratum,
the senior heads and heads of separate labour gangs, were open to
women at an early stage. Gradually, however, some women were
appointed overseer and even senior overseer. Significantly, all
appointments of  women to supervisory positions continue to be in
the female-dominated sections of the estate, particularly in the
plucking section. It is still unthinkable that women would be
appointed to a supervisory position in a male-dominated section of
the estate.
The middle stratum constitutes an essential communication link
between the top stratum of the hierarchy and the workers, and at
the same time it maintains discipline at work. Despite its vital
position in the organisation of production, those who occupy it do
not enjoy a standard of living even approaching that of the top
stratum. In particular the headmen and headwomen, who are in
Category 3 of the Standard National Classification of Occupations,
receive a salary not conspicuously different from their subordinates
(see Table 3.6). Overseers, and especially senior overseers
(Categories 4-8), on the contrary, are better rewarded for their
services. Unlike the top stratum, the middle stratum is
accommodated in the labour camps, although its members are
entitled to more rooms than their subordinates. Like the top stratum,
it has not escaped from drastic cuts in benefits during the economic
crisis.
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The intermediate position in the estate hierarchy tends to be
ambiguous. The supervisory staff  is often ‘caught in the middle’
between demands of  the top stratum and those of  the workers.
This is well illustrated by the fact that a good number of  supervisory
staff members have been elected trade union officers at the local
level on account of their educational achievements and leadership
capacities (see Chapter 5). There is also ample evidence that some
supervisory staff  members, in particular headmen and headwomen
who are close to their labour gangs, tended to side with workers
during collective disputes.
At the bottom of the hierarchy is the labour force, which is
expected to respect constituted authority and unconditionally
implement orders from its immediate supervisors.
From the very inception of  the estate, however, male supervisory
control over female workers has been problematic. Some women
felt reluctant to approach the often rather authoritarian male
supervisors. Consequently, a number of  their grievances were not
immediately addressed and lingered on until they surfaced in
individual and collective actions. Other women were quite inventive
in manipulating their male supervisors. During my fieldwork male
supervisory and managerial staff  often complained to me:
Women are more difficult to control than men. They tell you all
kinds of  excuses for their absence from work or low productivity.
And we men never know for sure whether these excuses are true or
not.
In addition, women were often sexually harassed by their male
supervisors. They were often threatened if  sexual favours were not
granted. One of the victims of sexual harassment told me:
When a woman refuses the supervisor’s advances, she stands little
chance in the field. The supervisor will either give a bad report to
management about you or will ill treat you in the field.
Women are usually afraid to report this matter to management.
Sometimes, however, they are forced to do so. This was the case
with one female plucker who was victimised by her supervisor at
work for ending their sexual relationship:
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In response to your warning letter dated 20th July 1979, I would
indeed like you to understand certain things that have been happening
between me and my direct boss. I hope the theme of  this letter is
not misconstrued .... Regarding the case with my overseer, Mr M., I
could make it clear that he was my boy friend. When I decided to
drop him, he took revenge by punishing me at work. It should be
recalled that I joined the CDC in the year 1965 and since then I have
never received an official warning except this year that I have received
two from my work with Mr M.2
Some women, however, try to exploit their sexual relationships with
male supervisors to the utmost, going to the extent of  making ‘illegal’
demands for the supply of  sexual favours. Quite a number of  male
supervisors have been caught in the course of  time who either
marked their ‘girl friends’ present while they were absent or promoted
them to a position for which they did not qualify.
The problem of  male supervisory control over female workers
has been one of the principal reasons for the gradual appointment
of women to overseer and senior overseer positions in the plucking
section.
In their written and oral communications with workers, the
management regularly propagates ideological views to either support
or obscure the male-dominated hierarchal order (Konings 1993).
On the one hand, there is the ideology of  paternalism. This tries to
persuade the women that the relationship between male managers
and female workers at the workplace is similar to the relationship
between male elders and women in the local communities. It insists
that female workers should behave towards supervisory and
managerial staff  members as if  they were their fathers. Moreover, it
admonishes the women to be grateful to the management for its
‘concern’ with their well-being and its provision of a variety of
‘benefits’ during their working career, including employment,
accommodation, health care, recreational facilities, ‘chop farms’,
and gratuities. It encourages the women to adopt in return a loyal
and deferential attitude towards the management. On the other hand,
there is the ideology of  the ‘corporative collective’ which glosses over the
existing hierarchical order and fosters a company-based sense of
‘oneness’ or ‘family’. Since his appointment in 1974, the first
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Cameroonian General Manager of  the CDC, Mr J.N. Ngu, has
constantly tried to impress upon the workers that the corporation,
being a parastatal, belongs to all Cameroonians, and that a ‘team’
or ‘family’ spirit should prevail in the corporation, as a necessary
prerequisite for an increase in production and improvement in the
standard of  living of  all its workers.3
The introduction of a system of rewards and punishments in the
labour process
In addition to the male-dominated hierarchical command structure,
the management has introduced a system of rewards and
punishments in the labour process, to control female workers and
increase their productivity,
To mobilise the women in the labour process, the management
has devised a series of regularly revised incentive schemes, in
particular the payment of  bonuses for seniority, regular work
attendance, completion of  task, over-task work and so on (see Table
3.7); it has provided promotion and training opportunities for
deserving women and has created a gratuity scheme. To punish the
women for undisciplined and unproductive behaviour in the labour
process, the management has taken a series of disciplinary measures,
including pro-rata payment for uncompleted work, verbal and written
warnings, transfers and dismissals.
Following independence and reunification in 1961, the
management made a determined effort to increase output and capital
accumulation and started a crusade against undisciplined and
unproductive workers. This crusade was actually intensified from
the end of the 1960s onwards at the instigation of the foreign
financiers of  the corporation’s post-colonial development
programmes (Konings 1993). On 23 October 1969, the management
promulgated the so-called Internal Regulations,4 which laid down
the various rules governing management-labour relations inside and
outside the workplace and the whole scale of sanctions at the
disposal of  the management to punish any violations of  these rules.
One of  the most important rules concerned absenteeism:
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Workers who are absent for two executive days without authorisation
are considered to have abandoned their posts and their names will
be removed from the corporation’s employment register.
Every worker is supposed to know these Internal Regulations and
adhere to them unconditionally.
The post-colonial managerial crusade against undisciplined and
unproductive workers was revived during the economic crisis. After
the conclusion of a Contract Plan between the corporation and the
government in 1989, the General Manager of the CDC stressed
that the corporation could no longer tolerate any undisciplined and
unproductive behaviour in its struggle for economic recovery:
In the Contract Plan drawn up and signed by the Government of
Cameroon and the Corporation, the corporation is required to meet
certain standards of efficiency and be self-supporting and profitable.
In striving to meet its own part of the agreement the corporation
has to take certain measures which at times have to touch on personnel
and industrial relations. Such measures can be expected to be difficult
to digest as they will certainly mean belt-tightening. That is why we
shall have to be generally very strict on discipline and sanction any
manifestation of  laxity. We shall have to do more and more to stop
or at least reduce the undermining of  the corporation’s assets.
Pilferage, however, shall meet with maximum sanctions. Maximum
efforts shall be required of employees so as to continue producing
more at lower and lower cost; laxity and laissez-faire which are
characterised by an alarming rate of  absenteeism and uncompleted
tasks shall not be tolerated. A World Bank report has situated the
loss of  man-hours in recent years to the millions. These absentees
and de facto part-time workers are on the corporation’s pay roll
just for the social benefits which they get at 100% without contributing
their fair share.5
The economic crisis could indeed contribute to the maintenance of
discipline at work and the increase in labour productivity. In a
situation of  mass layoffs of  workers throughout the country, workers
may be inclined to work hard and in an orderly manner to keep
their jobs.
86
Gender and Plantation Labour in Africa
The management has also regularly intervened in the labour camps
with a view to restoring order and ameliorating the quality of life,
for it believes that the continued existence of disorder and
dissatisfaction in the labour camps may negatively affect labour
control and labour productivity. The following example shows how
a female plucker was punished by the management for a ‘criminal’
act by her son in the camp:
You are suspended from work for 8 days. The reason for your
suspension is that your son, Salifu, was caught for hooliganism during
a film show at the club on 1 February 1982. If  your son or any of
your children is caught committing any other crime, your appointment
with the CDC will be terminated.6
During the 1980s the management started installing camp
committees in all the CDC estates. These committees are responsible
for the maintenance of  hygiene and discipline in the camps.
Committee members have been mostly involved in the settlement
of petty disputes among the camp population. Their decisions are
usually upheld by the management:
You are suspended from work as a punitive measure for two days,
The reasons for your suspension are: (i) it is illegal to inflict corporal
punishment on your wife, (ii) you have no right to go against the
decision of the camp committee, and (iii) two days ago you caused
this woman bodily damage despite warnings from the camp
committee. You are warned that should you continue to beat your
wife again and refuse to adhere to the decision of the camp
committee, your services with the corporation will be terminated.7
The frequent management interventions in the labour camps are
clear manifestations of the considerable power that estate
management tends to wield over the entire lives of their
subordinates.
87
Chapter 4: Management of  Female workers
State and labour control
The state authorities are interested in labour control for two main
reasons. First, they share management’s concern with the increase
in output and capital accumulation. And second, they want to
establish control over civil society and so curb any challenge of the
workers to the present political status quo (Bayart 1979, 1989).
Two periods can be distinguished in the state’s labour control
strategies after the reopening of  the Tole Estate in 1954. The first
period is that of  the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ identified by Peter Kilby
(1969). This model may perhaps be more properly described as the
liberal-paternalist-colonial model because of  its differences from the
British original (cf. Waterman 1982: 22). The second period, from
the end of the 1960s to the political liberalisation era in the 1990s,
showed a distinct tendency towards the corporatist model common in
much of Latin America, characterised by increased state
intervention in the system of  industrial relations and the
subordination of trade unionism to the state (Konings 2009b).
In short, the liberal-paternalist-colonial model advocated, in
principle, absence of  state intervention in the system of  industrial
relations (‘laissez-faire’). In practice, however, it considered the
enactment of minimal legislation and the creation of certain
institutions to be necessary for safeguarding labour control in the
colonial setting and maintaining stable, orderly relationships between
the employers and the workers (Waterman 1982; Shivji 1986).
Its emphasis was on ‘free collective bargaining’ between
‘representatives of labour’ and ‘representatives of management’.
Legislation and regulations were of  a ‘permissive’ character where trade
unions were concerned. One significant difference from Britain at that
time was the colonial requirement of compulsory registration of trade
unions. Another was that the protection from action for civil wrongs
was not granted to all trade union actions but only to that related to
labour disputes as strictly defined. These limitations were aimed at
government control of ‘irresponsible’ political protest (see Chapter 5).
 The law had a ‘protective’ character where minimum conditions
of employment were concerned. The Labour Code laid down
conditions on contract of  employment, length of  notice, forms of
wage payment, hours of work, the employment of women and
children, and so on.
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The institutions created by the state were largely of a more
positive or ‘stimulative’ character, intended to provide a framework
for voluntary bipartite collective bargaining between workers and
employers. The basis, of  course, was the Department of  Labour
which played an active role in assisting, advising and training trade
unions in British Cameroon (see Chapter 5).
From the end of the 1960s, the post-colonial state began
intervening intensively in the system of  industrial relations in an
effort to regulate and centralise almost any aspect of the system
(Kendrick 1979). The right to strike was virtually outlawed and
trade unions were subordinated to the single party (see Chapter 5).
This intensive intervention stemmed not only from the fact that
the political elite perceived the liberal-paternalist-colonial model
as an obstacle to the predominant task of  national reconstruction
and the maximisation of  capital accumulation. It was also, as Bayart
(1979) has rightly observed, a clear expression of  the ‘total’ control
the Cameroonian post-colonial state attempted to achieve over civil
society as part of its ‘hegemonic project’.
Several brands of  ideology have been propagated by the post-
colonial state to persuade workers to cooperate with managerial
efforts to raise labour productivity. The most important, the ideology
of ‘national development’, exhorts workers to make ‘sacrifices’ (in
the sense of foregoing wage increases) and to cooperate with
management for the sake of rapid capital accumulation (Sandbrook
1982).
Finally, the post-colonial state frequently used force in its pursuit
of labour control. The management habitually calls on the forces
of law and order when there is a threat of strike action. A
considerable number of ‘agitators’ and ‘ring leaders’ have been
rounded up by the gendarmes and severely beaten. In 1980 the
union warned the Tole Estate manager that he should approach the
union and workers’ representatives rather than the police and
gendarmes for the settlement of  labour disputes.8 This does not
seem to have had any effect, for the use of force as a means of
labour control has continued up to the present day.
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Conclusion
Female workers occupy a vital position in tea plucking, the central
activity of production. The management has preferred female labour
to male labour in the plucking section, in the belief that women
were naturally more suited to plucking and more submissive to
managerial authority. Nevertheless, it has felt the need to control
female workers. I have shown that one of  its principal labour control
strategies, the establishment of a male-dominated hierarchical
command structure, did not yield the intended result. Gender
conflicts cropped up in the relationship between male supervisors
and female pluckers, posing problems of control. The estate
management has since tried to solve this problem by appointing
more and more women to supervisory positions in the plucking
section.
After independence and reunification in 1961 the management
even intensified its controlling actions in an effort to increase labour
productivity and capital accumulation. It received constant support
for such efforts from the state in the form of  legislative measures,
ideological indoctrination and even the outright use of force.
Notes
1. See Agreement between the CDC and CDC Workers, dated 6 January
1990.
2. Letter of  Mrs Esther Itchiaha Simon to Estate Manager Tole Tea
Estate, dated 20 July 1979, in File MTPS/SWP/BU.95/S.1, Vol. IX,
Complaints from CDC.
3. See, for instance, CDC Press Release no. 39, dated 22 September
1975.
4. CDC, Règlement Intérieur (Revu), October 1982.
5. See Report of the Consultation Meeting with the Ministry of Labour
and Social Insurance at Provincial Level by Mr P.M. Kamga, dated 28
October 1989, in File MEPS/SWP/BU. 134, Vol. IV, General
Correspondence CDC.
90
Gender and Plantation Labour in Africa
6. Letter of  Senior Field Assistant, Tole Tea Estate, to Mrs Martha Meme,
Plucker at the Tole Tea Estate, dated 4 August 1981, in File MTPS/
SWP/BU.95/S.1, Vol. IX, Complaints from CDC.
7. See Letter of  Mr C.M.T. Babei, Acting Estate Manager at Mabeta
Rubber Estate to Mr Joseph Mokube, Tapper Section I, dated 27
June 1985, in File MTPS/DTPS/SWP/LB.2, Vol. XX, Complaints
from CDC.
8. See Letter of Provincial Inspector of Labour, Buea, to Administrative
Personnel Controller of CDC, dated 20 August 1980, in File MTPS/
SWP/BU.95/S.1, Vol. IX, Complaints from CDC.
91
5
Female workers and trade unionism
Introduction
In the previous chapters I argued that female workers have become
largely dependent on plantation labour for the reproduction of their
families, yet are poorly remunerated for their hard work and are
subject to intensive control in the labour process. In the next two
chapters I examine whether these women have engaged in any forms
of resistance against their control and exploitation.
Trade unionism is one of  the principal institutional modes of
labour resistance. A trade union was already in existence on the
CDC estates when the Tole Estate was reopened in 1954. In 1968
shop stewards were introduced on the CDC estates. What role has
trade unionism played in the defence of the female workers’
interests? And have female workers actively participated in trade
union activities? These are important questions, for it has often
been observed that women’s union participation, and their
mobilisation as union activists, universally tends to be low (Elson
& Pearson 1984; Pittin 1984; Ecevit 1991; Abdullah 1997).
In the first two sections I describe the actual role played by the
union and local shop stewards in defending workers’ interests. In
the final section I evaluate the female tea pluckers’ perception of
how the union is representing their interests and their active
participation in trade union activities.
Trade unionism on the CDC estates
Following the reopening of  the Tole Tea Estate, most workers on
the estate joined the already existing trade union on the CDC estates.
I have dealt elsewhere extensively with trade unionism on the CDC
estates (Konings 1993, 2011a). Hence, I shall briefly discuss those
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elements in the history of trade unionism that are directly relevant
to understanding female workers’ perception of  union performance
and their participation in trade union activities.
‘Free but responsible’ trade unionism, 1947-1972
In July 1947 a union was registered on the estates of the newly
established CDC, in accordance with the 1938 Nigerian Trade Union
Ordinance. This Cameroon Development Corporation Workers’ Union
(CDCWU) was soon to become the largest manual workers’ union in
West Africa, claiming a membership of  19,700 in 1952, approximately
four fifths of  the total labour force (Warmington 1960: 24).
Contrary to the CDC management, the British Trusteeship
Authority had not opposed the formation of  this union, if  only
because it saw it as a more sophisticated means of labour control.
In fact, the Labour Department had advised the union leaders on
administrative problems and moreover had launched an intensive
programme educating them in the principles of ‘sound’ trade
unionism. Sound trade unionism was equated with what I have
designated as ‘free but responsible’ trade unionism. The Labour
Department continually encouraged CDCWU leaders (i) to stay away
from ‘politics’, particularly with regard to the emerging nationalist
movements, and to restrict themselves to economic and industrial
demands; and (ii) to solve their conflicts with the CDC management
in a cordial manner, i.e. through negotiation and collective bargaining
rather than strikes. The freedom to strike was only to be exercised
if all other means of settling disputes, including conciliation and
arbitration, had failed. The Labour Department was soon assisted
in its educational efforts by the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), to which the CDCWU became affiliated.
The union leaders received regular invitations to attend ICFTU
courses, in which they were repeatedly exposed to the ideology of
‘free but responsible’ trade unionism (Beling 1968).
These educational efforts proved effective. The union leadership,
composed mainly of  male clerical workers and supervisory staff
members, generally played a ‘responsible’ role. In contrast with the
predominantly unskilled and semi-skilled union members, it was
inclined to rely on ‘peaceful’ negotiations with the employer rather
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than on militant strike action. Moreover, its level of educational
attainment enabled it to play the ‘complex game’ of collective
bargaining. The substantial number of  supervisory staff  members
in the union leadership often also had a personal interest in pursuing
a moderate, productionist and apolitical trade union policy, to retain
the good offices of  the corporation’s management.
The union leadership has always endeavoured to raise collective
demands with the management through negotiation and collective
bargaining and has continued to regard the strike weapon as a last
resort. It generally seized any opportunity to improve its relationship
with the management. On 3 June 1962, for example, it signed a
‘Heads of  Agreement’, in which it came to terms with the
management upon a number of issues, including the following: the
improvement of the existing machinery for negotiation and
consultation through the creation of a Joint Industrial Council (JIC)
and consultative committees at the various levels of the
corporation’s organisation; and the establishment of  a check-off
system within the corporation whereby a worker authorises the
employer to deduct the union dues from his wages and transfer
them directly to the union.1
The union leadership continued to be quite moderate, and wage
demands were based on meticulous calculations of rises in the cost
of  living. Moreover, its claims were often accompanied by promises
of  union assistance in managerial efforts to raise productivity. It
made several requests to the management to introduce or renew
incentive schemes, with a view to increasing labour productivity
and income (Wells & Warmington 1962: 168).
Like the management, the union leadership generally condemned
the numerous ‘unofficial’ strikes that occurred on the CDC estates
during the period 1947-1972 (Konings 1993). It strongly resented
these strikes, which were beyond its control and which threatened
to disturb its ‘cordial’ relationship with the management. It usually
tried to end the strikes. In exceptional cases, however, particularly
if the demands of the strikers proved justified, it might declare
them official.
Whilst the union leadership was in principle prepared to play a
‘constructive’ role, it was nevertheless compelled to declare a
considerable number of trade disputes during this period. In fact, it
94
Gender and Plantation Labour in Africa
regularly threatened management with strikes and, in some cases,
actually called workers out on strike. Two factors are largely
responsible for this situation. First, the management often refused
to meet and consult the union on important issues, to give in to
‘justified’ union demands, and to respect long-standing workers’
rights. Second, the rank and file exerted constant pressure on the
moderate leadership to use the strike weapon more freely to ‘bring
management to its knees’. The union leadership could hardly ignore
these pressures, as its income depended on the voluntary
contributions of its members until 1963, when the check-off system
was introduced.
The most important issues of conflict between management and
the union were:
• wages and conditions of  service. This has been a constant bone
of  contention. Owing to management’s hard-line attitude
in wage negotiations, the union leadership was compelled
at an early stage to develop a more aggressive bargaining
style, backing up its demands with strike threats. After
protracted negotiations, it actually called its members out
on strike in 1949, 1955, and 1966 (Warmington 1960;
Konings 1993). These strikes were successful. A majority
of  Tole workers took part in the 1955 and 1966 strikes.
As soon as these strikes were over, however, the union
leadership tried to restore its ‘cordial’ relationship with
management.
• the management’s gradual withdrawal of  a number of  social welfare
services. Ordinance no 39 (1946), which provided for the
foundation of the CDC, stipulated that the corporation
should not only aim at maximisation of capital
accumulation, but also devote special attention to the
workers’ social welfare (Epale 1985). As a consequence,
the newly established corporation invested a substantial
proportion of its profits in a social welfare scheme,
including the construction of  schools, hospitals and stores
(selling consumer goods to the workers at controlled prices).
However, following independence and reunification in
1961, the CDC management decided to scrap a number
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of  these services with a view to increasing capital
accumulation. The union leadership reacted to this
violation of  the 1946 Ordinance in two ways. On the one
hand, it vehemently opposed the handing over of schools
and hospitals to the government, all the more because it
was never properly consulted. On the other hand,
confronted with persistent cuts in the corporation’s social
welfare budget, it decided to take over some of the social
welfare services from the management and to initiate a
few other ones. It took over the corporation’s palm oil
scheme, which involved the sale of palm oil to the workers
at low cost, as well as some of the remaining stores which
had constantly been running at a loss. In addition, it
introduced a credit union scheme on the CDC estates
which became very popular among the workers (see above).
There is no doubt that the provision of  these services has
generally enhanced the standing of the union among its
members.
• the increase in task work as well as regular transfers and layoffs of
workers. Under constant pressure from the corporation’s
foreign financiers, the management began in the late 1960s
(i) to increase task work to an extent that a growing number
of workers were unable to complete their task and earn
the basic wage, and (ii) to transfer and lay off ‘surplus’
labour. The union used to support managerial efforts to
raise labour productivity, provided that increases in task
work would remain ‘reasonable’ and increased output
would be rewarded by higher wages, However, it made
very clear to the management that it was not prepared to
tolerate ‘excessive’ increases in task work and the frequent
occurrence of pro-rata payment. It also opposed any
redundancy plans and often threatened to call strikes on
this issue. Moreover, it accused the management of using
redundancies as a means of getting rid of militant workers
and union representatives.
These conflicts strengthened the managerial belief that the union
was more often than not an exponent of ‘reckless’ and ‘irresponsible’
trade unionism. The management therefore heartily welcomed the
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post-colonial state’s efforts to halt ‘unbridled’ strike action and to
replace the ‘colonial’ model of autonomous trade unionism by a
‘new’ model of state-controlled unionism.
The 1967 Federal Labour Code, which brought about a
harmonisation of  labour legislation in the Federal Republic, virtually
outlawed strikes. In the matter of  collective disputes, the Labour
Code requires that all channels available towards peaceful settlement
- principally, the conciliatory offices of  the Labour Inspector, and
arbitration - be exhausted before a strike may be called. ‘Illegal’
strike action may be punished with the termination of  workers’
employment contracts.
When the Cameroon National Union (CNU) emerged as the only
party on 1 September 1966, it soon became evident that the creation
of one central labour organisation and the subordination of the
trade union movement to the party would be the next steps in
President Ahidjo’s ‘hegemonic project’ (Bayart 1979).
The CDCWU leadership demonstrated a great commitment to
the achievement of  trade union unity in the Federal Republic, but
remained strongly opposed to state controls. It was only after
considerable pressure from the CNU party and Labour Inspectorate
(the former Labour Department) that it agreed to drop its claim of
union autonomy, albeit still reluctantly (Konings 1993).
Trade union unity and union subordination to the party were
eventually achieved by the creation of the National Union of
Cameroon Workers (NUCW). In February 1972 a Confederal Bureau
was elected to manage its affairs. Its president became a member of
the Central Committee of  the CNU.
The subordination of the NUCW to the party is manifest in the
Statutes, which stipulate that the party’s Political Bureau must be
represented at all levels of the NUCW and that no decision should
ever be taken by the NUCW without the Political Bureau’s approval.
Article 9 of the NUCW Statutes assigns a four-faceted role to
the trade union movement in national development: (i) to strive for
the implementation of labour laws in the enterprises; (ii) to ensure
discipline of workers within the enterprises and to organise therein
the systematic pursuit of an increased output; (iii) to broaden and
strengthen dialogue between employers and workers with a view to
a peaceful settlement of labour disputes; and (iv) to co-operate
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closely with the government within the framework of options
prescribed by the party for the attainment of national objectives of
social and economic development.
It is obvious that the party assumed that the ‘new’ trade union
model was going to transform trade unionism from a vehicle of
labour resistance into an instrument of  labour control and a
‘responsible’ partner in national development. Following the creation
of  the NUCW, the union leadership was co-opted into the labour
control structure - albeit in a subordinate position. It was supposed
to play a major role in national development, especially through the
education of workers in the ‘need’ for increased production and
constant ‘dialogue’ with the employers.
The NUCW was organised at both national and divisional levels.
The latter comprises (i) the divisional trade unions, unions belonging
to the same field or related fields of activities within the various
administrative divisions of Cameroon, and (ii) the divisional unions
of trade unions, federations of unions within the same administrative
divisions irrespective of  their fields of  activities.
After the establishment of  the NUCW, the CDCWU was
dissolved in September 1972. Its membership was then taken over
by two newly established divisional unions of agricultural workers
in the South West Province: the vast majority of  the former
CDCWU membership was absorbed into the Fako Agricultural
Workers’ Union (FAWU), and the remainder into the Meme
Agricultural Workers’ Union (MAWU). As the Tole Tea Estate is
situated in the Fako Division, I will restrict myself in this chapter
to a discussion of  the FAWU.
It should be noted that the role of  the FAWU is far more limited
than that of  the previous CDCWU. Since the reorganisation of  trade
unionism in the country, all important decisions concerning labour
are taken at the national level. The NUCW is represented in national
tripartite commissions, boards, and councils dealing with labour
matters, such as the National Labour Council and the National
Bargaining Board for Collective Agreements and Wages (Le Faou
1985). Divisional unions, like the FAWU, are no longer concerned
with collective bargaining and collective agreements. They
concentrate instead on the actual implementation of labour
legislation and decisions of these national institutions at the
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divisional level. In addition, they represent their members within
the NUCW machinery, educate them in the ‘need’ for social peace
and high productivity, and deal with individual and collective
grievances.
State-controlled trade unionism, 1972 to the present
From the very start, the FAWU experienced numerous internal and
external problems which prevented it from executing its ‘new’
responsibilities satisfactorily, at least until 1975. The new union
immediately faced serious financial problems. The existing check-
off system had been suspended, pending the national reorganisation
of  trade unionism. Workers were requested to sign new forms in
which they consented to the automatic deduction of the union dues
from their wages. Very few trade union officers, however, had
organised the actual signing of  these forms. Moreover, the
introduction of a new system for the distribution of the check-off
contributions aggravated the union’s financial crisis. In accordance
with the NUCW Statutes, the FAWU would receive 50% of  its
members’ contributions, the remainder being divided among the
national centre (30%) and the Fako Divisional Union of  Trade
Unions (FADUTU) (20%). A state-controlled National Committee
for Trade Union Contributions in Yaoundé was made responsible
for collecting and allocating the check-off contributions throughout
the country, resulting, not surprisingly, in frequent and often
protracted delays in the committee’s due remittances to the
divisional unions, as well as in massive embezzlement of  funds.
One of the gravest consequences of this crisis was that the new
union was no longer able to pay the salaries of  its full-time officers.
Even when it started receiving its share of the check-off
contributions in 1974, its monthly income only allowed for the
payment of four full-time officers - all men, save for the check-off
clerk. This meant that the newly elected president, Mr C.P.N.
Vewessee, scarcely received any assistance in running the union.
He soon became president of  the Fako Divisional Union of  Trade
Unions (FADUTU) as well, thus monopolising the most important
trade union functions in the Fako Division.
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The union lacked funds for the continuation of its welfare
services. Consequently, it stopped selling cheap palm oil to its
members and closed down its stores. This inevitably contributed to
the union’s loss of  standing among the workers.
There is substantial evidence that the CDC management took
advantage of the reorganisation of trade unionism and the new
union’s internal problems. Firstly, it ceased to respect previous
agreements with the former CDCWU and almost entirely ignored
the new union, as shown by its persistent refusal to invite the union
leadership for negotiations and consultations. Secondly, it undertook
a new offensive against ‘unproductive’ and ‘militant’ workers,
transferring and laying off a substantial number of them during the
corporation’s reorganisation in 1973.
The union petitioned the Provincial Inspector of Labour several
times to assist both parties in overcoming the complete breakdown
in industrial relations. Shortly after the election of  full-time union
officers on 8 May 1974, the Provincial Inspector of Labour finally
appealed to the CDC General Manager ‘to restore the formal cordial
relationship which existed between your management and the
defunct CDCWU and to extend the same mutual understanding to
the FAWU’.2 This appeal did not receive any positive reaction until
7 April 1975 when the newly appointed General Manager, Mr J.N.
Ngu, invited the union’s executive committee to his office and
promised it that ‘the union and management link would now be
restored’.3
The General Manager kept his word. After this meeting there
was a noticeable improvement in joint consultation at all levels.
Notably, certain issues of  vital importance to the workers, such as
redundancy and retirement, continued to be decided upon in ‘secret’
meetings between the union president and the General Manager,
without previous consultation of the union executive and shop
stewards. As these decisions often turned out unfavourable to the
workers, rumours rapidly spread among the rank and file that their
president had been ‘bought over’ by the General Manager. Although
the president continued to render services to his members,
representing their individual and collective grievances, the vast
majority of the rank and file had lost faith in him.
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Under constant supervision of  the party and the NUCW
Confederal Bureau, the union tended to give priority to the education
of  its members in the ‘need’ for social peace and high productivity.
During one of  the regular Workers’ Educational Seminars in 1982,
Mr Vewessee declared:
The union places priority in the education of the workers in order
to enhance and obtain maximum and quality production ... Since
the exploitation of our natural resources is basically in the hands of
Cameroonians, the word ‘confrontation’ should no longer have a
place in the trade union vocabulary, as this has been replaced by the
words ‘dialogue and consultation’.4
Mr Vewessee seems to have always been in high esteem within
management circles as a controller of  labour. He has regularly been
asked by management to explain ‘sensitive’ issues to the workers,
even to CDC workers outside the Fako Division, and to assist in
quelling any ‘illegal’ strikes. He has usually advocated severe
punishment for ‘ringleaders’ of  ‘illegal’ strikes, including termination
of contract. After the suppression of such strikes, however, he has
sometimes identified himself with the ‘genuine’ grievances of the
workers and tried to solve them in subsequent negotiations with
the state and management. In this way, he aims to demonstrate to
the workers that the union’s settlement of  conflicts through the
‘correct’ procedures was more likely than strike actions to satisfy
justified workers’ demands.
The severe economic crisis that hit the corporation since the
mid-1980s has further undermined the union’s representation and
defence of  workers’ interests. In view of  the continual deterioration
of  the corporation’s financial position, the union was requested by
the management in 1987 (i) to make suggestions on what
contributions the workers could make to lowering the corporation’s
production costs and its economic recovery, and (ii) to ‘sensitise’
the workers on the prevailing economic crisis and elicit their support
for any necessary austerity measures. On 3  August 1987 the union
agreed with management upon a series of measures to combat the
crisis, including a substantial increase in task work (see Chapter 6).
When these measures proved inadequate, a new agreement was
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concluded between union and management on 6 January 1990,
involving drastic cuts in workers’ income and fringe benefits (see
Chapter 3). The union leadership thought that its acceptance of
these draconian measures would save the jobs of  its members. This
again proved to be wishful thinking. Between 1990 and 1991 the
management implemented a new reorganisation plan involving mass
transfers and layoffs.
Interestingly, in the wake of  the political liberalisation process
in the 1990s, one could observe the gradual emergence of  conflicts
between the unions and the state: a number of trade union leaders,
especially in Anglophone Cameroon, began to strive for a return to
the ‘colonial’ model of  trade union autonomy, which they tended
to perceive as the best safeguard for the representation and defence
of  the workers’ interests. Clearly, this was a significant change in
the close post-colonial state-union relations. Even after Paul Biya
had taken over power from Ahidjo in 1982, the union continued to
strongly support the new government, and it faithfully followed any
changes initiated by the party. When the party changed its name
from Cameroon National Union (CNU) into Cameroon People’s
Democratic Movement (CPDM) at its Bamenda Congress in 1985,
the NUCW soon followed suit by changing its name into Cameroon
Trade Union Congress (CTUC). The union leadership also adopted
the party’s ideological ‘innovations’: it championed the party’s ‘new’
rhetoric of ‘rigour, moralisation and democratisation’ among the
workers (Mehler 1993; Konings 2009b). In the early 1990s,
however, the first signs of dissent disappeared. Faced with the
deteriorating economic situation and increasing calls in society for
political reforms and political pluralism, some union leaders began
criticising the regime in power and challenging the union’s
subordination to the party.
The FAWU president, Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, was actually the first
union leader who openly dared to attack the regime and demand a
return to trade union autonomy. Two factors may explain his bold
stand. First, Mr Vewessee hails from the North West Province that
became the centre of  Anglophone Cameroon’s opposition to the
regime and the cradle of  the struggle for political pluralism in the
country (Takougang & Krieger 1998; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003).
After the introduction of the multi-party system in Cameroon in
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1990, he joined the opposition. Secondly, having been one of  the
leading members of  the former CDCWU, he has never been in favour
of state control over the union, but was forced to accept it in the
then prevailing political situation. In February 1991, he declared:
The workers expect an independent and strong trade union
organisation that would be autonomous in relation to all political
parties and state bodies and institutions ... This will relieve the trade
union of  the rubber-stamp element in the country’s political life. If
the trade union does not become more militant and resolute in its
demands, then the CTUC won’t be of  much help to the workers.5
And on 1 May 1991, Labour Day, he added:
The trade unions in this country have been bedfellows with the single
political party and unable to do anything in the protection of
employment. The ‘New Deal’ dream has been a nightmare because
rigour and moralisation have only helped to make billionaires and
millionaires out of  a special group in the public service who are
appointed to financially milk public enterprises. Political pluralism
and an independent free trade union movement are the only hopes
to free this country from greed and regression.6
He strongly condemned the corrupt leadership of  the CTUC for its
continuing alliance with the ruling party and its complete neglect
of the defence of workers’ interests during the economic crisis and
the structural adjustment programme. His relentless efforts yielded
some success. On 2 April 1991, the CTUC recognised the rights of
its members to join the political party of their choice.7 Without a
doubt this can be seen as a landmark in the history of trade unionism
in Cameroon. Unfortunately, although the Cameroonian government
officially started commending trade union autonomy, it nevertheless
made renewed attempts to keep the unions under control. First, the
1992 Labour Code stated that any newly formed trade unions should
be registered. This enabled the state to deny legal existence to any
trade union suspected of supporting the opposition. Second, the
government continued to intervene in the existing unions and to
harass any members and leaders engaged in oppositional actions
(Konings 2009b).
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Shop stewards on the Tole Tea Estate
In 1968 shop stewards were introduced on the Tole Estate. In the
first part of this section, I describe their position and functions on
the estate. In the second part, I discuss their performance on the
estate.
The role of  shop stewards on the Tole Tea Estate
As in other CDC estates, there used to be a local union branch on
the Tole Estate. All the sections of  the estate were represented in
the branch executive. Like the union executive, the branch executive
consisted mainly of  male supervisory staff  members and clerical
workers. Apparently, no illiterate worker, either male or female, has
ever been a branch executive member. Warmington (1960: 27-28)
claims that the branch executives on the CDC estates were never
elected by democratic procedures:
What normally happened was that the branch general meeting, so
far as one was held, would be an informal one, attended only by a
selection of ‘leaders of opinion’ in the branch – usually some of the
more senior employees – who decided among themselves the best
people to nominate and appoint to the branch executive for the
coming year, and those who in fact would best serve the interests
of the workers as their representatives of the union.
The most important responsibilities of the branch executives were
(i) to implement the union’s policy at the branch level, and (ii) to
raise local individual and collective grievances with the estate
management. There used to be informal and formal consultative
meetings between the branch executive and the estate management,
though usually not on a regular basis.
The 1967 Federal Labour Code introduced shop stewards, the
so-called Staff Representatives, in the (larger) enterprises throughout
the national territory.8 This did not, in fact, involve a complete break
with the past. What actually happened was that the local union
representatives were now given a legal status and that their position
was regulated and protected by law. The Code clearly defined their
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conditions of eligibility and their functions, obliged the employer
to grant them some time for the proper execution of their functions
and to hold regular consultative meetings with them, and gave them
some legal protection against reprisals on the part of  the employer.
The Code laid down the following conditions of eligibility:
candidates should be over 20 years of age, be able to express
themselves in French or English, have been employed without
interruption in the enterprise for at least 12 months, and never have
been convicted of a criminal offence. In the wake of growing state
control over the unions after 1967, some other conditions of
eligibility actually carried more weight, and these were reaffirmed
by the First National Council of  Cameroon Trade Union Congress
(CTUC) held at Yaoundé from 2-4 October 1986:
The CTUC should (a) ensure that candidates for the elections of
Staff Representatives are effectively members of our trade union
organisation and our great national party; (b) take into account their
moral-conduct discipline and professional experience; and (c) ascertain
lastly that the candidate enjoys his full civic and civil rights. The CTUC
therefore has the duty to do everything necessary to ensure that the
Staff Representative should henceforth be, not just a troublemaker
who distinguishes himself at his place of work through his bad
behaviour or dictates to his employer under fallacious pretexts, but
rather a model worker in the full sense of the world.9
Evidently, some of  the conditions, like fluency in English or French,
professional experience, and the possession of certain moral qualities
such as ‘discipline and responsibility’ inevitably resulted in the
continuous nomination of a substantial number of clerical workers
and supervisory staff  members as candidates during Staff
Representative elections.
The union is responsible for the organisation of Staff
Representative elections, but it is obliged to carry out this
responsibility in close co-operation with the management and the
Labour Inspectorate. In the past it had the prerogative of ‘screening’
the candidates proposed by the workers and to present a final list.
This procedure enabled the union to discard any workers’ candidates
who were suspected of being militants or troublemakers, and replace
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them with loyal and responsible ones. At times, the management
tried to influence the election process and impose its own candidates
upon the union.
During the 1987 Staff Representative elections some changes
were introduced into the election procedure. Like the party, the
union declared that it had abandoned the list system. It claimed
that workers would now be offered a multiple choice of candidates
(though still nominated by the union) in a secret ballot. In practice,
however, it appears to have manipulated the election and election
procedures, for, after the elections, the Divisional Inspector of
Labour, Mr Charles Ebot Ayuk, blamed the union for ‘the
abnormalities in the choice of  candidates and the unfair manner in
which elections were carried out at the Tole Tea Estate’.10
Similar to the former union branch elections, each department
or section in the enterprise elects its own representatives. Although
the Staff Representatives are supposed to work in a team, each of
them is expected primarily to defend the interests of the workers
who voted them into office. Being employed in the same section/
department as their electorate, they are thought to be in a better
position to understand any individual and collective labour problems
arising in that section/department and raise them with the
management, the union, and the Labour Inspectorate. There is no
hierarchy in the team of Staff Representatives; each of them has
equal rights and powers. They and their elected substitutes hold
office for two years and may be re-elected.
This rule that each section/department elects its own
representatives has had some important consequences for the
representation of  women’s interests on the estate. On the one hand,
it gives female candidates in the female-dominated sections of the
estate, especially the plucking section, a good chance of being
elected. Female candidates in the tea plucking section tend to be
almost exclusively supervisory staff  members because of  the high
degree of  illiteracy among female pluckers. The plucking section is
entitled to two permanent and two substitute Staff  Representatives.
Table 5.1 shows that all these positions, except one, were occupied
by women in 1983.
The elected Staff Representatives are charged by the Labour
Code with the following responsibilities:
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• to refer to the employers any individual and collective
demands which have not directly been acceded to, in
respect of conditions of employment, workers’ protection,
application of collective agreements, classification of
occupations, and wage rates;
• to refer to the Inspectorate of Labour and Social Insurance
any complaint or representation respecting the application
of the laws and regulations which the said Inspectorate is
responsible for enforcing;
• to ensure that the rules relating to the hygiene and safety
of  workers and to social insurance are observed, and to
recommend any necessary action on these matters; and
• to transmit to the employer any useful suggestions for
improving the organisation and output of the enterprise.
Table 5.1  Staff  Representatives elected at the Tole Tea Estate on 18 January 1983
Source: Letter of Administrative Personnel Controller CDC to Provincial
Inspector of  Labour, dated 18 January 1983, in File MTPS/SWP/BU.180/
S.1, Vol. III, Election of  Staff  Representatives – CDC.
This shows that the Labour Code assigns a double role to Staff
Representatives: (i) the representation and defence of workers’
interests at the local level, and (ii) the promotion of output in the
enterprise. This role is therefore quite ambivalent and delicate. Staff
Representatives are subject to constant pressures from above and
below. Workers usually expect them to defend their interests at all
costs, even to the extent of violating the law on strike action. The
______________________________________________________________________________
 
SECTION/DEPARTMENT               Permanent  Staff  Subst itute Staff 
 Representatives          Representat ives 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
Field - Plucking                            Rose Enjeh Muyuka    Regina Amah 
                                             Justine Ngum           William Atabong 
Field – Weeding/Pruning      Mathias Anyacheck       Victor Bambot  
Office/Clinic            John Tangwa        Galega Gladys 
Factory                  Sampson Nganjing      Michael Tawung 
Wo rkshop                    John Linonge          Isaac Ndonga 
______________________________________________________________________________
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Labour Inspector, the employer, and the union, on the other hand,
view them as the lowest chain in the control structure over labour
and continually urge them to negotiate with the employer in a
peaceful manner and to help increase labour productivity. The
divisional union in particular plays a pivotal role in the control of
Staff Representatives, by ‘inculcating a sense of responsibility in
them in the discharge of their duties’ and constantly overseeing
their activities.11
Certain provisions in the Labour Code serve to guarantee proper
execution of  the Staff  Representatives’ duties. In agricultural
enterprises the employer must grant them 16 (paid) hours a month
for the performance of  their duties. In addition, he is obliged to
meet with them at least once a month for the airing of grievances
and to discuss suggestions for improvements in work organisation.
The Labour Code aims at protecting them from reprisals on the
part of the employer by requiring that prior authorisation be given
by the Labour Inspector before they may be dismissed or laid off. It
also demands that they be given priority in keeping their jobs or
being transferred to another service when workers are laid off.
The performance of  shop stewards on the Tole Tea Estate
Few Staff  Representative elections on the Tole Estate seem to have
passed without difficulties. In the very first elections in October
1968 there were problems with the list of candidates proposed by
the union. The workers, both male and female, threatened not to
cast their votes unless other candidates who enjoyed their support
were nominated. In the end, the union leadership was forced to
withdraw the original list and to present a new one more acceptable
to the workers.12
The elected Staff  Representatives have met formidable obstacles
in the execution of  their duties. The management appears to have
never fully trusted them, most probably out of  fear that they might
challenge its control over the labour process. The CDC
Administrative Personnel Controller, Mr I.N. Malafa, used to warn
them that ‘their duty was not only to defend the workers, but also
to urge them to have a productive spirit and respect constituted
authority at all times’.13
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Initially the management often refused to consult the Staff
Representatives, a practice facilitated by the emasculation of trade
unionism after the imposition of state control. It did not hesitate to
intimidate or even victimise any of them it suspected of being
militant champions of workers’ interests (Konings 1993). It was
not until 1 January 1976 that the CDC General Manager, Mr J.N.
Ngu, ordered estate managers to hold regular informal and formal
meetings with the Staff Representatives:
Estate managers are requested to pay more attention to the
development of good relations in their area of work than hitherto
and one way of furthering this is to make regular use of Joint
Consultative Committees. Informal meetings should also be
encouraged in order to deal with matters which call for immediate
attention.14
Although the General Manager’s request did encourage some
communication between management staff and Staff
Representatives, the relationship between the two parties continued
to be strained (see below).
The FAWU, too, has been of  little help to the Staff  Representatives
in the execution of their duties, except for organising short
educational courses. Many Staff  Representatives feel frustrated, and
sometimes even embarrassed, by the union leadership. They claim
that the union president, Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, looks down on them
in view of their low standard of education, and that he victimises
any of them who cause trouble to the management or oppose his
one-man rule over the union.15 He seldom informs them of  the
union’s activities or consults them on matters of  direct relevance
to the workers. On the other hand, he does regularly order them to
communicate to the workers painful decisions arrived at by the
management and union leadership, whereby they run the risk of
being accused of  betraying workers’ interests.
There have also been attempts by non-union members to obstruct
the work of  the Staff  Representatives. It was recorded that a small
group of non-union members began discrediting the incumbent Staff
Representatives in 1979. This group was composed mainly of
supervisory staff  members, clerks, and a handful of  workers, all of
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them men. It was backed by the Senior Field Assistant, Mr V.K.
Ngah, who was inclined to see the Staff Representatives as threats
to management and workers alike.16 The group held the Staff
Representatives responsible for:
• the increase in the plucking task in 1980 from 18 kg to 26
kg of green leaves (see Chapter 6). This created problems
for both pluckers and supervisory staff. Pluckers had trouble
completing their task, and supervisory staff  had problems
in achieving the production target and bonus as well as in
controlling the workers.
• the maintenance of the same plucking task on Saturdays
as on other working days. The Senior Field Assistant and
some overseers did not like being in the field on Saturdays
and preferred a reduction in the Saturday task.
• the exposure of certain financial misdeeds committed by
some clerks to gain sexual favours from female workers.17
The group attempted to stir up the workers against the Staff
Representatives. The Senior Field Assistant even refused to settle
individual disputes with the Staff Representatives, hoping this would
create the impression among the labour force that the Staff
Representatives were incapable of  handling their cases. In a letter
to the CDC Personnel Controller on 14 December 1981, the group
demanded the immediate dismissal of the incumbent Staff
Representatives and expressed its intention to participate in
forthcoming (1982) Staff  Representative elections.18 When the union
refused to nominate any of them as candidates, the group urged the
workers to resign from the union ‘as it was opposed to the holding
of open elections on the estate’. The workers, however, refused to
co-operate; they had no confidence in this group and identified it
with management.
Confronted with the persistent distrust of  management, lack of
union support, and opposition of non-union members, the Staff
Representatives could hardly have been expected to execute their
duties satisfactorily. One may, however, observe a considerable
variation in their individual representation of  workers’ interests.
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Some of them have come close to the ‘model worker’ preferred
by the management, union and Labour Inspectorate (see above).
For example, one of  the female Staff  Representatives, a clerk, was
selected in 1990 as a candidate for the ‘Best Employee Contest’ on
the estate because of her exemplary behaviour:
She concentrates on her job, hardly makes any mistakes, never
complains about doing anything, even if she will not be paid overtime,
renders accurate information, her records and personality are neat.
She leads a good social life. In short, she has been classified as the
best office worker this estate has had recently.19
Generally speaking, this type of Staff Representative tends to avoid
anything which may disturb his/her good relationship with the
employer, to be careful in his/her handling of workers’ grievances
and demands, and to constantly impress upon the workers the
necessity of hard work and co-operation with management.
Others use their position as an avenue to power and capital
accumulation. They lord it over the workers who have voted them
into office, demonstrate how important they are, and neglect the
representation of individual grievances to management, union, and
Labour Inspectorate unless they are remunerated in one way or
another. Still others concentrate almost exclusively on representing
the interests of friends, relatives, and members of their own ethnic
group. Finally, there are those who are sincerely committed to the
representation of the workers’ interests, even to the extent of calling
out a strike as a last resort. One of  these was Michael Tayong.
Case no. 5.1  A bold Staff  Representative
Michael Tayong was a pruner. He acquired a bad reputation in
management circles after his election as a Staff Representative in the
pruning section. In 1977 he was charged by the estate management
with having organised a go-slow of pruners which aimed at a
reduction in their task. On that occasion the management failed to
obtain the labour Inspector’s approval for his dismissal, but was
allowed to transfer him from the pruning section to the factory.
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Only one year later (1978) he was elected as one of the Staff
Representatives in the factory. In the course of  that same year the
management changed the shift system in the factory from two shifts
to three shifts of 8 hours, starting from midnight. As a result, the
workers lost their entitlement to a ‘basket allowance’ as provided
for in Article 45 of the 1976 National Collective Agreement
Governing Agricultural Activities and Related Activities:
Every worker who works at least eight hours at night stretching
over mid-night or ten hours in the day shall receive a basket
allowance, the amount of which shall not be less than twice the
hourly wage of category 4a for workers in categories 1 to 4 and
twice the hourly wage for the incremental position ‘a’ of the
category of the workers concerned for workers in category 5
and above.20
On 24 September 1978, Michael Tayong and six other workers
held a secret meeting in the camp at which they decided to no longer
follow the new factory roster. The 21 male and female workers,
who were to start work at midnight (the first shift) the following
day, did not report for work until 6 a.m. When the estate manager
was informed of  the strike action, he warned the strikers in writing
and appealed to the Staff Representatives to advise the workers to
keep to the new roster. However, the workers ignored his warning
and went on reporting at 6 a.m. until 28 September, when they
were driven out of the factory with the aid of the police and
dismissed.
The next morning, Tayong, together with another Staff
Representative, Mr Apollinaire Yamawe, tried to organise a solidarity
strike of  all the Tole Tea workers on behalf  of  their dismissed
colleagues. Their efforts largely failed, however, as the pluckers and
most other workers started work at 8 a.m. One of the main reasons
for this failure was that the workers did not want to risk losing their
jobs for an issue that applied only to the factory workers, especially
when it was already dealt with by the authorities concerned (see
below).
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The union president strongly condemned this illegal strike action.
Before the start of the strike, he had already raised the issue with the
CDC General Manager, having received a complaint from the Staff
Representatives. He pleaded for the reinstatement of  the 21 dismissed
workers, but endorsed management’s decision to terminate Tayong
and transfer Yamawe to another estate.21 In his recommendation to
the Ministry of  Labour in Yaoundé, the Provincial Inspector of
Labour warned the Minister that ‘the social situation at the CDC
Tole Tea Estate is really boiling and will soon explode if  no immediate
action is taken to arrest the situation’.22 In the end, the Minister
approved his recommendations.
The workers have always been dissatisfied with the performance
of  some Staff  Representatives. This often gave rise to tensions and
conflicts both within the team of Staff Representatives and between
the bad performers and the workers. The severest conflict developed
after the election of new Staff Representatives in January 1982.
Soon after these elections, two factions emerged within the team
of  Staff  Representatives. The leaders of  these factions were Pauline
Abid, an overseer in the plucking section, and Mathias Anyacheck,
an acting headman in the pruning section. These factions were not
based on gender. Mathias Anyacheck enjoyed the support of  some
female Staff Representatives as well as of a substantial number of
female pluckers. One reason was that Pauline Abid was not popular
among the female pluckers. She was known as an extremely
authoritarian overseer who strictly controlled her subordinates.
Another reason was that she had not been nominated by the pluckers
during the Staff  Representative elections. Her name nevertheless
appeared on the union list of  candidates. No wonder that the workers
believed that she owed her election to the union president, Mr C.P.N.
Vewessee. That impression was reinforced when she soon began
styling herself as the ‘captain’ of the team of Staff Representatives
and demanding that all individual grievances on the estate be
channelled to the management through her.
Clearly, this self-proclaimed leadership was a violation of  existing
legislation and the Statutes of  the NUCW, which stressed the equal
rights and powers of the Staff Representatives and prohibited the
creation of a hierarchical order in the team. There was no doubt in
the minds of the workers that Pauline Abid could never have claimed
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this illegal post without the approval of the union president. They
were well aware that the  latter had already appointed some of his
loyal ‘followers’ among the Staff Representatives as ‘spokesmen’
or ‘captains’ on other CDC estates and had charged them with
controlling the activities of militant Staff Representatives (Konings
1993).
Pauline Abid was feared by most Staff  Representatives. She was
a very domineering woman who maintained close links with
management staff and the union president. Some of the Staff
Representatives ascribed mystical powers to her and took her for a
witch. She continuously threatened her opponents in the team of
Staff Representatives, even removing a few of them from office.
She did not hesitate to co-opt into the team one of her favourite
colleagues in the plucking section who had not been voted into
office.
Mathias Anyacheck, who also acted as a witch doctor in the
labour camps, was not afraid to contest Pauline Abid’s power
position. He in fact became the mouthpiece of the growing
opposition against Pauline Abid’s ‘dictatorship’. This oppositional
role did not endear him to the union president, who seized the first
chance to victimise him. His request for promotion to the rank of
headman was rejected by the management, on the union president’s
recommendation; he was instead demoted from acting headman to
worker in the pruning section.
On 4 October 1982 an open confrontation took place between
Pauline Abid and Mathias Anyacheck. That morning Anyacheck
had taken time off to discuss two collective disputes with the union
president. On his return to the camp, he ran into Pauline Abid. She
shouted at him that he was plotting her overthrow and that he had
reported her and her followers to the union president. When he
denied this, she threw one of her files at him and threatened to
bring about his downfall. The workers perceived this open
confrontation as a big scandal. They were annoyed that such internal
struggles for power in the team of  Staff  Representatives were
interfering with the representation of  their interests.23
The growing discontent with Pauline Abid’s ‘ambition for power’
was fuelled by the exposure of some misdeeds committed by her
and two of  her followers in the team of  Staff  Representatives. The
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workers alleged that she had passed false reports to the management
and that a number of female pluckers had been punished by the
management as a result. Moreover, she was to have proposed to
the management the transfer of several workers, though Staff
Representatives have no authority to do so. And last but not least,
she was to have collected a contribution of  FCFA 50 per worker
for organising a witch-cleansing session, but this session had never
taken place and she had never accounted for the money. She was
also blamed for having condoned misbehaviour by Messrs Lucas
Fomuso and Johnson Bituaka, two of  her followers.
Mr Lucas Fomuso was the camp warden on the estate. Like
Pauline Abid, he had been nominated Staff Representative by the
union president rather than by the workers. The workers alleged
that he was demanding bribes for allocating rooms in the camps.
Obviously this would have been a lucrative business in view of the
serious shortage of  rooms there. Mr Johnson Bituaka had formerly
been a factory watchman but had later been transferred to the field
as a plucker (see Chapter 3, Case no. 3.1). He was accused by the
workers of  misconstruing facts and misinforming them of  decisions
taken by the team of  Staff  Representatives.
 On 1 November 1982, the Senior Field Assistant, Mr V.K. Ngah,
decided to intervene by calling a meeting with the Staff
Representatives. During this meeting he expressed his disapproval
of  the power struggle going on in the team and advised the three
Staff Representatives just mentioned to hand in their letters of
resignation to the union president on grounds of incompetence and
misbehaviour.24
His intervention presented Mathias Anyacheck and his faction
with an excellent opportunity to mobilise the workers for removal
of  these three Staff  Representatives. They organised a mass meeting
of workers on 11 November 1982 which unanimously voted to
replace the three Staff  Representatives. The next day they informed
the union president of this decision. The union president, however,
replied that he could not accept the decision unless it was signed by
the majority of  the workers, as prescribed by Ministerial Order no.
10 of 17 June 1968.
The signatures were delivered and the union president held a
meeting with the corporation’s Personnel Officer and the Staff
Representatives on 16 November 1982 to investigate the matter.
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This meeting was interrupted by the workers who came out en masse
demanding the transfer of the three Staff Representatives to another
estate. The workers believed that the union president was opposed
to their unanimous decision and was trying to keep Pauline Abid
and her two followers in office. The Personnel Officer, Mr J.S. Ekwa,
eventually persuaded them to return to the camp after assuring them
that he would discuss their complaint with the Provincial Inspector
of Labour at Buea.25 The Staff Representatives agreed to calm the
workers down, on the condition that their three colleagues accused
of misbehaviour would be transferred. Failure to do so would
inevitably result in strike action.
As the matter dragged on and strike action threatened, the
Provincial Inspector of Labour decided to settle the matter once
and for all. On 3 December 1982 he met on the estate with Staff
Representatives, the union president, and management
representatives. He strongly condemned the power struggle among
the Staff Representatives and the misbehaviour of some of them.
He also pointed out to the management that the procedures for
handling workers’ grievances were not being respected on the estate.
As the atmosphere in the meeting grew more and more tense due to
the menacing presence of a large number of workers outside the
meeting room, the Provincial Inspector decided to summon a mass
meeting of workers on 7 December 1982 before taking appropriate
measures to resolve the matter.
At this mass meeting, the workers declared that the union
president was the main cause of the troubles because he (i) had
imposed Staff Representatives who were not the workers’ choice,
and (ii) had elevated one Staff Representative to the illegal position
of ‘captain’. The Provincial Inspector persuaded the workers not
to single out any incumbent Staff Representatives for punishment,
especially in the form of  replacement or transfer, but to hold new
elections on 18 January 1983. Afterwards, he warned the union
president that
candidates to be put forward must be those of the choice of the
entire workers after due consultation in a general meeting of the
electoral bodies. You are no doubt familiar with the tone of  the
present agitation.26
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In the elections, Mathias Anyacheck and some of his followers were
re-elected, while Pauline Abid and her two unpopular allies were
defeated (see Table 5.1). Immediately following their victory,
Anyacheck and his followers sent a petition to the Provincial
Inspector of Labour requesting the removal of the union president:
We, the entire workers of  the Tole Tea Estate move a vote of
TOTAL AND COMPLETE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE in Fako
Agricultural Workers’ President, Mr Vewessee, and his leadership,
call on the Provincial Inspector of Labour and Social Insurance for
the South West Province, the President of  the NUCW, Yaoundé,
and the Minister of  Labour, Yaoundé, to take action and change
this present union president, Mr Vewessee, so as to redeem CDC
workers and avoid future problems of this nature and save the
union and workers from suffering further.27
No action was ever taken on this petition, however.
Conflicts of this nature have not occurred any more since 1983,
notwithstanding the fact that the economic crisis has badly impinged
upon the Staff  Representatives’ representation of  workers’ interests.
Both management and union leadership constantly pressure them
to focus on the increase in labour productivity rather than the
protection of  the workers’ interests, for the sake of  the corporation’s
economic recovery. At the time of  the economic crisis their most
important responsibilities became: (i) to attend the frequent meetings
organised by management and union leadership to discuss possible
worker contributions to the struggle for economic recovery, and
(ii) to assist the union leadership and the management in
implementing a series of unpopular measures taken at these meetings
(see above). Little time remained to discuss and settle the numerous
complaints of  the workers. Most workers therefore had no more
confidence in the Staff  Representatives.
Participation of  female workers in trade unionism
The vast majority of  the female workers on the Tole Estate are
union members. Female membership (87.5%) is even slightly higher
than male membership (84.5%). Of course, this high rate of female
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membership does not necessarily imply a high degree of participation
in the union, nor a high degree of  union popularity.
The following answers given by the women help explain the high
rate of female membership:
It is a tradition that you automatically become a union member as
soon as you start working.
The union is the normal channel of communicating your problems to
the management.
On the one hand, the women tend to perceive trade union
membership as virtually a ‘must’ or ‘automatism’. This is quite
understandable. First, new workers are usually immediately
approached by the union to sign check-off  forms. Shop stewards,
who are also supervisory staff  members, use their authority to
‘convince’ new workers in their section that they should sign the
forms and join the union. Once they are check-off  members, it is
quite difficult for the predominantly illiterate women to resign from
the union because of existing bureaucratic procedures: resignations
have to be directed to the President of the CTUC Confederal Bureau
at Yaoundé. Secondly, after the subordination of  the union to the
party, there were enormous pressures on workers to join both party
and union. Workers who did not possess union and party membership
cards ran the risk of being troubled by the forces of law and order
at the numerous checkpoints on the roads in Cameroon. It is hence
not surprising that most non-members claimed to have been
‘overlooked’ by the union, in the sense of having not (yet) been
asked to sign check-off  forms.
On the other hand, a large number of women equally seem to
have developed a ‘trade union consciousness’, since they tend to
look upon the union as the normal channel of  communicating their
individual and collective grievances to the management and the
Labour Inspectorate. This is doubtless the result of the relatively
long history of  trade unionism on the estate. The union leadership,
the management, and the Labour Inspectorate have always impressed
upon the workers that the union is the intermediary between workers
and management, and that they should therefore rely on the union
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for solving individual and collective disputes. Indeed, management
generally refuses to deal with the workers directly. It should be
emphasised, however, that although the women have usually
accepted the union’s intermediary role, they have never supported
the union unconditionally. If  union leadership and shop stewards
act promptly and energetically upon receipt of a complaint and
‘deliver the goods’, they can be sure of massive support among the
women. However, if they neglect the representation and defence
of  the women’s interests, they can expect women to circumvent
the union and seek alternative ways of defending their interests,
such as engaging in informal and collective actions.
Not surprisingly, during my fieldwork I found that most women
(76%) had lost confidence in the state-controlled union. The
remaining women have several complaints about the union’s
performance as well, but still considered it of  some help in
representing their individual and collective grievances. Especially
older women were still well aware of the considerable strength and
achievements of the autonomous CDCWU and deeply regretted
the present union decline.
The women have always been inclined to actively participate in
any collective action called by the union in defence of the
occupational interests of their own section or the total labour force.
In these actions they have fought side by side with the male workers.
However, they play a subordinate role in the administration of the
union and seldom participate in daily union affairs.
Like uneducated men, uneducated women have never shown
interest in standing for office, showing instead great dependence
on the educated union leaders for representing their grievances.
Formal and informal rules have effectively barred them from
competing for office. Moreover, those educated women, in particular
female supervisory staff  members, who did stand for office at the
local level, have always formed a tiny minority in the male-
dominated team of  Staff  Representatives. Nevertheless, a few
‘strong’ women, like Pauline Abid, played an exceptionally dominant
role at the local level.
The vast majority of female pluckers said they preferred female
Staff Representatives to defend their sectional interests, since ‘it
was easier for women to approach them’ and ‘they tend to understand
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women’s problems better than male Staff  Representatives’. The
example of Pauline Abid, however, clearly illustrates that female
pluckers will not hesitate to shift their allegiance to male Staff
Representatives should female ones fail to defend their interests.
No woman has ever played a leading role in the union at the
corporation level. This is not only due to the relatively small
proportion of women in the total CDC labour force and their lack
of  educational qualifications, but also to the persistent ideology of
male dominance. It would appear that women have never contested
the superior bargaining strength of the male clerks who have
dominated in the union leadership and who are derisively called the
‘academicians’. But there is still a considerable socio-cultural gap
between illiterate female pluckers and this type of  leadership, and
women have always remained somewhat suspicious of the union
leadership’s representation of  their interests.
Well aware of  the women’s conditional support, the male leaders
have always stressed that they were committed to defending the
interests of all workers and that women would benefit equally to
men when general concessions from management were gained.
During the period of autonomous unionism, they fought for
improvement in the living and working conditions of all workers
and achieved substantial results. Like the male members, female
workers highly valued such achievements. Unsurprisingly, the male
leaders tended to pay less attention to specific problems women
face in the labour process, such as initial differences in remuneration
between men and women, lack of training and promotions for
women, sexual harassment, and child care. However, if women
themselves reported such issues to the union, the union leadership
did often raise them in its meetings with management. There is no
evidence that the predominantly illiterate women have ever protested
against the male leaders’ neglect of their specific problems, or have
contemplated the creation of  a women’s union to represent their
interests vis-a-vis the employer and male co-workers (cf. Pittin 1984;
Abdullah 1997).
Finally, the vast majority of  the illiterate female workers seem
little acquainted with the union’s policies and day-to-day activities.
For example, I found that the female workers were not aware of
any changes in union policies during political liberalisation, such as
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the leadership’s pursuit of  a return to union autonomy. Mass
meetings at which the workers are consulted about or informed of
current union issues by Staff Representatives and union leaders,
are rare; if they occur, few women attend them. Most women told
me that they are not keen to do so because of their multiple
responsibilities and their illiteracy. It is only during serious disputes
with management that they turn out en masse for these meetings.
On such occasions, they often surround the negotiation room
together with their male colleagues in order to ‘check up’ on the
proceedings and – above all – the union leadership’s representation
of  their interests.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that the widely accepted
notion of a general lack of ‘trade union consciousness’ among female
workers needs some qualification, at least as far as female workers
at the Tole Estate go.28
It is true that women’s participation in daily trade union affairs
is low. Female pluckers at the Tole Estate participate little in the
decision-making process and rarely compete for office. Undoubtedly
this must be attributed among other causes, to their illiteracy and
lack of  time as well as to the union’s patriarchal structure.
However, I disagree that low participation in trade union affairs
necessarily implies a low degree of ‘trade union consciousness’.
Female pluckers at the Tole Estate have learnt to perceive the union
as the ‘normal’ intermediary channel for settlement of  their
individual and collective grievances with management. And they
are ready to participate actively in any action taken by union
leadership in defence of  their occupational interests.
I have stressed that their support for the union is still highly
conditional and instrumental. They expect the union to represent
their interests effectively and ‘deliver the goods’. If such
expectations are not met, they are inclined to bypass the union.
The establishment of state control over the union has brought about
a crisis of confidence in the union leadership and Staff
Representatives. Women’s growing dissatisfaction with the union’s
representation of their interests is manifested in their attempts (i)
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to appeal directly to the Labour Inspector for the settlement of
individual and collective grievances and (ii) to revert to alternative
modes of  resistance, in particular to informal and collective actions.
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6
Informal and collective actions of  female
workers
Introduction
African women have clearly demonstrated a capacity to protect their
interests individually and collectively. Collective actions of  women
have occurred in several African countries (Ardener 1975; O’Barr
1984; Parpart 1988b). Some of such actions have been documented
in the Bamenda Grassfields, the region of  origin of  most Tole Tea
women (Nkwi 1985; Diduk 1989; Shanklin 1990; Fonchingong et
al. 2008). These were in essence manifestations of  women’s
resistance against male abuse of power and the increasing loss of
female control over the means of production (land) and the labour
process in the colonial and post-colonial period.
Female pluckers on the Tole Estate have likewise proved capable
of  a variety of  informal and collective actions to protest against
their control and exploitation in the labour process, having perceived
that union leadership and Staff Representatives were neglecting
their interests and had failed to produce results.
The actions of the female pluckers challenged the initial
managerial assumption that women would be more docile than men.
The Tole Estate, in fact, soon acquired a bad reputation in
management circles. Time and again the management was forced
to admit that ‘the Tole Tea Estate is one of  the most troubled spots
on the CDC plantations’1 and that ‘output on the estate has remained
almost pathetically low’.2
In this chapter I want to focus on the variety of actions that
female pluckers waged against managerial efforts (i) to maximise
labour productivity, (ii) to assert control over the labour process,
and (iii) to minimise wages and other conditions of  service. These
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efforts, which are obviously crucial to capital accumulation, were
intensified during the economic crisis and became central to the
corporation’s adjustment measures.
Actions of female pluckers against managerial efforts to
increase labour productivity
Female pluckers have always been inclined to oppose managerial
efforts to raise the level of task work. The management usually
attributes their resistance to ‘laziness’. The pluckers for their part
give a different explanation. Most of them stressed that
Women are used to working hard, but they do not want to become
slaves. Therefore, we pluckers insist on being treated as human beings
in the field.
It appears to me that women tend to reject the capitalist work ethic,
which may lead to growing ‘dehumanisation’ and ‘exploitation’ in
the labour process, and insist on the use of non-capitalist criteria
for a definition of ‘hard work’. In their local communities, they
were compelled to work hard, but could at least control the pace of
work and did not feel ‘alienated’ in the labour process.
Female workers also gave a number of  other reasons for opposing
an increase in task work:
It is usually followed by an increase in pro-rata payments.
It leaves us hardly any time and energy to carry out our domestic
duties.
It raises conflicts among workers themselves (envy and competition)
and between workers and supervisory staff  (disciplinary actions).
It is interesting to observe that for a considerable period of  time
female pluckers have successfully resisted managerial attempts to
raise the level of  task work. Table 6.1 demonstrates that plucking
norms on the estate have hardly been increased by management
between 1963 and 1980. Female pluckers have employed several
strategies to achieve this remarkable result. One strategy was
complaining that the current task level was ‘too high’. Another was
to resort to strike action.
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The first recorded strike relating to task work occurred on 11
January 1963. The pluckers went on strike after repeated complaints
about ‘excessive’ task work and ‘continuous’ pro-rata payments.
They demanded an immediate abolition of task work.
Table 6.1  Plucking norms and incentive bonus at the Tole Tea Estate
Sources: Memorandum of  Agreement between CDC and CDCWU,
November 1963, Appendix B.1, Tea Pluckers and Pruners, in BNA, File
Qe (1958) 1, Trade Disputes; and Letter of  Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, President
of  FAWU, to General Manager of  CDC, dated 10 October 1988, in File
MTPS/IDTPS/SWP/BU.95/S.1, Vol. XII, Complaints from CDC.
The strike began without union approval. The union leadership
therefore refused to intervene on the strikers’ behalf. The strikers
subsequently nominated ‘spokesmen’ for the representation of their
grievances with the management. Feelings ran high during the strike.
As there were strong indications that the strikers might resort to
violence, the management decided to call on the forces of law and
order. One police officer responsible for restoring order on the estate
made the following report on the strike:3
____________________________________________________________________________________
 
YEAR    PLUCKING  INCENTIVE 
 NORM    BONUS 
                   ____________   
         
   Peak  Slack 
 Period    Period 
____________________________________________________________________________________
 
1963         35 lb     30 lb       FCFA 3 for every lb of leaves plucked above the norm 
1969        18 kg       16 kg       FCFA 7 for every kg of leaves plucked above the norm 
                                               FCFA 10 for every kg of leaves plucked in extra time 
1980     26 kg      14 kg    FCFA 15 for every kg of leaves plucked between 27 and 45 kg 
                                             FCFA 20 for every kg of leaves plucked between 46 and 55 kg 
                              FCFA 25 for every kg of leaves plucked above 55 kg 
1987      32 kg   18 kg      FCFA 15 for every kg of leaves plucked between 33 and 45 kg 
                                               FCFA 20 for every kg of leaves plucked between 46 and 55 kg 
                                                    FCFA 25 for every kg of leaves plucked above 55 kg 
____________________________________________________________________________________
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When I arrived at the estate, Corporal Gbong reported to me that
only a few of  the workers had turned up for work in the morning.
He further stated that when those who stayed at home noticed some
of their co-workers had defied the sit-down strike agreement, they
ran to the farm, seized tools from the working group and forced
them back to the camp. The constables around were protecting the
overseers and headmen as well as the management and the factory.
I noticed upon arrival that the workers had gathered in about four
groups. Two groups were seated at the camp and one group went
round the farm to ensure that no one was at work. Another group
tried to gain entrance into the factory but the police barred the
entrance. When I noticed that the people were determined to have
their way as they carried cutlasses, sticks, stones etc and that if the
people tried to disperse them an ugly situation might arise, I advised
the manager that the engine should be stopped. This was done and
the mob retreated quietly to the camp. During this encounter, five
gendarmes arrived under the command of  the Chief  Marechal de
Logis. The gendarme officer worked hand in hand with me and his
men patrolled the area along with the policemen.
CDC officials arrived earlier and were holding discussions with
spokesmen of  the workers in the manager’s office under police
guard, with a view to ironing out their differences. They finally agreed
on certain points and the spokesmen went down to the camp to
address the workers. We all wanted to see their reactions when the
decisions arrived at in the meeting would have [been] delivered to
them. The Assistant Commissioner arrived at Tole Farm at about
11.15 hrs with more reinforcement of 13 men including a rifle and
smoke party. The spokesmen addressed the workers and they all
agreed to go back to work as usual on the 12th of July 1963. The
spokesmen signed an undertaking to the CDC officials to this effect.
The Police Riot Unit together with the Assistant Commissioner,
myself  and the gendarme officers waited at the scene until the
workers quietly retreated to their homes in the camp. No arrests
were made. All being quiet, policemen were posted to guard the
factory and this will continue until tomorrow morning.
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In its negotiations with the spokesmen of the strikers, the
management recognised some of the grievances raised by the
pluckers during the strike, but it consented to neither a reduction
nor an abolition of task work. This outcome, of course, was hardly
satisfactory to the pluckers. After the strike they continued
protesting against ‘excessive’ task work. During the 1960s their
protests were often supported by the CDCWU (see Chapter 5).
Though confronted with increasing controls on the part of state,
management, and union, the pluckers did not abandon their protest
actions during the 1970s. On the contrary, they intensified their
actions in 1977 following a successful campaign by pruners for a
reduction in their task. The pruners had staged a strike in 1976 in
response to frequent instances of pro-rata payment and succeeded
in achieving a considerable task reduction. However, they did not
stop agitating, and even started a series of go-slows in 1977 aimed
at a further reduction.4 Encouraged by the pruners’ success, the
pluckers organised several actions as well. On 28 November 1977,
they refused to do overtime, even though many leaves were still on
the bushes. When ninety-three pluckers reported late for work the
following morning, they were sent home by the Senior Field Assistant,
Mr V.K. Ngah.5 The pluckers, in turn, staged a number of  go-slows
between November 1977 and March 1978, and these resulted in
frequent pro-rata payments.6
At the same time, they began agitating for a review of the
incentive bonus scheme (see table 6.1). When this scheme was
introduced on the estate, wages were quite low, FCFA 121-138 a
day, and any incentive bonus formed an attractive addition to the
pluckers’ meagre incomes. With wage increases over the years,
however, the unreviewed bonus no longer served as an incentive.7
In 1978 the prevailing plucking norm of  18 kg of  green leaves
provided the pluckers with the basic wage of  about FCFA 400.
Taking into account the bonus of  FCFA 7 for any kg of  green leaves
plucked above the norm, an extra 18 kg of  green leaves plucked
would add no more than FCFA 126 to the basic wage (see Table
6.1). It is not surprising that pluckers bitterly complained that
management did not want to give workers an appropriate reward
for the desired increase in labour productivity.
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Management ignored their complaint. The pluckers then refused
to stay in the field to work overtime. Neither the supervisory staff
nor the Staff  Representatives could change their minds.8 At a mass
meeting on 2 September 1978, the pluckers instructed Staff
Representatives to press both for a review of the plucking bonus
scheme and the payment of full wages to the pluckers who had
received pro-rata payments between November 1977 and March
1978.9 The management informed Staff  Representatives that it was
ready to negotiate on a review of the plucking bonus, but it would
not concede to the second demand.
After long negotiations, union leadership, Staff  Representatives
and management agreed on 8 July 1980 upon an increase in both
task work and incentive bonus (see table 6.1). This did not stop a
number of female pluckers from protesting a few years later (1982)
against this agreement and insisting on a reduction in the task.10
The management strongly resented this attitude to work and began
meting out severe punishments to ‘undisciplined’ and ‘lazy’ women.
In October 1982, for instance, it summarily dismissed one plucker,
Mrs Esther Egouach, for inciting her colleagues to stop working
before closing time due to bad weather. This was a widow with 8
children who had never received a warning in her 21 years of
service.11
In January 1987 the union leadership, Staff  Representatives and
management agreed on an increase in the level of task work from
26 kg to 32 kg of green leaves, as an adjustment measure to the
economic crisis (see table 6.1). While the new norms were
implemented on the Djuttitsa and Ndu Estates in June-July 1987,
female pluckers on the Tole Estate continued to resist this decision.
Eventually, the CDC General Manager was compelled to personally
call upon the union to persuade the Tole tea pluckers to accept the
decision.12 It was not till October 1987 that the Tole tea pluckers
reluctantly accepted the increase in task work at a mass meeting
organised by the union.
One year later, on 3 October 1988, 469 pluckers laid down their
roots. The estate manager inquired why they went on strike, but
received no reply. The Staff  Representatives tried but failed to
persuade the pluckers to resume work. The strikers told Staff
Representatives instead that they no longer had confidence in them
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‘because they had teamed up with the management’.13 Subsequently,
they marched to the Provincial Delegation of Labour at Buea,
singing battle songs and waving placards protesting against the high
plucking task. On their arrival, the Provincial Delegate of Labour
urged them to go back to work and settle their grievances through
peaceful negotiations. He then walked back with them to the estate.
On the estate they met the union president, Mr C.P.N. Vewessee,
who had been informed of  the strike by the management. He was
jeered when he asked their motives for going on strike. The strike
leaders then stated some of their grievances:
• that they were unable to complete the new plucking norm
of 32 kg, even though they stayed in the field from 6.30
a.m. to 6 p.m. As a result, they were continually being paid
pro-rata.
• that they had accepted the new norm on condition that
not only task workers but also other CDC workers would
be made to contribute to economic recovery. During the
mass meeting in October 1987 they had been told by the
union leadership that it had proposed a compulsory savings
scheme for workers who were not paid by results: these
workers would be compelled to save 10-15% of their
monthly wages to help the corporation’s economic recovery.
The union proposal, however, had not yet been
implemented by management. Consequently task workers,
like the tea pluckers, felt no longer bound to the new norm.
In reply, the union president pointed up the illegality of  their action
and requested them to heed the General Manager’s deadline of
reporting for work next day. All but seventy-nine strikers decided
to resume work. The refusers were sacked by the management. In a
letter to the CDC General Manager, the union president pleaded
for leniency towards the striking workers, but asked for severe
disciplinary measures against the ringleaders as a deterrent to anyone
planning ‘illegal’ strikes. He then tried to enlighten the General
Manager on the differing views of pluckers and union leaders on
the existing plucking norm:
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To give a good picture of  what the workers want, it is necessary for
me to briefly state that the lesser the task, the higher the overtask
bonus. From past plucking records, during the flush period, some
pluckers were able to pluck 90 kg, 80 kg, 70 kg and the least bring
45 kg. If  the task is brought down to 26 kg as the workers are
demanding, a worker bringing 90 kg will of course be earning more
than three and a half  day’s wages in a day and that can only have the
effect of  exaggerating the present cost of  production from 800
FCFA to about 1,000 FCFA per kg when nobody is buying the tea
at 500 FCFA.
While the union is out to see that workers are not being exploited,
we fail to see any justification on the part of the workers who would
want to insist on the review of the present task and the defined
quality which is two leaves and a bud. Besides, if the manager does
not insist on this quality, there is no doubt that the tea bushes will be
destroyed in less than five years.14
In addition to such sporadic collective actions, female pluckers have
continuously engaged in various individual, informal actions to
challenge the managerial pursuit of  increased labour productivity.
During my fieldwork I regularly observed various forms of  output
restriction, including late arrival at work, departure before closing
time, malingering and so on. Supervisory staff  have even caught
women making love in the fields during working hours. For example,
on 11 October 1986, the estate manager sanctioned two female
pluckers, as ‘it has been proved without any doubt that on 8 October
1986 you had sexual intercourse with a boy in the field during
working hours’.15
Without doubt the most serious threat to increased productivity
on the estate is absenteeism. The rate of absenteeism has always been
conspicuously high. This is due particularly to the large proportion
of  female workers in the estate’s total labour force. Women tend to
be absent from the estate more often than men because of their
multiple responsibilities outside the labour process, such as their
care for (sick) children, their work on the ‘chop farms’, and so on.
Already in 1967, Bederman noted the high rate of  absenteeism on
the estate:
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At no time will the complete labour force be working. The average
absenteeism rate among women is about 16% while it is 10% among
the men (Bederman 1967: 320).
Alarmed at this high rate of  absenteeism, the estate manager warned
the workers in 1983 that he would no longer tolerate their ‘laxity’
towards work attendance:
It has become a very bad hobby on the estate that workers decide
on when to go to work or not. This is very pronounced in the
plucking section where we have a total of 900 pluckers but we have
never, I say never had 700 pluckers present on one single day for the
past six years. In so doing very often one is tempted to recruit more
casual workers as the leaf often goes off-hand. With immediate
effect any person who takes three voluntary absences within one
month gets a warning and if any worker gets three of such warnings
his or her name will be removed from our books.16
The implementation of a series of disciplinary measures, however,
seems not to have effected a drastic reduction in absenteeism. On
13 October 1990 the estate manager requested the assistance of
the Staff Representatives in his fight against absenteeism:
While disciplinary measures are being considered as the last resort to
check the high wave of absenteeism, Staff Representatives will in
the first instance carry out a sensitisation campaign.17
At the same time, he prohibited one of the most common practices
of ‘absconding’ from the estate:
The practice whereby permission for absence is sought by somebody
else, when the real person is already away, ignorant of  whether the
request will even be granted or not was condemned. All permissions
must be approved before the persons leave the estate.18
One wonders, however, whether management will ever be able to
control absenteeism as long as women carry the dual burden of
productive and reproductive labour. The rate of  absenteeism on
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the estate appears to have reached alarming proportions during the
economic crisis. The estate manager reported to the union that
absenteeism was responsible for the loss of over 1,700 man-days in
July-August 1992. He estimated that the corporation’s financial loss
at about FCFA 11 million. He warned the union president that he
would not hesitate to dismiss more than a hundred workers if the
union and the shop stewards failed to end this situation. Apparently,
the managerial crusade against undisciplined and unproductive
workers has not yet been successful.
Actions of female workers against managerial efforts
to establish control over the labour process
The female pluckers have never questioned the hierarchical
organisation of production. They are habituated to the existence
of a hierarchical order both within the household and the society at
large. Their actions are normally oriented towards what they perceive
as an ‘inhuman’ or ‘uncompassionate’ exercise of constituted
authority.
During my fieldwork I discovered that the women draw a sharp
line between ‘wicked’ and ‘nice’ supervisors, and they direct their
anger at the former. ‘Wicked’ supervisors are those who treat them
as mere objects of production and display a large measure of
insensitivity to the workers’ plight. They may be differentiated into
two types. Firstly, supervisors who are notorious for being
authoritarian and bossy. They tend to command their subordinates
without taking into account their opinions and advice into account.
Secondly, supervisors who are overzealous in the exercise of  their
duties. They are merely interested in raising output, and therefore
supervise their subordinates closely and uncompassionately.
‘Nice’ supervisors, on the other hand, are those who treat their
subordinates as human beings in the labour process, taking their
personal and domestic problems into consideration in exercising
their supervisory powers. They generally do not supervise so strictly
as not to leave the women some measure of autonomy in executing
their allotted task. One of the pluckers gave me the following
description of  ‘nice’ supervisors:
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Nice supervisors show compassion and use their discretion. If  they
are informed that my child is ill, they will not bully me if  I cannot
concentrate on my work.
Wicked supervisors usually experience greater difficulties in
controlling workers than nice ones. Female workers tend to engage
in a range of  informal modes of  resistance against authoritarian
and overzealous control.
Women tend to be ‘stubborn’ towards wicked supervisors. They
regularly bluntly refuse to carry out an order given by such
supervisors, even if  such a refusal might lead to a serious breakdown
in the production process or a considerable loss of output.
Insubordination is often accompanied by insults and abuse, and in
some cases by physical attacks on supervisory staff. Women also
play tricks on wicked supervisors or discredit them with their superiors
with false accusations of  bribery, corruption and other vices.
A quite common way of  stonewalling supervisors is to invoke
their authority when they are around, but as soon as they have turned
their backs to mock and ridicule them as well as ‘relaxing’ and
‘playing around’. A more vicious means of ‘lashing out’ is the threat
of  using mystical powers against supervisory staff. It is hard for the
latter to know whether such a threat is real or merely a bluff. In
1988 a supervisory staff  member alleged that one of  the female
workers had threatened to kill him by witchcraft;
 I wish to report to you as boss of this estate that Rose Ebanja is
threatening my life. She is not only doing this. She has taken an
irrevocable oath to kill me. Here is part of what she was saying:
You will see, I will show you that women can be above men. Mr
Kaba has been recently transported to Bamenda dead, the next corpse
to be transported to Bamenda is yours. I am saying this and you all
take it like a joke but when he will die you will be surprised. I will
spend the bit I have and even a loan for this purpose. He must die.19
The female workers have also been engaged from time to time in
collective actions against authoritarian and overzealous managerial
and supervisory staff. Such collective actions are usually aimed at
the latter’s removal from office.
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One of the demands of the pluckers during the 1963 strike described
above was the immediate transfer of  the estate manager, Mr K.P.
MacNicol, and an overseer in the plucking section, Mr Lawrence
Bana. They were held responsible for ‘excessive’ task work, frequent
pro-rata payments and dismissals of  workers. In 1969 pluckers
agitated for the transfer of Mr E.A. Eloundou, at the time a Senior
Field Assistant on the estate. They accused him of (i) having
destroyed a number of baskets of green leaves, which according to
him had been crushed beyond redemption by the pluckers and (ii)
having kicked the women involved.20 The estate manager blamed
one of the Staff Representatives in the plucking section for this
disturbance. She had never approached him on the issue, but had
incited the women to agitate. Moreover, he suggested that
the real basic trouble lies in a general resentment at the sharp fall in
bonus earning opportunities 12 months ago when higher plucking
standards were required by the management. It was Mr Eloundou’s
unenviable task to bring about these improved standards.21
In the end, he asked Mr Eloundou to improve his relationship with
the women.
Apparently, he did not do so, for his relationship with the women
continued to be strained, even after his promotion to estate manager.
On 23 November 1976, the workers threatened to go on strike, if
Mr Eloundou was not immediately transferred. The following
charges were raised against him:22
• maltreatment of workers. The workers alleged that Mr
Eloundou treated them ‘with scorn’. They cited an incident
on 17 November 1976, when he bullied the Staff
Representatives and refused to discuss task work with them.
They stated that they were no longer willing to work under
him, since he seemed uninterested in listening to their
problems.
• irresponsibility. The workers claimed that immediately after
a conciliation meeting with the Provincial Delegate of
Labour on 16 November 1976, Mr Eloundou rushed to
the field and threatened to sack any workers who failed to
complete the daily task. He even issued warning letters to
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several of them. Owing to his irresponsible behaviour,
output had continued to fall on the estate.
• total disregard for his subordinates. The workers maintained
that Mr Eloundou failed to provide them with opportunities
for training and promotion. Accordingly, whenever
vacancies occurred for training and promotion, he gave
preference to qualified people from outside the estate. In
April 1976 the workers had already declared a trade dispute
after his appointment of  a fresh recruit to the position of
overseer. On that occasion they had demanded the
introduction of  a training scheme for deserving workers.23
The matter was settled upon the intervention of  the Provincial
Inspector of  Labour.
During the period 1977-1979 there were regular threats of strike
action following the alleged victimisation of militant Staff
Representatives and workers,24 but no strikes actually took place
on this issue.
On 11 May 1978 the workers declared a trade dispute against
Mr Anthony Bame, a senior overseer in the plucking section. They
demanded a transfer because he ‘had become a nuisance to the
workers’.25 They charged him with (i) maltreatment of female
pluckers during working hours, (ii) bribery and corruption, and (iii)
creating confusion in the plucking section. To substantiate their
accusations, they cited a letter from one Mrs Olga Bih that read as
follows:
This Anthony Bame has been asking me since last year (1976) whether
I was not interested in becoming a headwoman. He told me one
day that there was a chance for me to become a headwoman and
asked me to give him FCFA 6,000 on 4 November 1977.
During his investigations the Provincial Inspector of Labour
discovered that Mrs Bih’s story was fabricated, as part of  a ‘plot’ to
bring on the downfall of  this overzealous overseer. He consequently
summoned the workers to withdraw their trade dispute because all
their allegations had turned out unjustified.
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Collective actions against supervisory and managerial staff
members have no longer been occurring during the economic crisis.
Female pluckers seem to realise that such actions have  become
risky as well as ineffective. The management actively encourages
the supervisory and managerial staff  members during the crisis to
strictly control their subordinates, to use their authority to the fullest
and if necessary to discipline any worker without compassion. It is
evident that management will no longer tolerate any collective action
which aims at transfer or dismissal of authoritarian and overzealous
supervisory and managerial staff  members. Subsequently, the female
pluckers have switched from collective to informal modes of
resistance against their subjection in the labour process.
Actions of female workers against managerial efforts
to minimise wages and other conditions of  service
As we have seen in Chapter 3, wages and conditions of  service
were negotiated between management and union until 1969, when
a National Joint Bargaining Board for Collective Agreements and
Wages was installed by the government. In October 1970 this Board
adopted a classification of workers into 12 categories, with minimum
salaries attached to each category. Its classification was introduced
into the corporation in 1971.
The classification adopted has been a continuous source of
conflict on the Tole Estate. Like other field workers on the estate,
female pluckers have protested against the category they were
classified in. This led to numerous collective trade disputes and
threats of strike action.26
The pluckers were initially placed in Category 1, the lowest
category comprising unskilled labour. This caused a great deal of
disgruntlement among the pluckers who looked upon their
classification as a serious underestimation of the skills required for
plucking and an attempt to underpay them. After numerous
complaints to the management, they declared a collective dispute
on 9 April 1976.27 Following a close examination of  the issue, the
Provincial Inspector of  Labour ruled on 28 May 1976 that the
pluckers should be placed in Category 2 (semi-skilled labour), with
effect from 1 April 1976.28
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In June 1976 the Tole Tea workers joined a general strike of  the
CDC workers. This strike, which was not supported by the union,
arose from the matter of payment of gratuities and 1971-1973 wage
increases, but it soon became a manifestation of the CDC workers’
general discontent with the low remuneration for their hard work.
The workers resumed work only when management had agreed that
workers’ representatives would be allowed to attend the verification
of the payment of gratuities and the wage increases by a delegation
of  the Ministry of  Labour.29
 In early 1992, all the CDC workers in the Fako Division,
including the Tole female pluckers, started to agitate for (i) the
abrogation of the January 1990 agreement between the CDC
management and the union leadership which had resulted in a drastic
reduction in their fringe benefits and the introduction of a
compulsory savings scheme, and (ii) the immediate payment of
seven quarters of  family allowance arrears. The CDC management,
however, refused to withdraw the agreement. The only concession
it was eventually willing to make was to offer a 3% reduction in the
compulsory savings rate so as to partly compensate the workers for
tax increases. This offer was unacceptable to the workers. When
the management declined to reconsider, CDC workers in the Fako
Division, including the Tole female pluckers, went on strike from
21 to 26 May 1992. After this strike, the management agreed upon
various amendments of the 6 January 1990 agreement as well as a
24% reduction in medical costs.
 Besides collective action, female pluckers have engaged in many
kinds of  informal actions in protest against low remuneration. These
included output restriction, sabotage and involvement in ‘illegal’
income-generating activities. Some women do not keep to the
plucking standards. They add bad leaves to the good ones, a practice
which enables them to complete their task earlier and to achieve
more weight and income. Others steal tea from the factory and sell
it to middlemen. Still others cut tea bushes and prunings to use
them for firewood.30 These and other ‘illegal’ activities are not only
expressions of protest, but also provide welcome additions to the
women’s meagre incomes.
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Conclusion
The material presented in this chapter challenges the common
managerial assumption that female workers in the developing
countries are easier to control than male workers. The Tole Estate
management, in fact, has never succeeded in creating a docile female
labour force. Female pluckers have always been wont to defend
their occupational interests independently, whenever they perceived
that the union was unresponsive to their demands. They have
engaged in a variety of  informal and collective actions to challenge
their control and exploitation. Spectacular collective actions, of
course, tend to be more risky than informal actions in a situation
where the state strives to achieve ‘total’ control over civil society
and where strikes are virtually outlawed. Strikes only occur as a last
resort when other means of defence are unavailable or have failed.
The actions of female pluckers may not always have achieved
their direct objectives, but they should not be judged solely in terms
of their effects on pay and conditions of work. They should also be
conceived as important opportunities for raising women’s capacities
for self-organisation and self-confidence.
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Part II
The Ndu Tea Estate
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Introduction
In 1957 the Estates and Agency Company Ltd (EAC), a British-
Indian multinational enterprise, started construction of  a tea estate
at Ndu, a chiefdom situated in the Donga-Mantung Division, one
of  the more isolated areas in the Bamenda Grassfields. The creation
of this estate had a significant impact on local and regional
development. It transformed Ndu from a small, economically
unimportant town into a regional economic centre. Moreover, it
was at that time the only agro-industrial enterprise in the entire
Bamenda Grassfields and one of the few enterprises in the region
offering wage employment.
Like most other areas in the Grassfields (Nkwi & Warnier 1982;
Fisiy 1992; Warnier 2009), the Donga-Mantung Division was
characterised by highly complex socio-political forms of  organisation
headed by powerful, even sacred, chiefs. The establishment of  the
estate was, therefore, inevitably, the outcome of  a negotiation
process between the chief  of  Ndu and the EAC. In return for the
chief ’s supply of  land and labour, the EAC promised to invest
substantial capital resources in tea production in the local
community.
Strikingly, in contrast to the Tole Estate, the Ndu Estate started
to employ almost exclusively male pluckers. This raises a number
of  important questions: (i) Why did the EAC management opt for
the recruitment of  male pluckers?  (ii) Which category of  men tended
to sell its labour power to the management? And (iii) are there any
differences in remuneration between Ndu male pluckers and Tole
female pluckers?
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Ndu society
Ndu is located between Kumbo, the capital of  Bui Division, and
Nkambe, the capital of Donga-Mantung Division. It is linked with
these two and other important towns in the North West Province
by the Ring Road. This is a gravel road, and during the height of the
rainy season some sections of it are motorable only in four-wheel
drive vehicles.
The local population belongs to the Wimbum, the most important
ethnic group in the Donga-Mantung Division. There is scarcely any
published material on this group (Jeffries 1962; Chilver & Kaberry
1967; Nkwi & Warnier 1982; Pool 1989; Probst & Bühler 1990).
These sources mention that after their migration from their mythical
home Kimi to their present habitat, the Wimbum faced horrendous
raids by the Fulani and encroachment on their land by the
neighbouring Nso.
The Wimbum comprise between 60,000 and 70,000 people and
are divided into three distinct clans, the Tang, the War and the Wiya.
Although oral tradition has it that the three clans arrived in the area
from different points of origin and at different times, they nonetheless
speak one language. Ndu is the largest of  the Wiya chiefdoms.
In contrast to societies in the southwestern plantation area such
as the Bakweri, the Wimbum possess a complex hierarchical socio-
political organisation. Each village has a chief, or fon as he is nowadays
called throughout the Grassfields. Each of  the Wimbum clans had a
senior chief who was recognised by the British for administrative
purposes. The chief  of  Ndu, who was then regarded as head of  the
Wiya clan, is still the most influential of the Wimbum chiefs and is
for this reason seen by some as the leader of all the Wimbum.
The chief is assisted in the execution of his responsibilities by
quarter-heads, councillors and a number of other important
(hereditary) title and office holders. These assistants are almost
invariably men, except the princess interrex and holders of ritual
incumbencies. Title and office holders can be grouped together in
(a) members of  the ruling dynasty, (b) members of  retainer lineages
among whom the personal attendants of  the chief  are recruited,
and (c) descendants of  groups of  immigrants who, in the course of
time, became voluntary allies to the chief.
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The complex system of titles and offices, some imported, is
expressed most vividly in the different colourful designs of the caps
worn by the men. These titles and offices are vested in the lineages
and in the various men’s fraternities such as the nwarong, a secret
society responsible for maintaining law and order in society; ngirri,
the society of princes; and the two warrior and hunting societies
nfuh and samba.
The striving to rise within these institutions to attain a position
of influence and prestige is common throughout the population
and thus furnishes internal flexibility to an otherwise stiffly stratified
social system (Probst & Bühler 1990). In fact, traditional institutions
have from time immemorial co-opted within their ranks prominent
people of  the community. The most common mechanism is to honour
such persons with a non-hereditary title. Titles and membership in
titled societies became important pieces of ‘symbolic capital’, and
thus an object of  accumulation. Titles served both to incorporate
ambitious and powerful men into the traditional government and
to facilitate the personal careers of these men (Goheen 1993, 1996;
Aletum & Fisiy 1989).
Agriculture was – and still is – the mainstay of  the local economy.
There used to be a clear sexual division of  labour. The role of  men
was usually limited to clearing new farms and transporting the
harvest. The women did all the rest of  the work. Girls assisted
their mothers from a very early age. Women grew a variety of  food
crops to feed the family and – increasingly – to market a surplus
and earn an income of their own. These food crops included maize,
guinea corn, cocoyam, cassava, groundnuts, beans, sweet and Irish
potatoes. Women were socialised in their food-producing role to
such an extent that they tended to be proud of this very demanding
responsibility; and their prestige within the family and village
depended on the quantity and quality of food they produced.
The men used to hunt and trade in small livestock (poultry, pigs,
sheep and goats), kola nuts and palm products (palm oil, palm wine,
and raphia). They engaged in the long-distance trade in kola nuts to
Nigeria, which used to be an important source of income before
the start of  labour migration and coffee production. Following the
example of the nomadic Fulani (Mbororo and Aku) in the area,
they also began to raise cattle.
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After the Second World War, there were two important changes
in the men’s roles:
• First, there was a steady increase in male labour migration
to the southwestern plantations (DeLancey 1973: 123).
Local labour resources had hardly been exploited after the
establishment of  colonial rule because of  the isolated
position of the Wimbum area in the Bamenda Grassfields
(Ardener et al. 1960: 205). Serious shortages of labour on
the southwestern estates after World War II encouraged
active labour recruitment among Wimbum men. Gwan
(1975: 148) claims that about 5-6% of southwestern
plantation labour during the 1960s and 1970s came from
the Donga-Mantung Division.
• Secondly, the introduction of  Arabica coffee provided a
new, major source of  revenue to the men and insurance
against old age. Cash crop production, together with
population growth, expansion of cattle herds of the Fulani,
who share the region with the Wimbum, and the creation
of the tea estate, have caused mounting pressure on the
land. As a result, women experience difficulties in finding
land for food cultivation (Fisiy 1992).
The creation of  the tea estate in 1957 had an enormous impact on
Ndu society. Most of  my informants referred to it as a milestone in
the history of Ndu. The estate provided local wage employment
and, in its wake, a whole range of other income-generating activities,
especially in trade, commerce and services. It thus transformed Ndu
from a small, insignificant town into a bustling regional commercial
centre.
Agreement between EAC and the chief  of  Ndu
In the early 1950s the EAC owned eleven tea estates in India and
Sri Lanka as well as mines and a chain of hotels in different parts
of the world. In search of further investments, it participated in
1955 in a mission of British investors to Anglophone Cameroon.
During a visit to the Bamenda Grassfields, the EAC representatives
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collected soil samples in the Ndu area. These samples were later
analysed in the company’s Head Office in London and it was
discovered that the soils at Ndu were suitable for tea production.
Soon afterwards, in March 1956 an EAC team led by one of  the
company’s directors, Mr. Sydney Bolster, returned to Anglophone
Cameroon. It was commissioned to survey the Ndu area for the
purpose of setting up an estate. When the team arrived at Bamenda,
the Provincial Administrator instructed the Senior Divisional Officer
(SDO) of Nkambe to conduct the team to Ndu.
The SDO, however, was personally more in favour of
establishing a tea estate at Nkambe than at Ndu, for it would
contribute to the rapid development of the divisional capital.
Therefore he decided to ignore the instruction given by his superior
and to direct the team to Nkambe instead of to Ndu. Unaware of
the SDO’s intentions, the team arrived at Nkambe and started to
survey the area in the vicinity of  the town. The local population
had not received any information about the objectives of  the team’s
mission. When rumours spread that its farming and grazing lands
were about to be expropriated, it revolted and started to erect
barricades to block the team’s access to its lands. The team then
explained its mission to the local chiefs, but they disapproved of
the project, on the grounds that it would endanger women’s food
production and the Fulani’s cattle grazing (Ngenge 1983).
The team was shocked when it learnt from the chiefs that it has
been misdirected by the SDO. It took off  at once for Ndu.
Accompanied by two local parliamentarians, Messrs J. Nsame and
J.T. Ndze, it approached the then chief  of  Ndu, His Royal Highness
William Nformi. It told the chief  that it planned to survey the area
and requested that he allocate land for the creation of a tea estate.
The two deputies were able to convince the chief of the benefits
of the introduction of tea production in his area of jurisdiction: it
would stimulate local development and halt the growing flow of
labour to the southwestern plantations. The chief  then offered EAC
a vast land of  approximately 1,660 ha between Ndu and Tatum, a
Nso village located at the border of  the Ndu and Nso territory.
One of his motives for allocating this specific site was to prevent
the Nso from further encroaching on his land: the estate would
serve as a permanent boundary between the Ndu and Nso territory
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and put an end to the numerous land and boundary disputes (cf.
Nkwi 2011). Consequent upon the chief ’s decision, farmers and
graziers in the allocated area had to be displaced. The company
agreed to compensate them for the loss of  their lands.
The chief stressed that the land was not sold but rather given
‘freely’ to the company for the purpose of cultivation (and could,
therefore, always be reclaimed). Nonetheless, he made it clear to
the team that he, as the custodian of the land, could customarily
expect some ‘token compensation’ from the beneficiary for the
benevolent provision of the land. It was finally agreed that the
company would pay the chief  an annual amount of  FCFA 660,000
and also provide him with some additional benefits such as the free
supply of  transport, electricity, water and wood.
This agreement signified the start of a close alliance between
the estate management and the chief. The chief has always been
greatly concerned with what was happening on ‘his’ land and
strongly believed that the company’s prosperity would be of
enormous benefit to the local community. He has regularly
performed a number of  rites to protect the company against any
misfortune. He has also played an important role in labour control
(see Chapter 8). This does not mean that the relationship between
the chief and the company has remained without conflict. Most
conflicts arose from the company’s infringement upon the original
agreement, in particular its unilateral withdrawal of certain benefits
to be enjoyed by the chief. It has, in fact, never supplied electricity
and water to the chief ’s palace. In 1967 it suddenly stopped paying
the annual ‘land rent’ to the chief; and it was only after several
complaints of the chief that it proposed to replace this land rent
with a monthly allowance of  FCFA 16,000. Although this implied
a drastic reduction in his income, the chief eventually accepted
this offer after the management had explained to him that it intended
to invest its scarce financial resources in the further expansion of
the estate. In 1976, it withdrew all the benefits of the chief, because
of ‘its incapacity to meet its obligations during the financial crisis
facing the company’.
Following the takeover of  the estate by the CDC in 1977, the
monthly allowance of the chief was re-introduced and even raised
to FCFA 25,000, but in 1982 payment was stopped. The chief ’s
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successor, installed in 1982, has often protested to the state
authorities and the CDC management against the withdrawal of
his benefits, threatening at times to reclaim the land, ‘as it was never
sold’. This threat now seems to be without any effect, as the state
can now claim any land needed for development purposes (Fisiy
1992), and automatically acquires any land occupied by a parastatal
body.
During the negotiations the chief expressed his fear that estate
employment might disturb his subjects’ loyalty to ‘traditional’ norms
and authority patterns. Therefore, he made the actual creation of
the estate conditional upon the company’s acceptance of  certain
rules in respect of  labour recruitment.
The first rule was that employment on the estate should be a
virtual male monopoly. The chief  rejected out of  hand the team’s
proposal to employ female pluckers on the estate, as it might
challenge ‘traditional’ male control over women’s productive and
reproductive labour: female workers would be inclined to neglect
food production on the family farms and to become ‘harlots’. In the
end, however, he agreed that women might be employed as casual
and temporary weeders on the estate, especially during the
agricultural off-season in the local economy. It was only in 1983
that his newly elected successor – a university graduate – allowed
the CDC to employ women as permanent tea pluckers.
There is ample evidence that male workers on the estate supported
the chief ’s negative attitude towards female employment. Most
women who started to work on the estate on temporary weeding
contracts were not Wimbum but Nso, living in Tatum. They faced a
tough time on the estate. Several reports mention that male workers
engaged in various modes of resistance against their employment.
On 8 November 1962, the first estate manager, Mr J.M.H. Barrable,
lodged a complaint with the union about this behaviour of the men:
Recently, there were many women who reported that they had been
threatened in various ways should they work on contracts on the
estate ... This is not in the interest of the estate. At certain times of
the year, work becomes out of hand due to the quick growth of
weeds, and only by employing contract workers can this be held in
check.1
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It is also reported that some male overseers were inclined to maltreat
these women. In 1962 the women even threatened to stop weeding
on the estate, if one overseer, Mr Michael Monde, was not sacked.
They accused him of persistent use of abusive language and
underpayment:
These are important points about contract women. They finished
their work and Mr Michael Monde told the manager to pay them
half money and tell them that they were bad women. All the women
say that if Mr Monde shall not be sacked they will not more come
to rake contract work.2
Male opposition to female employment on the estate has never
disappeared altogether. This is clearly reflected in the Minutes of
the Staff Representatives’ Preparatory Meetings during the 1980s:
On 6 April 1983 a member wanted to know why male workers are
being terminated but females do a continuous job.
On 10 June 1986 it was remarked that employment of females
should be well examined because there are some of them who
abandon their husbands and come to work on the estate.3
During my fieldwork in 1991, many male workers told me that they
had become used to female employment on the estate, yet they
would never allow their wives to work there.
Paradoxically, though largely excluded from wage employment
on the estate, women seem nevertheless to have been able to take
advantage of  the estate’s establishment. They started to sell a
proportion of the food they produced to the estate workers,
particularly to those who for one reason or another lived near the
estate without wives (see below). This has greatly assisted their
efforts to secure an income of their own and break the previous
male monopoly over financial resources. The increasing land scarcity,
however, poses the problem of acquiring more land for food
production.
The second rule on labour recruitment was that employment on
the estate should be confined to local men, preferably from Ndu and
nearby villages. The chief  argued that this rule would not only halt
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male labour migration to the southwestern plantations, but also
forestall the construction of  labour camps, common to the
southwestern plantations. This rule seemed mutually advantageous.
For the company it was a cost-saving device: it did not need to
invest in workers’ accommodation and other social welfare services.
For the chief  it was a controlling device: he wanted to ensure that
the estate workers continued to be integrated into the local
community, to spend their wage income in the local economy, and
to adhere to ‘traditional’ norms and customs. This is evident from
one of his speeches in 1977, in which he reiterated the main reasons
for his persistent opposition to the construction of  labour camps:
The construction of  labour camps tends to be harmful because
(1) the workers would not have in mind to develop themselves
because this had happened to our children who had gone to
the coast and had brought nothing.
(2) they would not participate in communal development in their
respective quarters.
(3)  they would not have time to help their neighbours.
(4)  most people’s wives and young girls would be taken into the
camps.
(5)  a lot of stealing would occur as goats and fowls will be carried
into the camps.4
For the workers, however, it was a source of  contradictions. They
in fact became subordinated to a dual authority: managerial
authority at work and chiefly authority in the local community. As
a result, they are often faced with a difficult dilemma: whether to
adhere to the capitalist work norms or to the ‘traditional’ norms,
both options being surrounded with sanctions on the part of the
respective authorities. To mitigate this conflict, the chief  has always
advised the management to study the local norms and customs and
take them into consideration in its labour control strategies (see
Chapter 8).5
The EAC accepted these rules from the chief  of  Ndu with regard
to labour recruitment and was subsequently allowed to proceed
with the construction of  the estate. Construction began in January
1957 with a loan of £100,000 from Barclays Overseas Development.
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There has been a steady increase in the estate’s cultivated area and
labour force (see Table 7.1). The EAC owned and managed the
estate for twenty years. At the end of  1976 it sold the estate to the
Cameroonian government (see Chapter 9). From 1 January 1977
onwards, the estate became part of the CDC, which has continued
to respect the rules governing labour recruitment agreed upon by
the chief  of  Ndu and EAC.
Table 7.1  Ndu Tea Estate: Cultivated area, output and labour force
______________________________________________________________________________
 
YEAR                       CULTIVATED  OUTPUT  NUMBER OF 
 AREA (HA)              (MT)          WORKERS 
______________________________________________________________________________
1957                    70 
1958       70              300 
1959      300               500 
1960     386      600 
1961     416             600 
1962           629 
1963             16       554 
1964                    164               588 
1965                  244.6             603 
1966                    216.8              609 
1967                    271.4             744 
1968                                448.9          793 
1969                                     532.9           782 
1970                   552.1        737 
1971/72                     679.7                747 
1972/73     422           620.8             781 
1973/74            741.3                801 
1974/75                      801.6                846 
1975/76            1,001.5              896 
1976/77         575           459.8         947 
1977/78                 711.4           1,045 
1978/79          879.5    1,042 
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Source: Ndoumba Manga (1984); Ndu Tea Estate records.
The male labour force on the Ndu Tea Estate
The estate has never had any shortage of labour; much to the
contrary, during periods of  low production and reorganisation a
number of workers have had to be laid off. This was because the
estate was located in an area where wage-earning opportunities were
few, yet manpower resources abundant (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2  Population of  North West Province, Donga-Mantung Division and
Ndu Plain
Source: Ndoumba Manga (1984: 59); and 1987 Population Census
(Provisional Results).
1978/79          879.5    1,042 
1979/80                   1,007.2   1,237 
1980/81                  1,005.5       1,456 
1981/82              1,145.5  1,580 
1982/83                           961.5 
1983/84                 985.6 
1984/85       592     1,181.0       1,563 
1985/86     1,446.8 
1986/87                   1,471.6      1,750 
1987/88                    1,490.0 
1988/89            1,125.4 
1989/90          613  1,200.3        1,133 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
YEAR        NORTH WEST  DONGA-MANTUNG  NDU 
 PROVINCE             DIVISION     PLAIN 
______________________________________________________________________________
1953          429,038          84,592          8,316 
1964           573,848             102,100 
1967                 16,962 
1976           980,531           184,516                   28,631 
1987            1,206,780          222,436 
______________________________________________________________________________
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In accordance with the agreement concluded with the chief of Ndu,
the company’s original policy was to recruit its labour force from
Ndu itself and neighbouring villages within a radius of 5 kilometres
from the estate. It was thought that these workers would have no
problem walking to the estate daily. Initially this policy was strictly
implemented. Relatively few workers were required during the first
phase of  setting up the estate (see Table 7.1); and the estate
management and the chief had agreed that priority should be given
to men displaced from the estate land.
However, when employment opportunities on the estate
increased after the tea bushes came to maturity, the management
also started employing men from more distant villages who
demonstrated great skills in tea plucking. Some of  them lived as far
as 20-30 km from the estate. No wonder the union soon demanded
that the management either construct labour camps or provide
transport for the workers (see Chapter 9). The management,
however, refused this demand.
Many of these workers then started to hire rooms in Ndu and to
build houses in the area surrounding the estate. New settlements
emerged in this way. The largest was Kakar/Three Corners situated
between Ndu and the estate. This has become a very lively place,
with a growing number of  shops, bars and restaurants. Most residents
are married workers, and some live with their wives and families.
They are usually older workers who arrived at a time when land
was not yet in short supply. They obtained sufficient land from the
local quarter-heads to build a house and establish food farms (and
in some cases even coffee farms). Others live there without their
wives and families. They arrived later when land had become an
urgent problem. They usually acquired a building plot, but no farming
land. Consequently, they tended to opt for double residence: during
the working week they stay on their own in the settlement and at
weekends they return to their villages of origin, where their wives
grow food and they themselves often own coffee farms.
According to Ndoumbe Manga (1984: 186-187), 73% of the estate
workers originate from the Donga-Mantung Division. All of them
are Wimbum, 51% being inhabitants of Ndu itself. Other ethnic groups
in the Donga-Mantung Division, such as the Mbembe, Misaje, Mbem
and Mfumte, live at a considerable distance from the estate and
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continue to supply labour to the southwestern plantations. However,
23.5% of the estate workers originate from the neighbouring Bui
Division, all of them being Nso who live in villages bordering the
estate. Only 3.5% of the estate workers originate from other
Divisions, including some clerical and supervisory staff  members who
have been transferred from the Tole Estate to the Ndu Estate.
Interestingly, although the labour force at the Ndu Estate is
ethnically less heterogeneous than that at the Tole Estate, it has
nevertheless been more prone to overt ethnic tensions and conflicts,
especially during the EAC period. This may be due to two factors:
• First, Ndu chauvinism. The Ndu chief  and people formerly
claimed that the estate was ‘theirs’ and that for that reason
Ndu workers should be given priority when vacancies
occurred for leading positions on the estate (see Chapter 8).
• Secondly, EAC personnel policy. During the EAC period
workers in the factory were predominantly Nso. This gave
rise to an explosive situation in the factory. Nso workers
tended to lord it over the minority of Wimbum workers,
often provoking them with assertions like ‘Fen ker ver’ –
‘we are here in control’. In 1972 they plotted the overthrow
of Mr Samuel Nduwa, a Wimbum man, who was not only
an overseer in the factory, but also a Staff  Representative
and the president of the union. They strongly resented their
subordination to a Wimbum man, the more so because he
dared to give them frequent warnings for indiscipline and
low productivity and expose their large-scale theft of tea
from the factory. They falsely accused him of
misappropriating estate labour and almost succeeded in
having him dismissed. After this incident, the union
leadership and Staff Representatives persuaded
management to transfer a number of the Nso workers to
the field and recruit factory workers henceforth on a multi-
ethnic basis.6
Following the takeover of  the estate by the CDC in 1977, ethnic
clashes of this nature have no longer occurred. As we have seen in
Chapter 2, the CDC management has always attempted to forestall
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the emergence of  ethnically based divisions among the workers.
During my fieldwork in 1991, I was constantly assured that workers
of  various ethnic groups get on well with each other.
The labour force on the estate expanded until 1986/87, when it
reached 1,750 workers. Owing to a series of  reorganisations during
the economic crisis, it decreased to 1,333 workers in 1990/91 (see
table 7.1). Table 7.3 shows that not less than 93.5% of  the present
labour force consists of  men. They form an overwhelming majority
in all sections of the estate except the clinic. The question may be
raised: what men tend to sell their labour power to the estate?
Table 7.3 Ndu Tea Estate labour force in 1990
Source: Ndu Tea Estate Records.
Generally speaking, they are usually men who have failed to be
selected as the successor to the family head. In Ndu, as elsewhere
in the Grassfields, there is only one such successor, who is not
necessarily the eldest son. He is chosen either by the father before
his death or, in cases where the father has died before nominating a
successor, by a family council composed of  male elders. After his
installation as head of  the family, he is in control of  all family
members and family property.
Estate work is highly valued by the non-successors, as one of the
few local wage-earning opportunities for men. The income gained
from estate work enables them to escape from the successor’s control
______________________________________________________________________________
SECTION                MALE                 FEMALE                  TOTAL  
                                ______________          ________________  NUMBER 
                               No       %                      No       % 
______________________________________________________________________________
Factory            154        94.5                 9          5.5            163 
Engineering            36        100.0                                                           36 
Office            39      88.5             5      11.5          44 
Clinic                        5       45.5             6     54.5            11 
Field                    825         94.0           54        6.0           879 
______________________________________________________________________________
TOTAL       1,059         93.5        74        6.5            1,133 
______________________________________________________________________________
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and to build up an independent existence. It serves as an important
avenue to social mobility in the local community. The majority of
non-successors use a proportion of their wage to achieve specific
objectives which can ‘compensate’ them for the loss of the
successorship and enhance their status within the local community.
One may usually observe a certain sequence in the pursuit of  these
objectives: one first attempts to build a house and marry one or more
wives who may look after the cultivation of food, then to set up a
coffee farm and raise cattle, and eventually to invest in the acquisition
of honorific titles which give the non-successors, like the hereditary
office and title holders, access to power and wealth in the community.
This is not an easy project, of course. It takes years of hard labour for the
low-waged estate workers to achieve at least some of these objectives.
The demographic characteristics of  the estate’s male labour force
seem to confirm the importance of  estate labour for non-successors
(see Table 7.4). Male workers have low educational levels: the vast
majority are either illiterate (56.5%) or have left primary school
before completion (31.5%). They display a long-standing
commitment to their job: 53% of them have been employed on the
estate for more than 10 years. And 90.5% have been able to marry
one or more wives despite the considerable increase in bride-price:
while the bride-price among the Wimbum varied between FCFA
50,000-120,000 in the 1970s (Tanto 1978), by the early 1990s it
had risen to FCFA 150,000-300,000. Through marriage, male
workers are assured of food, and this allows them to save a portion
of their wage income for investment in the objectives outlined above.
Male accumulation is, therefore, still partly based on their control
over women’s productive labour (Goheen 1993, 1996).
Women continue to be largely excluded from estate employment.
Only 6.5% of  the present labour force consists of  women (see Table
7.3).  About 73% of  them are pluckers who have been recruited
since 1983 following the conclusion of an agreement between the
chief  of  Ndu and the CDC on permanent female employment (see
above). They differ in a number of respects from both the male
pluckers on the Ndu Estate and female pluckers on the Tole Estate:
they are younger (87% are below 35 years of age) and better educated
(77% have completed primary school and 14% have enjoyed some
secondary education). They are women who want to escape from
‘traditional’ farm work and patriarchal control, but have not yet been
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able to find any employment other than plantation work. They tend,
therefore, to be less committed to their job than male pluckers on the
Ndu Estate and female pluckers on the Tole Estate. Some of  them
are constantly on the lookout for wage employment that is less arduous
than estate work and more in line with their educational achievements.
Others intend to move into trade or commerce when they have
accumulated sufficient capital in their present job. Still others stop
working on the estate as soon as they have found a lover or husband
who is able to maintain them.
Table 7.4  Demographic characteristics of  the Ndu Tea Estate labour force in 1986 (%)
______________________________________________________________________________
                           MALE         FEMALE   
______________________________________________________________________________
 
AGE 
15-25 years                             3.5                 36 
25-35 years                          25        51 
35-45 years                     38.5              9.5 
45-55 years                        28          3.5 
55 years and older              5 
                                                _____         _____ 
                                                 100.0         100.0 
 
 
MARITAL STATUS 
never married                                   8 
monogamously married           76.5 
polygamously married            14 
widowed                             1 
divorced/separated          0.5 
                                       _____  
                                    100.0     
 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
illiterate                                                56.5                      9 
primary education                                     39.5                 77 
technica l education/ apprenticeship           2.1  
secondary education                         1             14 
post-secondary education                           0.5 
                                          _____              ____ 
            100.0        100 
 
RELIGION 
Baptist                                              62 
Roman  Catholic                              21 
Presbyterian                                         5 
Independent churches                  4 
Muslim                                  1 
African beliefs                        7 
            _____ 
                     100 
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Source: Compiled from Ndu Tea Estate Employment Records.
Remuneration of  male pluckers on the Ndu Tea Estate
The wages of  male pluckers were formerly lower on the Ndu Estate
than on the Tole Estate. While the CDC, being a parastatal, tended
to follow government wage rates closely, the EAC initially refused
to do so. For example, in 1964, the basic wage rate approved by the
government for the Donga-Mantung Division was FCFA 120 per
diem, but the Ndu Estate management decided to pay its workers
no more than FCFA 105.
From the workers’ point of  view, this was a ‘starvation wage’, as
the cost of living in the Donga-Mantung Division was among the
highest in Anglophone Cameroon, due to the area’s isolated
position.7 The estate management usually tried to justify this wage
differential as follows:
• The plucking task was lighter on the Ndu Estate than on
the Tole Estate and, therefore, more lowly remunerated
(compare Tables 6.1 and 7.5). It should, however, be
pointed out that the management appeared less interested
in changing the situation than the workers. The
management, in fact, was for a long time deaf to the
repeated union request for an increase in task work and
remuneration, as it wanted to keep labour costs low. It
was not till 12 April 1970 that it agreed with the union
upon payment of an eight-hour wage, in return for an
increase in task work (see Table 7.5).
 
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT 
 0  - 5 years                                                   12.5      87 
 5  - 10 years                        34.5         9.5 
10 – 15 years                                 7.5            3.5 
15 – 25 years                            31.5 
25 years and more             14 
                                 _____       _____ 
                                                100.0      100.0 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
NUMBER                  1,136           86 
______________________________________________________________________________
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• The EAC had invested substantial capital resources in the
creation, expansion, and upkeep of the estate and,
therefore, could ill afford any increase in wage rates.8
I have already mentioned that in 1968 the government established
three wage zones in the country with differential levels of wages
and simultaneously created guaranteed minimum wages for
agricultural and non-agricultural workers throughout the national
territory (see Chapter 3). The CDC then adopted a policy of ‘zone
unique’, involving a uniform wage structure for all its estates,
irrespective of the zone in which they were situated. As a result,
wage and salary rates in the entire corporation were henceforth to
be identical to those of Zone II of the Primary Sector, entitling its
workers to a minimum wage of  FCFA 23 per hour (FCFA 184 for
an eight-hour working day). Unlike the CDC workers, Ndu workers
were classified in Zone III of the Primary Sector, receiving a
minimum wage of  only FCFA 19 per hour (FCFA 133 for a seven-
hour working day).
Surprisingly, when the CDC took over the Ndu Estate in 1977, it
did not immediately apply the corporation’s ‘zone unique’ policy to
the Ndu workers, on the grounds that previous approval from the
Ministry of  Labour was required. This Ministry, however, delayed
taking a decision. Only in 1987 did it give its approval, thus entitling
Ndu workers to a wage rate equal to that of other CDC workers
(see Chapter 9). In 1970 the pluckers were classified in Category 1
of the standard national classification of occupations (unskilled
labour). Like the Tole female workers, Ndu male pluckers strongly
protested against their classification in the most lowly remunerated
category and demanded classification in Category 3 (skilled labour).
In 1975 the Ministry of Labour decided to reclassify them in Category
2 (semi-skilled labour) – one year ahead of the reclassification of
Tole female pluckers in Category 2 (see Chapter 3).
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Table 7.5  Plucking norms and incentive bonus at the Ndu Tea Estate
Source: Ndu Tea Estate Records.
Ndu workers used to receive not only lower wages than the CDC
workers, but also fewer fringe benefits. In the absence of  labour
camps, the workers were not provided with accommodation and
other amenities such as recreational facilities. It was only in May
1974 that the EAC management finally agreed to the union’s repeated
demand for the introduction of a loan scheme that would enable
the workers to build houses and buy means of transport such as
bicycles and motorcycles. However, the funds allocated for this
purpose were simply not great enough to be of much assistance.
Moreover, the scheme was soon postponed indefinitely because of
the serious financial crisis that affected the estate at the end of the
EAC era.
______________________________________________________________________________
 
YEAR              PLUCKING NORM            INCENTIVE BONUS 
      __________________________ 
 
            Period                 Amount   
  of leaves 
______________________________________________________________________________
1961     Monday-Saturday  20 lb   3 francs  CFA for every pound plucked 
                                                              above 20 lb 
1969        Monday-Saturday  15 kg        10 francs  CFA for every kg plucked 
                                                                     over the basic task 
1970   Monday-Saturday     17 kg    10 francs  CFA for every kg plucked 
        Saturday              10 kg   over the basic task 
 
1977         Peak period        18 kg     7 francs  CFA for every kg plucked 
           Slack period             16 kg      over the basic task;  10 francs CFA 
                                                         for every kg  plucked  at extra time   
 
1980     Peak period               26 kg         15 francs  CFA for every kg plucked 
            Slack period       14 kg       between 27-45 kg; 20  francs CFA for 
                       every kg plucked between 46-55 kg;    
           25 francs  CFA for every kg plucked 
          above 55 kg    
 
1987      Peak period          32 kg        15 francs  CFA for every kg plucked 
            Slack period         18 kg       between 33-45 kg; 20  francs CFA for 
                     every kg plucked between 46-55 kg;              
      25 francs  CFA for every kg plucked 
     above 55 kg 
______________________________________________________________________________
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At the start of  its operations at Ndu, the EAC built a dispensary
for the workers and their families. This dispensary has never been
well equipped and often lacked the necessary medicines. Serious
cases were referred to the Banso Baptist Hospital at Kumbo, hospital
and transport costs being reimbursed by the estate. In 1965, the
General Secretary of  the union, Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, made the
following complaint to the Inspector of  Labour for West Cameroon
about the lack of medical facilities on the estate:
Our wives and the sick on the Ndu Estate itself have to go to
Banso Baptist Hospital for delivery and treatment even in the absence
of  proper ambulance service which was once on the estate. We
have repeatedly appealed in vain to management to extend the small
dispensary on the estate into a proper health centre by adding a
maternity ward. What the management once did instead was to
make an award of £ 1,000 to Banso Baptist Hospital for the building
of a maternity ward in Nso itself.9
The matter was frequently discussed in the period 1969-1974 and
the company promised that a hospital staffed with qualified medical
staff and a doctor would be in full operation before the end of
1973.10 This promise was never kept. The only thing the company
did was construct a maternity ward in 1973.
In 1969 the union called on management to open a workers’
shop selling consumer goods at controlled prices. The management
eventually did so, but the shop was never well-stocked.
Consequently, the union decided in 1974 to take over this shop and
transform it into a workers’ consumer co-operative shop.
Unfortunately, the shop was soon forced to close down because of
the shopkeeper’s maladministration and fraud. The same year, the
union introduced a credit union on the estate. In contrast to the
shop, this credit union has been functioning well (see below).
As in most CDC estates, the EAC management allocated ‘chop
farms’ to the workers. This was highly appreciated by the workers,
especially by those whose homes were far away from the estate and
whose efforts to acquire land near the estate had failed. After the
CDC had taken over the estate in 1977, the management instructed
workers to quit the ‘chop farms’. A soil surveyor was then asked to
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demarcate the land unsuitable for tea production. Although it was
promised that this land would be re-allocated to the workers for the
purpose of  establishing chop farms, this was never done. The
management seems to have been afraid that the bush fires set on
the ‘chop farms’ at the beginning of  the farming season might destroy
the tea bushes.
The wages and fringe benefits of Ndu workers have been further
eroded during the economic crisis. Like other CDC workers, they
were asked to contribute 15% of their basic wages and seniority
bonus to a compulsory savings scheme, to pay for the health services
supplied, and so on (see Chapter 3). Moreover, owing to the increase
in task work in 1987 from 26 kg to 32 kg of green leaves, a number
of workers now experience difficulties completing their task and
earning the basic wage.
Table 7.6  Ndu Tea Estate Co-operative Credit Union Ltd: Membership, shares/savings,
and loans granted during the period 1984-1989
Source: Computed from Ndu Credit Union Records.
______________________________________________________________________________
 
YEAR   MEMBER-     SHARES/  LOANS 
 SHIP SAVINGS (FCFA)   GRANTED 
                                                                      _________________________ 
                                                                                                                              
   No           Amount (FCFA) 
______________________________________________________________________________
1984    1,072         88,954,028      1,013           77,556,000 
1985   1,041     102,379,866           885     89,390,000 
1986    1,124      123,254,980             881        111,541,000 
1987     1,115      140,308,596          860      108,446,000 
1988   1,222       166,677,964           930      131,401,000 
1989    1,225     194,117,595           756       115,051,000 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
TOTAL           815,693,019      5,325     633,295,000 
______________________________________________________________________________
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Table 7.7  Ndu Tea Estate Co-operative Credit Union Ltd: Loan classification,
1984-1989
Source: Computed from Ndu Credit Union Records.
Generally speaking, though wages are rather low, workers seem
nevertheless happy with the regular monthly income derived from
estate work. Worst off  are usually the young ones at the beginning
of their working career: they mostly do not yet own land and
therefore depend on the market for the purchase of food. The vast
majority of the workers, by contrast, are not entirely dependent on
their wages for their reproduction: they do own land for food
production. Best off are the ones who also own land for coffee
production (though in 1991 they had not been paid by the co-
operative for two years), or those who raise cattle or trade in kola
nuts, palm wine, livestock, and so on.
Like Tole workers, Ndu workers tend to save a substantial
proportion of  their monthly wages in a variety of  savings institutions.
Membership of the credit union has grown from 200 in 1974 to
1,225 in 1989, approximately 94-95% of the total labour force.
Interestingly, while Tole workers spent 89% of  their credit union
loans on education, health, and consumption (see Table 3.11), Ndu
workers used only 37% of their credit union loans for these purposes
during the period 1984-1989 (see Table 7.7). They rather preferred
to spend no less than 54.5% of these loans on the building of a
house which, as I have shown above, is one of their primary
objectives during their working career.
 
PURPOSE OF LOAN 
 
 
AMOUNT 
(FCFA) 
 
 
% OF TOTAL 
LOANS GRANTED 
 
Building 345,898,000 54.5 
Educatio n 131,432,000 21.0 
Consumption 67,324,000 10.0 
Health 36,405,000 6.0 
Marriage 30,636,000 5.0 
Trading 16,405,000 2.5 
Farming 5,005,000 1.0 
   
TOTAL 633,105,000 100.0 
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Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the introduction of estate tea
production into Ndu society has had some important consequences.
One of them was the establishment of a ‘development coalition’
(Bates 1981) between the local chief  and the EAC management.
Another was the creation of wage employment for local men who
wanted to escape from the family head’s control and build an
independent existence.
Like Tole female pluckers, Ndu male pluckers are highly
dependent on a wage income for their reproduction and social
mobility project. Consequently, they display a high degree of
stabilisation and commitment to their job. Unlike Tole female
pluckers, Ndu male pluckers are still largely integrated into the local
community and subordinated to local norms and authority patterns.
As a result, the assertion of managerial control over the labour
process appears even more problematic on the Ndu Estate than on
the Tole Estate.
The close links with the local community tend to make Ndu
male pluckers even more inclined to take action than Tole female
pluckers. Such links may  (a) stimulate workers’ efforts to resist
capitalist norms and authority and to preserve a certain degree of
autonomy within the capitalist labour process; (b) fuel workers’
demands for better conditions of  service as they try to invest any
capital derived from wage employment in their social advancement
within the local economy; and (c) provide workers with an ‘exit-
option’, protecting them against severe managerial disciplinary
action, in the form of  dismissal.
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Management of  male workers and their
informal modes of  resistance
Introduction
The physical organisation of production and managerial strategies
of labour control on the Ndu Estate show great similarities with
those prevailing on the Tole Estate (see Chapter 4). In this chapter
I shall therefore focus on the differences in labour control regimes
between both estates. One of  the most interesting differences has
been the attempt of the Ndu Estate management to co-opt the
local chief  into this control structure.
Despite such differences, however, labour control at the Ndu
Estate appears to have been no more effective that that at the Tole
Estate. Like Tole female pluckers, Ndu male pluckers have
continued to resist control and exploitation in the labour process.
In this chapter I want to restrict myself to the Ndu pluckers’
informal actions. I shall argue that although the forms of  informal
action may be similar on both estates, there is nevertheless some
difference in scale and intensity: Ndu male pluckers seem to be
more often and deeply involved in informal modes of  resistance
than Tole female pluckers due to their closer links with the local
community.
Labour control regime on the Ndu Tea Estate
Like the Tole management (see Chapter 4), the Ndu Estate
management introduced a strict hierarchical command structure
buttressed by a system of  rewards and punishments. There is,
however, some evidence that managerial control on the Ndu Estate
tended to be somewhat more coercive and arbitrary than that on
the Tole Estate, especially during the early EAC period. This is not
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altogether surprising, of course. Labour control regimes on foreign-
owned plantations in Cameroon and elsewhere were often marked
by extreme authoritarianism and racism during the colonial and even
(early) post-colonial period (Mbengue 1979; Beckford 1972;
Burawoy 1985).
The first EAC managers seem to have still behaved like the ‘white
masters’ of  the ‘good old colonial days’.1 Racism formed the
foundation of their almost dictatorial and often quite arbitrary
exercise of  power. They still believed that physical punishment was
the only effective method of disciplining their ‘lazy and
undisciplined’ African employees and of habituating them to the
capitalist work rhythm and ethic. Particularly Mr Auty, the first
factory manager, was notorious for beating and abusing his
subordinates. In June 1962, one of  his victims reported:
On 3 May 1962, while drying, Mr Auty beat me twice. On 15 May
1962 he knocked Ramon Nfor when rolling tea. On 30 May 1962
he kicked Augustine Nchukwi with his foot.2
On 17 September 1962, Mr Samuel Nduwa, at that time one of the
union branch secretaries, asked the General Secretary of the union
to take action against Mr Auty:
Our branch does not want to work any longer with Mr Auty. We
want him to leave this estate as soon as possible, failure of which
we are going on strike. This man treats us like slaves. He beats us at
work and abuses us.3
The first EAC managers were also quite reluctant to discipline any
African supervisory staff  member who was charged with persistent
‘maltreatment’ of  workers. The union often complained that the
management had given extreme powers to supervisory staff:
You have given your senior men ‘the power of  life and death’ with
regard to any junior person’s employment on the estate, not realising
how dangerous it is to good management. At the same time you
made it a policy to refuse any junior worker right of defence or
appeal when once a headman has complained against him.4
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For a long time there was no code of  rules governing industrial
relations on the estate. Obviously, its absence encouraged the
arbitrary exercise of  power on the part of  managerial and supervisory
staff.
Gradually the EAC Board of  Directors realised that the ‘colonial’
type of management, with its distinctive dictatorial and racist
features, cold no longer be maintained – and indeed was
counterproductive – in the post-colonial period since it provoked
the Labour Inspectorate and workers alike. It then began appointing
managers who were more likely to function well within the changing
industrial relations scene after independence.
 Being in a different situation from the Tole Estate management,
the Ndu Estate management co-opted the local chief as an
intermediary in the control of  labour. Consequently, the chief
continued to admonish the workers to be productive and well-
disciplined in the labour process. In 1977, for example, he declared:
I say honesty is the key to success. That all workers should be serious
at their work and I shall not support anybody caught as a thief.5
He also assisted the management in quelling strikes. There is no
doubt that he is still capable of exercising considerable control over
the workers’ behaviour because of the continuing powerful position
of  chieftaincy in the local community. Only when he seems to
‘betray’ his subordinates’ interests to the management do the union
leadership and workers tend to oppose him and take action in
defence of their interests, even against his will.
It is noteworthy that the picture presented here differs from the
few other studies of  chieftaincy in the field of  industrial relations.
Epstein (1958) and Crisp (1984) have demonstrated that the colonial
state and management tried to forestall the development of trade
unionism in the mines of Zambia and Ghana, by introducing ‘chiefs’
and ‘tribal elders’ as brokers between management and workers of
various ethnic groups. The usual justification given for this strategy
was that chiefs and elders were the ‘customary’ representatives of
the people in Africa. The idea behind it, however, was that ‘tribal’
chiefs and elders could be more easily co-opted in the control
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structure over labour than trade union leaders, who were under
persistent suspicion of radicalising workers in the colonial context.
The strategy failed for two reasons, however.
First, the miners tended to identify themselves as workers rather
than as ‘tribesmen’, at least in the field of  industrial relations. And
second, these newly appointed intermediaries, who could claim little
‘traditional’ legacy for their authority, were soon denounced as
management stooges and lost any support they had ever enjoyed. I
have demonstrated elsewhere (Konings 1993) that the initial efforts
of  the British Trusteeship Authority and CDC management to use
chiefs in the South West Province as intermediaries in industrial
conflict were to no effect, as chieftaincy in that region was more or
less a colonial creation and hardly respected (Geschiere 1993). Unlike
these chiefs, chiefs (Fons) in the North West Province have continued
to be quite powerful, as their authority is based upon ‘tradition’ and
has a spiritual and ritual content. In this respect, Fisiy (1992: 191-
192) rightly observes:
The founding of  most of  the chiefdoms in the North West Province
is based on a myth of origin that tended to confer temporal power
on those repositories of  traditional authority. For the Fon, the source
of legitimacy is shrouded in myth and ritual orderings which give a
spiritual content to the exercise of  his authority. This is because the
lineage through which the myth was initially transmitted had contact
with the deities and the ancestors. Only members of  this ruling lineage
could lay claim to chieftaincy. This has safeguarded the sanctity and
spirituality of  the institution of  the Fon .... This conceptualisation of
the institution of  the Fon, based on sacred attributes, has tended to
sustain powerful chiefs who still maintain a firm spiritual and moral
grip over their people.
The colonial and post-colonial state have left the power position
of  chieftaincy in the North West Province largely intact and have
used its sacred character for the control of the local population. It
is only recently that chiefly authority has started to decay in the
North West Province. Fearing the physical, ritual and moral sanctions
that could befall them, Ndu workers will not challenge the local
chief ’s authority, unless he neglects the defence and representation
of  their interests.
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Whereas the co-option of the chief generally strengthened
managerial control over labour at the Ndu Tea Estate, there were
also some factors that weakened it:
• First, there were the relatively frequent changes in the ownership
and management of the estate. Changes in the ownership of
the estate have occurred three times before the privatisation
of  the CDC tea estates in 2002. During the EAC era (1957-
1977) there was an internal change in ownership: in 1972
the Indians on the EAC Board of  Directors acquired
majority shares in the company and took over control of
the estate from the British. Indian control, however, was
short-lived. Soon confronted with the severest financial
crisis in the estate’s history, the Indians decided at the end
of 1976 to sell the estate to the Cameroonian government
which, in turn, handed it over to the CDC (see Chapter 9).
Changes in the management of the estate were even more frequent.
Estate management was most stable under British control: between
1957 and 1972 there were only two management appointments,
while under Indian control from 1972 to 1977 there were six (see
Table 8.1).
Table 8.1  Ndu Tea Estate managers, 1957-1991
Source: Ngenge (1983: 130); and Ndu Estate records.
______________________________________________________________________________
 
NAME                PERIOD OF SERVICE         NATIONALITY 
______________________________________________________________________________
J.M.H. Barrable                1957-1967                          British 
R.J. Murray              1967-1972                 British 
P.G. Sausman        1972-1973              British 
P.F. Baxter            1973-1974          British 
K.P. MacNicol     1974-1975        British 
M.B. Gardiner    May 1975-September 1975  British 
B.C. Al ijah            September 1975-October 1975 Ghanaian 
K.V.S. Krishna      October 1975-January 1977  Indian 
E.A. Eloundou        1977-1983               Cameroonian 
R.J. Murray             1983-January 1986  British 
P. Bonnie/K. MacNee      January 1986-October 1986    British 
R.D. Ouvry             October 1986-1988        British 
R.W. Scott               1988-1990                British 
S.M.  Munju            1990-1991          Cameroonian 
______________________________________________________________________________
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Obviously, these relatively frequent changes in the estate’s
ownership and management were not conducive to the establishment
of  managerial control over the labour process. Quite the contrary:
workers often felt insecure and became restive. In 1975 the Staff
Representatives strongly condemned the rapid turnover of estate
managers under Indian control:
The idea behind the constant changes of management has been to
weed the Englishmen out of the company so that Indians should
dominate as is practicable in the London Head Office – to the
disadvantage of the workers as new managers need time to settle
down. Since the departure of Mr R.I. Murray in 1972, we have seen
new managers coming and going in short periods …. The workers
feel that this confusion of having a new manager almost every new
year has made work very uneasy for them and created a lot of
insecurity for all on the estate.6
They also often threatened strike action on this issue.
• Second, there was the estate management’s lack of  executive
powers. During the EAC period estate managers could not
even take a minor decision without consulting the Head
Office in London. This was strongly resented by the
workers as there were constant delays in the decision-
making process on urgent issues related to their working
and living conditions (see Chapter 9).
During the deepening crisis on the estate in 1974, the Indians started
to consider appointing a local managing agent in Cameroon, who
could serve as an intermediary between the Head Office in London,
the estate, and the government. Following the summary dismissal
in that same year of  Mr J. Leclerq, the head of  the company’s sales
office in Douala,7 they decided that his successor was to act as both
the company’s sales agent and management agent in Cameroon. Mr
Njoh Litumbe, a Bakwerian, who was acting at that time as the
company’s auditor in Cameroon, was chosen to occupy this
important post. Managerial staff on the Ndu Estate were enjoined
to strictly follow up Mr Litumbe’s instructions.
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The estate workers soon arrived at the conclusion that Mr Litumbe
was trying to take advantage of his new position in the company
and use it to pursue his own personal interests. He had created a
company of his own, the Emil Agency Company Ltd, and one of
his partners, Mr Ben Alijah, a Ghanaian, was made responsible for
the sale of Ndu tea. When the Ndu Estate was facing serious financial
problems in 1975/76, the Emil Agency Company sought to take
over the estate. Consequently, it was presumed that Mr Litumbe
was no longer interested in saving the company from imminent
collapse, but rather in acquiring it as cheaply as possible. He
continually refused to ratify any agreement reached between the
estate management and the union which entailed an increase in
labour costs.8 Little wonder that he and his partner, Mr Alijah, were
hated by the workers. Staff  Representatives demanded time and
again that the contract between EAC and Emil Agency Company
should be abrogated and that Mr Litumbe should cease to be the
company’s managing agent in Cameroon. The administration of  the
estate, they recommended, should be completely handed over to
the resident estate manager who was in direct contact with the
workers and had first-hand knowledge of the situation on the estate.
Although the CDC managers had more extensive powers than
the EAC managers, in particular in the field of  industrial relations,
the first CDC manager of the Ndu Estate, Mr E.A. Eloundou, was
regularly accused by the Labour Inspectorate and workers of
‘calculated manoeuvres to to postpone the implementation of
certain decisions reached through constant reference to the Head
Office’.9
• Thirdly, there were several contradictions within the command
structure on the estate which severely affected efficiency and
labour control:
(a) There was a clear division between expatriate and
Cameroonian managerial staff. At the start of  EAC
operations at Ndu in 1956/57, the Director at the time, Mr
S. Bolster, had assured the chief  and workers that eventually
all managerial posts on the estate would be Cameroonised,
except the post of  estate manager. Soon afterwards, in 1959,
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the government also insisted on a gradual Cameroonisation
of  managerial positions. Nonetheless, the EAC, like some
other foreign enterprises in Cameroon (Ayina 1983), hardly
bothered to keep its promise of Cameroonisation, for instance
by creating training schemes for deserving workers. This
caused a lot of  frustration among Cameroonian supervisory
staff  members who were aspiring to managerial positions.
From the very start, the union has protested at the absence
of any Cameroonisation policy on the estate and repeatedly
called for the implementation of  training schemes.
In the early 1970s there were some indications that the union was
about to reap the fruits of  its persistent efforts. Two supervisory
staff members, Messrs Simon Ndzi and Christopher Nsai, were sent
to the Cameroon College of  Arts, Science and Technology (CCAST)
at Bambili for further training. This experiment did not prove a
complete success due to the two men’s poor educational
background. In 1971 it was agreed between the EAC and the union
that all the expatriate assistant managers were going to be replaced
by Cameroonians and that the successor of  Mr R.J. Murray (see
Table 8.1) was going to be the last expatriate estate manager.10
However, when the Indians took over control of the estate in
1972, they failed to adhere to the terms of  this agreement, despite
persistent union protests. In October 1975, they even appointed an
Indian estate manager, Mr K.V.S. Krishna, and two Indian assistant
managers. It was only after the estate had been handed over to the
CDC in 1977 that the first Cameroonian estate manager,
Mr E.A. Eloundou, was appointed. In 1983, however, the CDC
General Manager transferred Mr Eloundou to the Tole Estate and
again recruited an expatriate to replace him, namely Mr R.J. Murray,
who had already served as an estate manager during the EAC period
(see above). Mr Murray’s appointment frustrated one of  the
Cameroonian field assistants’ expectations of succeeding Mr
Eloundou. Together with some other managerial staff  members, he
then began to scheme against Mr Murray, in order to discredit him
with the CDC General Manager and bring about his downfall.
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(b) There were also clear divisions within the Cameroonian
managerial staff  itself, often based on ethnic considerations.
This may be illustrated by the tensions and conflicts among
supervisory staff  members competing for managerial
positions on the estate. Apparently, the chief  of  Ndu originally
claimed that all leading positions on the estate which were
not reserved for expatriates should be occupied by members
of  his family, irrespective of  their professional qualifications.
This claim was contested by the General Secretary of the
union, Mr E.Y.K. Barthson. The chief  then dropped this claim
and instead began advocating that management give preference
to Ndu workers over other workers when vacancies for such
positions occurred (see Chapter 7). This caused a lot of unrest
among the workers in the early 1970s, when a struggle for
ascendancy was going on between two supervisors: Mr
Michael Monde, a man from Ndu and Mr Christopher Nsai,
a man hailing from Mbinon (Nso), though he was part
Wimbum part Noni by birth.
Mr Nsai possessed higher professional qualifications than Mr
Monde and was immensely popular among the workers because of
his humane and compassionate exercise of  his duties. Mr Monde,
on the other hand, was hated by most workers because of his
extremely authoritarian exercise of  his duties. Together with some
Ndu workers, Mr Monde tried to impress upon the management
that Mr Nsai was unqualified for holding a senior post on the estate
since he was not a native of Ndu and was moreover incapable of
controlling his subordinates. Although Mr Nsai enjoyed the support
of the vast majority of the workers, Mr Monde was eventually
promoted. The management appears to have ignored the workers’
choice on the grounds that it had more faith in Mr Monde’s style of
leadership and wanted to please the chief of Ndu.11
• Fourthly, there was less state control over labour at the Ndu
Estate than at the Tole Estate. The isolated position of  the
Ndu Estate made direct state intervention in the system
of industrial relations, especially through the Ministry of
Labour, a difficult and lengthy process. During the British
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Trusteeship period there was a Labour Department at Buea,
but major decisions in the field of industrial relations, such
as registration of  a trade union, were taken by the Federal
Ministry of  Labour at Lagos. Following the creation of  the
Federal State of  West Cameroon in 1961, Buea became
the seat of  the Inspector of  Labour for West Cameroon.
At the time, there was only one Divisional Labour Office
for the whole of the Bamenda Grassfields, located at
Bamenda. The Divisional Inspector of Labour hardly had
the time, and often lacked the transport, to visit the Ndu
Tea Estate regularly. In addition, he remained accountable
for all his actions to the Inspector of  Labour for West
Cameroon at Buea. These were clear obstacles to his
assisting in the settlement of labour disputes on the estate.
Not surprisingly, the Ndu workers sometimes preferred to
strike rather than wait for his intervention.
A certain improvement in the situation occurred after the creation
of the (United) Republic of Cameroon in 1972. The erstwhile
Federated State of  West Cameroon was then partitioned in two
provinces and the Divisional Inspectorate at Bamenda was
transformed into the Provincial Labour Inspectorate for the North
West Province. Finally, in 1976, a Divisional Labour Inspectorate
for the Donga-Mantung Division was opened at Nkambe. The line
of communication between the Divisional Labour Inspectorate at
Nkambe and the estate is nevertheless still far from satisfactory.
During my fieldwork in 1991, I found that the Divisional Inspector
was hardly aware of what was going on at the estate. His contacts
with the estate remained largely confined to interventions during
strike actions. He explained that the poor state of  the road between
Nkambe and Ndu as well as lack of transport continued to be strong
impediments to regular visits and inspections. For the same reason
estate workers rarely called upon the Divisional Inspector for the
settlement of  individual grievances.
The communication problem, however, is not the only reason
for the rather limited contribution of the Labour Inspectorate to
labour control on the estate. Over the years estate workers have
learnt to distrust the Labour Inspectorate. Particularly during the
period of Indian control of the estate (1972-1977) they suspected
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some labour officials of  collaborating with management. For
example, in 1972, the Labour Inspectorate delayed publication of
the Joint Classification Board’s report on the categorisation of  Ndu
Estate workers (see Chapter 9), and the union president, Mr E.Y.K.
Barthson, immediately accused it of taking sides with the
management:
What excuse have I in the circumstances when your office has failed
in six months’ time to produce the outcome of our discussions on
the categorisation of Ndu workers for signature? Thereby also making
it difficult for the appeals made by dissatisfied employees to be
heard. I am, however, happy that the initiative which stultified the
law and made it a mockery of it, came from quarters that are
supposed to uphold it. You will, of  course, agree with us that
incidents of this nature cannot inspire confidence or respect for the
Labour Office, as they are morally indefensible because it makes the
workers feel that the Labour Officers are taking sides with the
management and that the delay in not complying with the stipulations
of the law was a deliberate and calculated act on the part of the
management and the Labour Department to deprive workers of
their right.12
The impact of the party on labour control on the estate seems not
to have been very intense either, except perhaps indirectly – through
the union (see Chapter 9). The party was hardly visible on the estate.
Of course, all the workers were forced to buy membership cards,
yet there were no party meetings. Local and regional party leaders
usually turned up at the estate on two sorts of  occasions. First, they
came when workers were on strike. They were then in the habit of
strongly condemning ‘illegal’ strike action and advising workers ‘to
exercise patience’. Secondly, they turned up when the party needed
money for specific purposes. Workers mostly resented these
‘extortions’ of  money by the party elite. For instance, in 1983 a
vehement conflict developed between workers and party leadership
about the amount of money workers had to contribute to the
construction of  the Bamenda Congress Hall which was planned to
accommodate the forthcoming national congress of  the party. In a
circular letter, the CDC General Manager had fixed the donation of
the lowest paid workers in the corporation at FCFA 2,000, but the
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party leadership insisted that Ndu workers, like other workers in
the Donga-Mantung Division, should contribute FCFA 15,000. Ndu
workers replied that they were not going to pay more than other
CDC workers and warned that they would not hesitate to strike if a
higher amount than FCFA 2,000 was deducted from their wages.
Under pressure of  the party leadership, the Staff  Representatives
later agreed to contribute FCFA 7,000 in two instalments. A
considerable number of  workers then refused to pay anything.
Apparently, no action was taken against them.13
Informal actions of  male pluckers
Like female pluckers at the Tole Tea Estate, male pluckers at the
Ndu Estate have been persistently engaged in many kinds of  informal
actions to protest against their control and exploitation in the labour
process. During a meeting with the Staff  Representatives in 1979,
the estate manager listed the most common actions:
(1) continuous late arrival, (2) frequent absenteeism from work, (3)
exhibiting lack of interest in work, (4) low output, (5) poor work,
and (6) disrespect for managerial and supervisory staff.14
While these modes of  informal resistance are also commonplace
on the Tole Estate (see Chapter 6), Ndu workers seem to engage in
this form of  action even more than Tole workers.
Absenteeism
In 1968 the estate manager lamented that absenteeism had reached
the alarming rate of  25% on two or three days in the week.15 Despite
frequent written warnings to offenders, the situation had not
improved in 1969. He then urged the first elected Staff
Representatives to instruct the workers that ‘regular work attendance
was a necessary prerequisite for the well-functioning of the
enterprise’.16 However, their propaganda efforts soon proved even
less effective than disciplinary measures.
It is, of course, extremely difficult to habituate workers to regular
work attendance when they are still strongly rooted in local forms
of  organisation and value systems. A few examples may suffice to
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illustrate the close link between absenteeism and continuing
encapsulation in the local community:
During the annual harvesting period of  maize in August-September,
the men are customarily obliged to assist the women in the transport
of  the harvest from the farm to the compound. When this period
approaches, the rate of absenteeism on the estate tends to rise.
Gradually becoming aware of  this cultural constraint, the EAC
management was inclined to be less rigorous in its control of
absenteeism during this period. It generally sanctioned only those
workers who seemed to take undue advantage of its ‘leniency’, i.e.
were absent for more than a few days. Under constant pressure of
its foreign financiers to raise labour productivity, the CDC
management frowned upon this behaviour of the workers and tried
to control it from the very beginning.
During the period June-September 1982 the funeral rites of the
previous chief  took place at Ndu. Workers tended to absent from
work as they were expected to participate in these ceremonies. The
CDC management soon intervened, warning the workers as follows:
‘As far as absenteeism, conditions have greatly deteriorated because
of  the situation at the Fon’s palace (Fon’s death); no permissions for
the celebrations will be granted’.17
Ndu has the largest market in the Donga-Mantung Division. Market
days are not only of great economic importance, but also social
happenings. During market days workers are often either absent or
leave the estate before closing time.
In cases of sickness or death of close kin, workers do not feel obliged
to ask management permission to stay at home, but simply absent
themselves from work. As recently as 1988, they were severely
warned by the management to abandon this practice.18
The workers have even devised ways of ‘covering up’
absenteeism. In the factory there was formerly a high degree of
solidarity among the workers. They were few in number, belonged
predominantly to one ethnic group (Nso), and were engaged in
several common activities, both legal and illegal, such as common
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membership of savings and recreational associations, as well as of
a gang involved in the theft of  tea from the factory. They had created
a system whereby a worker who had just completed his shift would
continue working if his colleague had a good reason to be late or
absent. The absent worker was then marked present. As a result, it
often happened that workers worked two shifts (16 hours) without
being replaced. In 1972 the management suddenly prohibited this
long-standing practice because it had come to the conclusion that
the increasing rate of unpaid overtime had a negative effect on
productivity. It stipulated that any worker who continued working
after the change of shifts would be paid overtime. The workers
strongly disapproved of this prohibition. They complained to the
management that it was out to create divisions among them and
destroy their solidarity. Though workers were very bitter on the
issue, the management did not reverse its decision. The Divisional
Inspector of Labour at Bamenda supported the management,
arguing that ‘a practice, which encourages workers to work
continuously for sixteen hours on the same day, makes a mockery
of  the Statutory Hours of  Work Regulations’.19
Other common forms of informal action
Besides absenteeism, there are several other forms of  informal action
on the estate. I shall briefly review the most important of them:
• insubordination. There have been numerous incidents on the
estate whereby workers refused to obey direct orders from
supervisory staff  members. For instance, some workers
refuse to work during heavy rain in the cold, wet season at
Ndu. They maintain that nobody ever works under such
conditions in the local community. Others refuse to do
overtime on Saturdays during the peak plucking season,
even though they may receive double pay. They tend to
look upon the Saturday afternoon as a period of resting,
visiting friends and relatives, and working on their own
coffee farms.20 Insubordination has sometimes been
accompanied by physical attack. Quite a number of
workers have reportedly molested and beaten up
supervisory staff  members.
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• low output and poor work performance. During the EAC period
tasks were considerably lighter at the Ndu Estate than at
the Tole Estate (compare Tables 6.1 and 7.5). Nevertheless,
some male pluckers at the Ndu Estate tried to reduce the
task even further by employing the same tactics as their
female counterparts at the Tole Estate: they never stopped
complaining that the task allotted by the management was
‘too heavy’ and equally engaged in a variety of output-
restricting actions such as slowdowns. Other male pluckers
left the fields as soon as they had completed the task, though
the bonus for over-task was higher on the Ndu Estate than
on the Tole Estate (compare Tables 6.1 and 7.5). This gave
them ample time – many workers were able to complete
their task before noon during the EAC period – to engage
in a number of income-generating activities in the local
community, such as work on their coffee farms, trade, and
so on.
After the takeover of the estate by the CDC in 1977, Ndu workers
had to accept the standardisation of  task norms applied on all CDC
tea estates. Due to the substantial increases in task work during the
1980s, some of them now experience great difficulties in completing
their task and earning the basic wage.
Despite severe disciplinary measures, a number of pluckers still
come to work late or stop working before completing their task.
Some refuse to improve their work performance and continue to
pluck carelessly, thus destroying the tea bushes, or pluck bad leaves
– so as to finish early and/or increase plucking weight (and income).
• theft and fraud. Dissatisfied with their meagre wage income,
some workers engage in criminal acts such as theft and
fraud. Theft of tea evidently occurs on a larger scale on
the Ndu Estate than on the Tole Estate. Several
supervisory staff  members appear to have been involved
in the racket. In 1972, Staff Representatives reported to
the estate management:
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Senior people (headmen/overseers) in the factory have organised
the stealing from the factory and selling tea at Tatum. They sold
50,000 francs worth of  tea to one Malam at Ntumbaw. They have
been passing tea to Chad through Rudolf when he was a Ndu
Estate driver which he sold, bringing the money to share.21
Quite a number of workers have also stolen firewood from the
estate. Others have been engaged in fraudulent practices, mostly in
close collaboration with clerical and supervisory staff.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to show that, although the labour control
regime at the Ndu Estate in some respects differed from that at the
Tole Estate, the Ndu Estate management has not been more
effective in controlling labour than the Tole Estate management.
Ndu male pluckers, in fact, seem even more involved in informal
action than Tole female pluckers. This is particularly manifest in
the considerably higher degree of absenteeism on the Ndu Estate
than on the Tole Estate. This difference in scale and intensity of
informal action between Ndu and Tole pluckers may be attributed
largely to the fact that Ndu workers continue to be strongly rooted
in local forms of  organisation and values which are often in conflict
with capitalist organisation and values.
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Male workers and trade unionism
Introduction
The establishment and development of trade unionism on the Ndu
Estate has not been an easy process, since most Ndu workers were
initially not acquainted with trade unionism. The initiative to create
a trade union on the estate was taken by what Millen (1963) has
called an ‘outside’ leader. His organisational efforts were obstructed
for some time by the estate management and the local chief. Both
perceived trade unionism as a direct challenge to their authority
over the workers.
Gradually, these initial obstacles were overcome. Two factors
seem to account for the workers’ acceptance of the union as an
intermediary between labour and management. The first involved
the great organisational skills of  the ‘outside’ leader. In his
recruitment drive he relied on the small group of  clerical workers
and supervisory staff  members who had been active trade unionists
on the southwestern plantations and who wielded considerable
power over the estate workers. Second, the union could quickly
show itself capable of pressurising management and bringing about
improvements in workers’ conditions of  service.
Like the Tole female pluckers, Ndu male pluckers have continued
to support the union leadership as long as it represented their interests
effectively and ‘delivered the goods’. If the union failed to live up to
their expectations, however, they did not hesitate to bypass it.
In the first section of this chapter I shall describe the emergence
and development of trade unionism on the Ndu Estate during the
period 1958-1991: as on the Tole Estate, there has been a transition
from autonomous to state-controlled unionism. In the second section
I shall document the history of male pluckers’ trade union and
collective actions.
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The emergence and development of trade unionism on
the Ndu Tea Estate
When the Tole Estate was reopened in 1954, trade unionism was
already well-established on the CDC estates. When the Ndu Estate
was created in January 1957, trade unionism was still an unknown
entity to the vast majority of  the newly recruited, predominantly
illiterate workers, except for the few who had been previously
employed on the southwestern plantations. A trade union was not
founded on the estate until 27 July 1958. It was called the Ndu Estate
Workers’ Union (NEWU). Its founder was Mr E.Y.K. Barthson.
Case no. 7.1  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, Founder of  NEWU
Interestingly, Mr Barthson was not employed on the estate when he
founded the union. Outside leadership, of  course, used to be a
common phenomenon in developing countries where workers often
lacked the educational qualifications and organisational skills to
become trade union leaders (Millen 1963).
Mr Barthson had been active as a journalist in Lagos. When the
EAC team under the leadership of  Mr S. Bolster was prospecting
the Nkambe-Ndu area for the purpose of setting up the tea estate,
he served as a secretary to Mr Ndze, one of  the local deputies who
eventually persuaded the chief  of  Ndu to allocate land to EAC (see
Chapter 7).
During the construction of the estate it occurred to him to organise
the workers into a trade union. His idea received the support of a
small core of estate employees, particularly clerical workers and
supervisory staff  members, most of  whom had had some
experience with trade unionism on the southwestern plantations.
Members of this group elected the first union executive. Mr Barthson
was unanimously elected as the union’s General Secretary.
This was the start of  his long trade union career. He has been
dominating the trade union scene in the Donga-Mantung Division
up to the present time. He has also occupied important trade union
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posts at the national level. He was one of the founding members of
the West Cameroon Trade Union Congress (WCTUC) and the
National Union of  Cameroon Workers (NUCW). He has always
tried to combine his trade union leadership with active involvement
in local politics and business. As he was scarcely remunerated for his
services during the first years of  the union’s existence, this combination
enabled him to earn a decent income.
His ethnic origin could have been problematic in local politics and
trade union activities. He was not a native of  Ndu, but a Noni from
Bui Division, though raised in Tabenken, the most important Tang-
clan village in the Wimbum area (Pool 1989). Being a ‘stranger’, he
has adopted an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, he has tried
to integrate himself  within the local community. He has lived at
Ndu for a long time, he speaks the local language (Limbum) fluently,
and has adapted to local customs and norms. On the other hand, he
has never identified with the local community to an extent of being
unable to preserve a certain measure of  autonomy vis-a-vis the local
chief and Ndu chauvinism.
Like the CDCWU, the NEWU embraced the moderate ideology of
‘free but responsible unionism’ propagated by the Labour
Department (see Chapter 5). It is reported that after the union’s
application for registration, the Labour Department forwarded to it
the Labour Code, a series of ordinances concerning labour and trade
unionism, and the Guide Book for Trade Union Officials which
instructed trade union leaders in the principles of  ‘free but
responsible unionism’ and advised them on administrative matters.1
The union’s loyalty to this ideology was strengthened by Mr
Barthson’s close contacts with the CDCWU leadership and the
union’s early affiliation to the ICFTU. The union’s moderate stand
is manifest in its principal objectives as stipulated in its constitution:
• to associate with the management of the estate on matters of
common interest both to the management and the workers.
• to be charitably disposed to the management and promote
peaceful management-workers relations.2
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Notwithstanding its moderate objectives, the new union was
immediately opposed by both the estate management and the chief,
who regarded it as a threat to their authority.
The first estate manager, Mr J.M.H. Barrable, was by all accounts
an extremely authoritarian manager who was opposed to trade
unionism altogether. He strongly believed that union leaders could
not be trusted since ‘they were only out for trouble with
management’. His relationship with the union became very strained
when he started to victimise and even dismiss active union members.
Some of his clients in the labour force began intimidating their
colleagues to discourage them from joining the union or paying their
union dues. These ‘boss’s men’ often provoked union members by
telling them: ‘we will not join the union and we will contribute
nothing to union funds, but when the union asks for amenities we
will enjoy them too’.3 In response to such provocations, the union
executive resolved on 7 June 1961 that union membership should
be compulsory since all the workers benefitted from the union’s
achievements. The estate manager, in turn, immediately threatened
to take action against anybody who tried to enforce this resolution:
Under no circumstances would I agree to this as I am a champion
of individual freedom ... I sincerely hope that no cases of force or
threat come to my notice in regard to getting people to join the
union, as I do not wish to take action against a person or persons
concerned in such a case.4
The union regularly protested against the estate manager’s
‘obstructive attitude’. In 1962, for instance, the union’s General
Secretary, Mr Barthson, warned him:
I am directed by our Executive Committee to advise you that the
full-scale offensive you have launched against us is viewed with
complacency. You have already dismissed many trade union leaders,
the last two being Mathew Nfor and Kassimu. We view their dismissal
with concern.5
Although the estate manager eventually accepted the union’s
existence on the estate, their relationship never became cordial.
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The chief, too, was initially quite hostile to the newly formed
union and tried to thwart its development. During a Traditional
Council meeting in 1962 he even announced that all active union
members should be dismissed from the estate.6 In October 1962,
two union members were summoned to the Traditional Council and
required ‘to pay the six important things’ (a severe punishment meted
out to those who had either committed grave crimes against the
chief or violated important laws and customs in the local
community). One of them, a certain Jonah Karngong, had previously
caused the imprisonment of  one of  the chief ’s sons. The chief  later
asked the estate manager to dismiss both men.7
This vehement opposition by the estate management and the
chief  formed a serious obstacle to the General Secretary’s
organisational efforts during the first years of  the union’s existence.
This did not, however, discourage Mr Barthson; quite the contrary,
he became even more determined to organise the workers. His
strategy was to approach the supervisory staff  first. These were
usually literate men who had previously worked on the southwestern
plantations and had some trade union experience. When they decided
to join the union, they invariably became leaders of union branches
and members of the union executive.8 They would then try to
convince their subordinates of the benefits of trade unionism on
the estate and, if  necessary, put some pressure upon them to join
the union.
Organisational efforts and union activities were initially also
hampered by:
• lack of funds. The union was completely dependent on the
voluntary contributions of  its membership. The initial
membership fee was 2s6d, while the monthly subscription was
6d. The workers, however, were irregular in the payment of
their monthly dues and the dues collectors were often dishonest,
refusing to hand over the money collected to the union. So the
union’s income was insufficient to pay a salary to the General
Manager, employ staff, build an office, or purchase necessary
equipment. On special occasions, the union was forced to raise
extra funds. For example, the General Secretary depended on
donations of the rank and file for travelling to the Labour Office
at Buea. As early as 1961 voices were heard in the union
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demanding that the check-off system be introduced on the estate.9
But it was not until May 1967 that the management permitted its
introduction. This resulted in a substantial increase in the union’s
income, enabling it to pay a monthly salary of  FCFA 15,000 to
its General Secretary, employ some staff, and embark upon the
construction of its secretariat.
• delay in its registration by the state. The union could not function
properly on the estate until it was officially recognised and
registered by the state. It could therefore achieve few tangible
results in the defence of the workers’ interests, which could have
promoted its organisational efforts among the workers. The
management refused to negotiate with the union until it was
registered by the state. In these circumstances, it is understandable
that the union’s General Secretary put a lot of  energy into getting
a registration certificate. This was no easy undertaking since the
Registrar of  Trade Unions was then located in Lagos. The
registration took three years. The receipt of  the certificate on 17
April 1961 was exuberantly celebrated.
The union leadership and the management then agreed upon
formation of  a Consultative Committee. In his address at the
Inaugural Meeting of the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) on 6
April 1962, the union’s General Secretary stressed the importance
of these meetings for the settlement of workers’ grievances:
The development of effective and efficient machinery through which
workers’ discontent and unrest may be expressed; the machinery
for workers’ consultation on an estate like this cannot be
overemphasised and is of paramount importance.10
On 20 July 1962 he added that ‘the union undertakes to ensure that
until the procedure of the joint consultation scheme has been
exhausted there shall be no stoppage of work of either a partial or
of a general character’.11
Nevertheless, it would appear that even after this agreement the
management often attempted to ignore the union. On 30 April 1963,
the union’s General Secretary rebuked the estate manager for his
persistent refusal to consult the union:
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You have made many false promises in the past to the extent that
you refuse to even respect legal agreements to which you are a party.
Our stock of patience is exhausted.
You have stubbornly refused at times to negotiate with us or refused
to recognise that trade unions are nowadays a permanent feature of
the industrial landscape. You have failed to realise that we are both
of us the social partners in industry and that good relations between
us would lead to an increase in productivity.12
In the wake of  the union’s registration, however, workers’ confidence
in the union leadership grew. The union’s persistent struggles for
improvement in their living and working conditions, and in particular
its organisation of a strike against authoritarian management in 1962
(see below), increased its popularity among the labour force. This
is clearly manifest in the growth of union membership from 240 in
1961 to 644 in 1962. In 1968, a year after the introduction of the
check-off system on the estate, it was estimated that more than
90% of  the estate workers were dues-paying union members. There
is evidence that Ndu male workers tend to demonstrate a higher
degree of  participation in union affairs than Tole female workers:
Each time we convene an Annual Conference we get nearly every
registered and potential member present and eager to attend so that
it looks more like a general meeting than a conference as stipulated
in sections 5 to 7 of our constitution. On the other hand, previously
we had encouraged General Meetings of workers every month. At
these meetings workers prefer to discuss not only difficulties facing
them on the estate but all matters that should be handled by the
Annual Delegates Conference.13
Generally speaking, men have more time to participate in trade union
affairs than women. Moreover, compared to the large CDCWU, the
NEWU was only a relatively small union, and this allowed for closer
contact between leadership and rank and file, as well as more ready
participation in trade union affairs. Active participation in the union
enabled Ndu workers to exercise a considerable measure of control
over the union leadership’s representation of  their interests.
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In 1963 the union changed its name from Ndu Estate Workers’
Union (NEWU) into Cameroon Union of Plantations, Industrial
and Agricultural Workers (CUPIAW). Its intention was to offer
industrial and agricultural workers outside the estate an opportunity
to join the union. This has never happened, however. There were
few other wage workers outside the estate and, above all, the union
had no funds, manpower and transport facilities to actively recruit
members outside the estate.
On 31 October 1968 the first Staff Representative elections were
organised on the estate. The majority of the Staff Representatives
then elected were supervisory staff  members and clerical workers
with a relatively long working career and union experience on the
estate (see Table 9.1). Two of  them, Messrs Samuel Nduwa and
Johnson Tanto Massa, had been employed on the estate from the
start. They had risen through the ranks to the post of overseer and
had simultaneously occupied leading positions in the union. The
function of  Staff  Representative and membership of  the union’s
executive often went hand in hand. For example, Mr Johnson Tanto
Massa, has combined both posts from 1968 up till 1987.
Table 9.1 Permanent and substitute Staff  Representatives elected at the Ndu Tea
Estate in 1968
Source: File CUPIAW 38, Staff  Representative Elections and Other Matters.
______________________________________________________________________________
 
NAME OF STAFF     AGE   LENGTH OF SERVICE      LENGTH OF UNION 
REPRESENTATIVE          (years)   MEMBERSHIP (years) 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
S. Nduwa       34          11                 11 
G. Silva           23             7           0.5 
J.T. Massa    31            10        11 
E. Nfor              45       8                  8 
J.N. Shey    28   10         11 
M. Konsah     34      9       9 
P. Yukah        27           5        8 
B. Weriba     31      10              8 
E. Webngong      31        11           11 
I. Nfor      30    5           5 
E. Tata        22       2             2 
E.N. Tamnjon g     33       11      11 
C.W. Felixson       24       4.5           4.5 
______________________________________________________________________________
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Upon creation of  the National Union of  Cameroon Workers
(NUCW) in 1972, the CUPIAW was, like the CDCWU, dissolved.
On 15 September 1972 a Special Regional Committee charged with
the reorganisation of trade unionism in the Donga-Mantung Division
arrived at the estate. A few days before its arrival, Mr Barthson
instructed supervisory staff  members how to behave during the
committee’s presence:
The committee members will record all workers who will adhere
to the new union under the banner of  our Great Party, the CNU.
All they expect is to see a general sign of  Unity among the workers.
You will have to demonstrate to the organising team that you are a
United People and that you believe in Unity and Peace. You will not
show that there are any differences among yourselves.
The Organising Committee is already well-informed of  the situation
in your area .... They will make proposals to you and your reaction
will be to applaud, clap or approve what has been proposed.
Please, advise your workers properly about this matter in their
various gangs during working hours. Every worker will prove that
he is a true Cameroonian citizen by producing the following
documents: (a) tax tickets, (b) national identity cards, (c) current (1972)
CNU membership cards.14
Following the reorganisation exercise, Ndu estate workers became
part of  the Divisional Union of  Agricultural Workers of  Donga-
Mantung (DUAW D/M). DUAW in turn became the largest
constituent union of  the Divisional Union of  Trade Unions of
Donga-Mantung (DUTU D/M). Like Mr Vewessee in the Fako
Division, Mr Barthson came to dominate the trade union scene in
the Donga-Mantung Division: he was elected president of both
DUAW and DUTU). However, he soon experienced great difficulties
in combining these two functions with his posts in the NUCW
Confederal Bureau in Yaoundé: he rose from Assistant Secretary
for Juridical and Contentious Matters to Confederal Organising
Secretary and Chairman of  the National Occupational Committee.
In 1974 he resigned the presidency of  the DUAW, being replaced
by Mr W.M. Wanchem and later by Mr Johnson Tanto Massa, both
of  them Staff  Representatives at the Ndu Tea Estate. In 1980 he
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resigned the presidency of  DUTU, being replaced by Mr I.N. Ngala,
the president of  the Divisional Union of  Private Education Workers
and vice-president of  DUTU.
Just as occurred in the Fako Division (see Chapter 5), trade
unionism in the Donga-Mantung Division was crippled after the
reorganisation by lack of  funds. Rebates from the National
Committee for Trade Union Contributions in Yaoundé were either
not forthcoming or irregular, preventing the union from paying staff
members, holding regular meetings, and organising activities like
courses. During a joint meeting of  Staff  Representatives and DUAW
Executive on 25 February 1976, the union’s poor functioning was
discussed at some length:
The president, Mr Martin W. Wanchem remarked that because of
our failing to meet for a very long time many things have gone
wrong. Some members have been made dysfunctional; some have
suffered in performing union duties because of  lack of  funds to
pay transport allowances and sitting fees during meetings as it used
to happen in the past.
One of  the executive members, Mr S. Nduwa, said that all along
the functions of the administration had not been carried on properly
so much that the union had been run without estimates. The president
claimed that he was being ignored in the administration in that he
was not being consulted on many matters and he continued that,
instead, he saw Mr P.P. Nunyi, was acting as president and secretary.
So he saw that he was neglected and became annoyed.15
In the absence of  any regular meetings of  both the DUAW and
DUTU Executive, the representation of the Ndu Estate workers’
interests was mostly left to the vice-president (later president) of
the DUTU, Mr I.N. Ngala, and the Staff  Representatives.
On 1 August 1986, the president of  DUTU, Mr Ngala, once
again explained to the Minister of Labour the disastrous situation
of trade unionism in the Donga-Mantung Division and threatened
to withdraw the transfer of any union dues to the National
Committee for Trade Union Contributions in Yaoundé if  the rebates
were not regularly paid.16
From 1987 onwards, DUTU and DUAW have been further
weakened by internal struggles for power among the leadership.
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In 1987, the president of  DUTU, Mr Ngala, was transferred to
Bamenda. During an extraordinary congress of DUTU on 6 March
1987 he requested the election of a new president. Representatives
of  the DUAW, who were predominantly Ndu Estate workers,
nominated Mr Barthson, who was subsequently declared president.
Apparently, Mr Barthson still enjoyed great popularity among the
Ndu Tea Estate workers.
Mr Barthson’s election was immediately contested by the
president of  the CTUC. The latter declared Mr Barthson’s election
‘null and void’ since the Confederal Bureau was not represented at
the extraordinary congress as required by the CTUC Statutes.
However, there is no doubt that his rejection of the election result
mainly derived from the fact that Mr Barthson had just been
dismissed from the Confederal Bureau for his bold exposure of
corruption and maladministration in the CTUC. Understandably,
the CTUC president disliked the prospect of a new power position
for Mr Barthson within the union.
The CTUC president was backed by the divisional administration
and Mrs J.R. Massa, president of  the Council Workers’ Union, the
smallest constitutional union of  DUTU, and at that time vice-
president of  DUTU. She had aspired to the union’s presidency and
was assured of the support of the divisional administration and
party leadership.
The Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) of Nkambe eventually
decided to intervene in the conflict and ordered that new elections
should be held the year after (1988) in which multiple candidates,
including Mr Barthson, could compete.17 In these elections on 26
March 1988 Mr Barthson was re-elected DUTU president. On that
occasion, Mrs Massa did not even stand for office. The leaders of
DUAW, who had continued to support Mr Barthson during the
conflict, had made it clear to her that ‘we are not going to submit
ourselves to the whims and caprices of a small union with its self-
centred leaders and friends’.18
At the same time, there were also struggles for power within the
DUAW. Ndu Estate workers once dominated leadership positions
within the DUAW, but they were defeated in the 1987 elections. Mr
George Majam, an officer in the Nkambe Area Cooperative Union
Ltd (NACU) at Mbiyeh, managed to win the presidency. There were
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two reasons for Mr Majam’s victory. First, he was a member of  the
royal family at Ndu and therefore received the votes of the electorate
that was close to the chief of Ndu. Second, his main competitor,
Mr Johnson Tanto Massa, the former DUAW president, had lost all
support among the Ndu workers in 1987 after he, together with Mr
Vewessee of  the FAWU, had agreed with the CDC management
upon an increase in task work from 26 kg to 32 kg of green leaves
for the sake of  economic recovery.
Ndu Estate workers soon became disappointed in the new leader.
Mr Majam was accused of ‘drinking tea’ with the management and
of having ‘sold out’ the workers during the economic crisis (see
below). This was also one of the main causes of his strained
relationship with Mr Barthson, the DUTU president. Obviously,
disunity among the union leadership has contributed to union decline
during the economic crisis.
Trade union and collective action of  male pluckers,
1958-1991
The history of trade union and collective action on the Ndu Estate
may be divided into two broad periods:
First, the period of ‘free but responsible unionism’, 1958-1972. This
was a period of growing reliance of rank-and-file workers on the union
leadership for the representation of  their interests. Their confidence
in the union leadership is evidenced by the almost complete absence
of any independent collective action during this period.
Second, the period of ‘state-controlled unionism’, 1972-1991.
This was a period of growing contradictions between rank and file
and union leadership. Loss of  confidence in the union leadership is
manifest in the increase of independent collective action. This period
may be subdivided into:
(a) the period of Indian control over the estate (1972-1977). This
was a period of collapse in financial viability and
managerial control on the estate, leading to unprecedented
workers’ militancy: workers pressed foreign management
into the defensive and even challenged its authority. The
high degree of workers’ militancy during this period is
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probably unique in the history of state-controlled
unionism in Cameroon. During this period one may
observe the emergence of  the first conflicts between the
rank and file and union leadership/Staff  Representatives.
(b) the period of CDC control over the estate (1977-1991). This
was a period of reassertion of managerial control on the
estate and increasing union atrophy. During this period
the contradictions between the rank and file and union
leadership/Staff Representatives came more and more
into the open, but the economic crisis was setting limits
to the workers’ independent collective action.
Trade union and collective action during the period of
‘free but responsible unionism’, 1958-1972
During the first years of its existence the union exhibited great
restraint and ‘refused to be provoked by the diabolical actions of
the management’,19 which often maltreated and exploited the
workers and declined to recognise the union. On 18 June 1962,
however, the union’s General Secretary, Mr Barthson, wrote to the
estate manager that the union was not going to tolerate this situation
any longer and wished to declare a trade dispute:
You will bear us witness that we have done our utmost to avoid any
conflicts with you; we have done our utmost to inject good
relationship between you and us which has been so woefully lacking,
but since you do not appreciate our good intentions and the goodwill
on our part as one designed to maximise productivity and promote
happy industrial relations; and since you have remained hard-hearted
and are determined to treat workers as beasts, we are resolved to
take extreme measures within the ambit of our recognised rights to
achieve our objectives.
Certainly, where workers work under poor and appalling conditions,
such as those on the Ndu Estate; where workers are denied the
right of democratic participation of the control of their working
lives; where workers are not given even spoon-fed amenities and
work not only on wages at starvation level, but can be beaten and
kicked by their employer, such as is the practice on the Ndu Estate;
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where workers are treated as automatons and are arbitrary dismissed
at any time without the right to defence or fair trial, the answer and
only answer to these is a LABOUR DISPUTE.20
Subsequently, he presented the estate manager with a long list of
demands. These included the introduction of  a system of  grading
and rewarding the various categories of workers, the implementation
of disciplinary measures other than arbitrary dismissals, the
regulation of working in rain, the specification of sick leave, the
construction of  labour camps, the provision of  protective clothing,
such as overalls and raincoats, and a tools allowance, the creation
of a personnel department, the payment of arrears and higher wages,
the reduction in weeding task, a change in working hours, the setting
up of a scheme for training and promotion, and the improvement
of  incentive bonus schemes.21
When the estate manager refused to discuss the demands, Mr
Barthson called the workers out on strike the next day. As we have
indicated, this strike was of great significance in trade union
development on the estate. It convinced many workers of the
importance of  organisation in defence of  their interests. It also
enhanced their confidence in the union’s General Secretary. He
became a hero practically overnight.
There were violent clashes between the strikers and strike-
breakers and between strikers and police. Twenty-three workers
were arrested and imprisoned at Nkambe. The strikers then
assembled at the Ndu market, armed with sticks, cutlasses and
spears and singing battle chants. They threatened to march to
Nkambe to free their colleagues. Only the union’s General Secretary
managed to calm them down.
The chief  of  Ndu attempted to intervene in the strike on 22
June 1962. He called upon the General Secretary to start negotiations
with the estate manager at his palace. The General Secretary turned
down his request. He told the chief that if the estate manager wanted
to start negotiations, he should approach the union directly.22
Government officials and police then pressured the management
and union leadership into reaching an agreement. During a short
meeting between both parties on 23 June 1962, the management
promised to discuss all the grievances if the strike was called off.
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The union’s General Secretary finally agreed to do so for the duration
of negotiations, but he warned the management that the strike would
be resumed should they fail.
When the negotiations began on 27 June 1962, the union’s General
Secretary did nothing besides threaten the management. The estate
manager then declined to proceed with the negotiations. He made
plain to the General Secretary that he would not discuss any issue
‘so long you insist on using threats of violence against senior
members of the estate’.23
As the estate manager persisted in his refusal to resume talks,
the union’s General Secretary again called out the workers on strike
on 2 July 1962. The strike lasted until 20 July 1962, when a
settlement was reached in a meeting with the Senior Labour Officer,
who acted as a conciliator. The management approved some of  the
issues raised by the union, such as the grading and remuneration of
artisans, the specification of sick leave, and the provision of
protective clothing and a tools allowance, but rejected others, in
particular the construction of  labour camps, the creation of  a
personnel department, and an increase in wages.
After the settlement of this important strike, the union continued
to fight for further improvement in the living and working conditions
of  its members. It focused on the most common demands of  the
workers, such as an increase in wages and salaries, the provision of
transport, housing and other social welfare services, and the
codification of  conditions of  service. While the union leadership
was generally quite moderate in its attitudes and demands, it was
often forced to declare collective trade disputes and threaten strike
action before the management was even willing to discuss such
issues.24
In November 1964 the union’s General Secretary drew up a 38-
point Memorandum on the Conditions of  Service for Workers on the estate.
In a letter to the estate manager, he explained the aim of the
Memorandum:
The aim is to have a Code of  Conditions of  Service for your
employees which is awfully lacking, and not your usual ‘verbal
contracts’ which are abrogated by you any time unilaterally to the
detriment of  any employee concerned. You have been known over
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the years to be the employer who gives a condition in the morning
and withdraws it in the afternoon. We want a code, in fact, a workers’
‘Bible’ of  conditions of  service.25
The management, however, continued to postpone any discussions
on this Memorandum. On 5 May 1966, the union declared a trade
dispute on this and other issues.26 In a long and heated
correspondence, the union’s General Secretary alleged that the
management appeared not to be interested in its employees’
conditions of  service, as it refused to hold a Joint Consultative
Committee (JCC) meeting on the issue. He finally called a strike on
the issue in October 1966. Because of the persistent industrial unrest
on the estate, the EAC Head Office decided to terminate the
contract of  the first estate manager, Mr J.M.H. Barrable, in 1967.
Immediately upon taking office, the new manager, Mr R.J. Murray,
was presented with a list of demands by the union, including the
establishment of  a company store, a workers’ club, a football pitch,
a maternity ward, and a provident fund scheme. He asked the union
to exercise patience as the estate was already burdened with the
payment of certain schemes recently introduced by the government,
such as family allowances.
The appointment of the new estate manager resulted in some
improvement in management-union relations, which was manifest
in the more or less regular joint consultations and negotiations. In
1969, however, a severe conflict developed between management
and workers. In this conflict the workers directly challenged the
managerial prerogative of  dismissing employees. The immediate
cause of  this conflict was a serious violation of  the company’s rules
by a certain headman called Mr Simon Ndzi. This headman was
hated by the workers because of his extremely authoritarian and
overzealous behaviour. He habitually marked ‘unproductive’ workers
absent, thus causing them to lose their daily wage. Not surprisingly,
the workers wanted revenge. On 30 October 1969 they heard that
Mr Ndzi had sent a worker to the market during working hours to
do his shopping. The Staff  Representatives immediately demanded
Mr Ndzi’s dismissal. They reminded the management that it had
dismissed workers for the same breach of  the rules, sometimes on
Mr Ndzi’s recommendation.
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The management, however, considered the matter rather trivial
and issued a warning to Mr Ndzi. The workers then walked out
on strike and threatened not to resume work until Mr Ndzi had
been dismissed. Their strike was fully supported by the union.
Given this situation, the estate manager asked Mr Ndzi to withdraw
from work while he sought advice from the Inspector of Labour
for West Cameroon.
In reply to the estate manager’s letter, the Inspector of  Labour
advised that since Mr Ndzi had already been served a warning for
misconduct it would be unreasonable to dismiss him for the same
act, regardless of  pressure from the workers. The estate manager
convened a meeting with the Staff Representatives on 31 March
1970 to inform them of  the Inspector of  Labour’s advice. The Staff
Representatives then agreed to Mr Ndzi’s reinstatement, albeit in a
different capacity, with effect from 6 April 1970.
The workers did not accept this agreement, however, and forced
the Staff Representatives to revoke it. On 4 April 1970 the estate
manager reproached the Staff Representatives for their unreliability
and warned them against the consequences of any strike action on
the estate.
On 6 April 1970 Mr Ndzi came to work on the estate. As soon
as he started work, the workers staged a work stoppage of four
hours until he had left the estate. The management then asked the
Labour Inspectorate to intervene. In a meeting with the Staff
Representatives on 11 April 1970, the Divisional Inspector of Labour
cautioned them to use corrective measures when a fellow worker
was doing something wrong, rather than to trying to create a precedent
which, if  followed rigidly, would eventually affect all and sundry.
Moreover, they should be firm and stick to whatever decision they
had taken and educate the workers on the issue. After long
deliberations, it was resolved that Mr Ndzi (i) be offered a different
job on the estate, such as the post of day watchman, where he
would not be in command of workers, and (ii) be requested to render
a formal apology to the workers for his behaviour.
The workers rejected these decisions outright. To regain control
over them, the management was left with no other choice than to
dismiss Mr Ndzi.27
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The same year (1970) the Inspector of  Labour for West Cameroon
visited the Ndu Estate after being informed that the workers were
restive and were planning strike action. In a meeting with
management, union leadership and Staff Representatives, a number
of long-standing workers’ grievances were discussed, including the
following:
• salaries and wages. The union demanded a 50% increase in view of
rising costs of living at Ndu. The management initially declined
to grant any increase, explaining that it wanted to invest all available
funds in expanding the estate. In the end, it agreed upon a 3-5%
increase for all categories of  workers.
• hours of work and task. The plucking task at the time was 15 kg of
green leaves. The management deemed this equal to seven hours’
work and remunerated it as such. The union stressed that workers
on the southwestern plantations received eight hours’ wage after
completing their task, and therefore demanded similar
remuneration on the Ndu Estate. The management refused to
give in unless the task was raised. The parties finally agreed upon
an eight hours’ remuneration, in return for an increase in task
work from 15 kg to 17 kg (see Table 7.5).
• a code of  conditions of  service. The union complained that its
Memorandum on the Conditions of  Service for the Workers submitted in
1964 (see above) had never been responded to by either the
management or the Labour Inspectorate. The Inspector of
Labour maintained that this item should be struck off the agenda,
as National Collective Agreements were presently being drawn
up by the tripartite partners and were to serve as future codes
of  conditions of  service.
• Cameroonisation. The union stated that since the creation of the
Ndu Estate, no Cameroonian had ever been promoted to a
post of  responsibility. The Inspector of  Labour advised the
management to upgrade qualified Cameroonians to posts of
responsibility.28 When the management failed to heed this advice,
the issue of Cameroonisation continued to be a prime source
of conflict between union and management, especially in the
period of Indian control (see Chapter 8).
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Trade union and collective action during the period
of ‘state-controlled unionism’, 1972-1991
(a) The period of Indian control, 1972-1977
The year 1972 was the starting point of both Indian control and
state-controlled unionism on the estate. Contrary to expectations,
however, there was an increase in workers’ militancy during the
period of Indian control (1972-1977). A number of factors may
account for this situation:
First of all, there was the problem of managerial control. As we
have seen in the previous chapter, the rapid turnover of British
estate managers, together with the managing agent’s pursuit of
private interests, paralysed the administration of the estate and
created unrest among the workers.
Second, there was a growing financial crisis on the estate (see
Table 9.2). Costs of  production had risen so much that the tea had
to be sold below cost price in the world market, causing substantial
losses. The company then tried to withdraw from the world market,
but experienced great difficulties in selling the tea locally because
of lack of demand. From 1975 onwards, there were continuous
stocks of 350-400 tonnes of unsold tea. In 1976 the banks stopped
providing overdraft facilities to the ailing company. As a
consequence, the estate management was unable to pay wages and
wage arrears regularly, fuelling workers’ unrest.
Thirdly, there was a general belief  among the workers that the
Indians were only interested in cheating the nation and exploiting
labour. The workers had discovered that after taking over the estate
the Indians had secretly begun repatriating the profits made by the
estate since 1969, with the assistance of the BICIC bank in Douala.
In October 1976 it was estimated that the repatriated profits
amounted to over FCFA 100 million. As a result, the estate was left
with no working capital during the 1975-1976 crisis.29 Moreover,
after his appointment in October 1975, the Indian estate manager
took a series of unprecedented measures to increase labour
productivity (see below). The workers therefore hated the Indian
management more than they had the British.
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Although trade unionism was strongly weakened after its
reorganisation in 1972, the union leadership and, above all, the Staff
Representatives still attempted to defend the workers’ interests as
much as possible. Nonetheless, there is evidence that some conflicts
did emerge between workers and the moderate union leadership/
Staff Representatives during the period of Indian control.
Table 9.2  Estates and Agency Company Ltd: Cash flow statement, 26 December
1975-30 June 1976
Source: File MTLS/DILSI/NK/17, Ndu Tea Estate – General
Correspondence.
In the period 1972-1974 the union leadership and Staff
Representatives raised a number of long-standing grievances which
had never been satisfactorily settled, including completion of the
hospital project, expansion of the estate, Cameroonisation of
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INCOMES                                                                    FCFA 
 
Tea Stocks                                             64,250,000 
Estimated Output                          155,750,000 
Sundry Debtors                          14,000,000 
Bank Overdrafts              50,000,000 
Cash/Bank Balances             1,380,000 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TOTAL INCOMES         285,380,000 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
OUTGOINGS 
 
Estate Salaries            82,000,000 
Estate Fuel  Requirements    118,000,000 
Estate Liabil ities                                         50,000,000 
Douala Office Expenses                                 5,000,000 
Sundry Creditors                                   43,683,000 
Estimated Commitments January-June 197 6      15,000,000 
Bank Interes t and Commiss ion                   8,800,000 
Bank Commitments                             79,880,000 
_________________________________________________________________________
 
TOTAL OUTGOINGS     302,363,000 
_________________________________________________________________________
 
NET DEFICIT        16,983,000 
_________________________________________________________________________
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managerial staff, introduction of a training scheme and a housing
scheme, provision of rent allowances and transport facilities,
construction of  a workers’ club, and review and codification of
conditions of  service.30 When Mr V.K. Reddy, the EAC Director
responsible for the Ndu Estate visited the estate in February 1974,
he bluntly declared that the estate could not meet such demands in
view of its rising production costs and marketing problems:
Your suggestions contained in the memo could only be feasibly
implemented at the expense of closing the estate for lack of
operational funds. Frequent references to meetings and tentative
programmes dating back to 1969 etc. have been made. Perhaps
you may consider that the buoyant conditions then existing have
been eroded continuously over the years.
The days of haphazard appointments, categorisation, capital
investment both for the operational and social programmes must
now be a thing of the past. In these very difficult times it is the
continued security of  operation that should be uppermost in our
minds, not emphasis on the benefits to a few at the expense of the
many.31
The workers were shocked by his reply and the union declared a
collective trade dispute on 23 March 1974. The Provincial Inspector
of  Labour eventually intervened in this dispute and organised a
conciliatory meeting on 11-12 May 1974. On that occasion, all the
grievances presented were discussed at great length. The
management then reiterated its promise to implement most of the
workers’ demands. However, it again failed to keep its promises.
For example, during his visit to the estate in November 1974, the
company’s chairman informed the workers that the company was
to hand over the hospital project to the government. The workers,
infuriated, told the chairman that if  the company intended to do
that, it had better hand over the whole estate to the government.32
Mounting workers’ discontent came to an explosion during the
company’s handling of  the issue of  categorisation of  the estate’s
labour force and the payment of  categorisation arrears. A Joint
Classification Board, under leadership of the Inspector of Labour
for West Cameroon, Mr E.K. Lottin, sat on 31 January 1972 to
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classify the workers of  the Ndu Estate. Although the Board’s report
should have been published within eight days, the workers did not
get hold of it until 15 November 1972 when the Staff
Representatives discovered that six copies of the report were locked
up in the estate manager’s office. The estate manager claimed that
the Divisional Inspector of  Labour, Mr J.F.G. Fomban, had forwarded
them to him in September 1972, but had prohibited him from
distributing them among the workers. It is noteworthy here that Mr
Fomban had previously been accused by estate workers of  constant
disregard of workers’ interests and of siding with the white
management in labour disputes.
After inspection of the report, many workers protested against
the categories assigned them by the Board. The Minister of Labour
then appointed another Joint Classification Board to look into the
appeals. The Board was to sit in August 1974, but its meeting had
to be postponed because the company’s managing agent, Mr Njoh
Litumbe, had not nominated a management representative on the
Board as required by law. Not until 27 January 1975 could the Board
start work, and it announced its decision on 1 February. The estate
manager thereupon calculated arrears of  about FCFA 8 million (later
this proved a miscalculation, the real amount being FCFA
23,198,523). He subsequently sought permission from Mr Litumbe
to pay both the arrears and the categorised salaries and wages. On
15 February 1975, Mr Litumbe replied that the company was unable
to pay the arrears and had appealed to the Minister of Labour against
the Board’s decision.
The workers had exercised patience during the period of
classification and reclassification, but they could no longer be
controlled by the Staff  Representatives after Mr Litumbe’s reply.
The Staff Representatives held several meetings with management
on the issue, but no solution could be found. The workers threatened
to go on strike if  the Board’s decision was not implemented before
30 April 1975.33
Early May 1975, Mr Fomban, who had meanwhile been appointed
Provincial Inspector of  Labour for the North West Province, rushed
to the estate to calm the workers down. He advised them to show
restraint, as the Minister of Labour was still considering the appeal
lodged by the company against the Board’s decision. The workers
finally agreed to abide by the law and postpone their strike action.
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The workers waited in vain until November 1975. They then
decided to strike on 15 November 1975. One day before the strike,
however, the Provincial Inspector of  Labour, Mr Fomban, received
the Minister’s final decision that the report of  the Joint Classification
Board be respected and rejecting the company’s appeal. The newly
appointed Indian estate manager, Mr K.V.S. Krishna, subsequently
agreed with union officials and Staff Representatives on 16
November that the November wages would be paid according to
the categorised rates. On 28 November, however, he received a
message from the Head Office ordering him to pay the November
wages at the old rates. He discussed the matter with the company’s
lawyer, Mr L.K. Sendze, who advised him that the company had no
choice but to pay the workers in accordance with the Minister’s
decision. Subsequently, the estate manager went to the Douala office
and made it plain to Mr Litumbe that non-payment of the categorised
wages would inevitably result in strike action. Mr Litumbe
nevertheless directed him to comply with the Head Office’s order.
Upon his arrival at the estate on 6 December, he put up a notice
informing the workers that their November wages would be paid at
the old rates.
The same day estate workers informed him that they would not
accept their November wages at the old rates and were set to go on
strike on 8 December.
On the day of strike, 8 December 1975, a meeting was organised
by the Provincial Inspector of Labour attended by the union
executive, Staff Representatives, and management. During this
meeting a telex message was received from the company chairman.
He instructed the estate manager to pay the difference between the
old and new rates for November 1975, totalling FCFA 280,970,
into a special account in the bank or with the workers’ solicitors,
pending the outcome of  a meeting of  the EAC Board of  Directors
with the Minister of Labour between 15 and 20 December 1975. It
was also agreed that a five-man workers’ delegation would meet
the chairman at Douala to discuss all the grievances.
In the afternoon practically all the workers had assembled on
the premises of  the estate manager’s office. Mr Peter Nunyi, a Staff
Representative and union executive member, addressed them and
appealed to them to accept their November wages at the old rates
pending the arrival of  the company chairman from London.
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The workers, however, rejected his appeal outright and insisted
on being paid the new rates as agreed on 16 November. They alleged
that Messrs Njoh Litumbe and Ben Alhijah were responsible for
the chairman’s refusal to implement the Minister’s decision and
demanded their dismissal. They stated categorically that they would
not resume work until they had been paid according to the new
rates. They shouted down the Provincial Inspector of  Labour when
he tried to point out the costs of strike action. They told him that
they could not care less; they only wanted their November wages at
the new rates as previously agreed.
During the turmoil a telex message was received from Douala
office informing the estate manager of  the chairman’s final approval
of  payment at the new rates. When the news was announced to the
workers, they all ‘went mad with joy and applauded for a long time’.34
The following day, 9 December 1975, the Minister of  Labour
instructed the Provincial Inspector of  Labour to examine with the
Staff Representatives and the estate manager the method of paying
the categorisation arrears. In view of  the precarious financial position
of the estate, it was decided that the arrears would be paid in twenty-
-four installments (months), starting in March 1976.
After the conclusion of this agreement, there was no
improvement in industrial relations on the estate. Instead the
atmosphere got tenser. This was because the estate manager, anxious
to increase labour productivity, started introducing new changes in
the labour process without consulting the Staff Representatives:35
• the weighing of tea baskets was to be brought back from thrice
to twice a day. Tea pluckers opposed this instruction for two
reasons: (i) it meant carrying the heavy baskets for longer periods,
and (ii) it resulted in a reduction of weight of the green leaves
plucked due to loss of moisture.
• working hours were to be raised from 45 to 48 hours a week.
This actually involved an extension of Saturday work from five
hours to eight hours. Moreover, overtime was no longer allowed
except as ordered by the management.
Workers began organising in the various sections of  the estate
without the knowledge of  the Staff  Representatives. Apparently,
they had lost confidence in the team of Staff Representatives, after
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some team members had failed to report on their recent meeting
with the company chairman at Douala. The workers submitted a
series of petitions to the management and threatened to go on strike
on 15 January 1976 if the proposed changes in the labour process
had not been withdrawn by then and the categorisation arrears paid.
In their petitions the workers announced they did not intend to
carry out the new work instructions, thereby directly challenging
management authority over the labour process. One petition read
as follows:
We the workers of  this Division are very sorry to see how Ndu
Estate is going backward. We have worked on the estate for more
than 20 years but we have never been treated as at the moment.
Have you seen that the managers who worked here before were
fools? Does it mean according to you that we were not working for
all these years? You were sent here to work with people who have
been working and not with people who have just begun to work.
For only two months you have been here your notices of  instructions
are more than thirty. Which one will we follow?
We will weigh our tea three times as in the past and not two times as
you have said now. We don’t want you to confuse us.
We will not work for 8 hours on Saturdays as you say. Have you
asked in the whole of Cameroon and you were told that even one
firm up to government departments work on Saturdays for 8 hours?
Or do you want to make a new law on this estate? We have no
camps and live several miles away. On Saturdays we go home to see
our families and relatives and also to get food and to attend to
other family matters and cannot work for 8 hours on Saturdays. We
have never worked for 8 hours on Saturdays since this estate started.
We want our arrears to be paid without fail on the 15th of  January
1976 and not in installments as you are saying. We have struggled
for five years to get our correct category and you want to add 5
years to make 10 years. This has never happened and we don’t want
you to treat us as slaves because Cameroon is independent.
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You are very happy that you have seen fools in Cameroon on Ndu
Estate. It is not good that when a man starts to dance and the drum
is stopped, be should continue to dance without the drum beats. If
you want us to dance together we will see who is going to get tired.
We are not from India and we don’t want Indian laws in this country.
If  you want laws, follow the laws of  our country. A word to the
wise is enough.36
The Indian estate manager and his two Indian assistants looked
upon these petitions as clear expressions of  workers’ determination
to topple the estate administration. They tendered their resignations
to the company chairman on the grounds that they lacked the
necessary support and co-operation from the workers in the crisis.
The chairman, however, did not accept their resignation.
On 14 January 1976, the newly appointed Divisional Inspector
of  Labour for the Donga-Mantung Division, Mrs A.Tantoh, was
informed by the estate manager that field workers had stopped
working at noon. She proceeded to the estate the next day. At her
arrival, she heard that the workers had already left the fields at 10
a.m. She decided to organise a meeting of all the parties concerned.
At this meeting the estate manager promised to restore the practice
of  weighing three times a day. In return, the workers discontinued
their strike action. They nevertheless insisted that Saturday work
should not exceed five hours and that the arrears should be paid as
soon as possible.37
On 16 February 1976, Mr V.K. Reddy, the EAC Director
responsible for the Ndu Tea Estate, informed the estate staff  that
the company wanted to close down the estate because of its
deteriorating financial position. Staff Representatives and union
leadership were shocked by this ‘disturbing news’. On 25 February
1976, the Staff  Representatives and DUAW Executive resolved
that the government should take over the estate, leaving the
management to the CDC.38 In a memorandum to the Governor of
the North West Province on 2 March 1976, they again called upon
the government to save the estate since it ‘has the reputation of
producing the best tea in the world market and, moreover, is the
only agro-industrial establishment in the North West Province’.39
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The estate manager’s announcement at the end of  March 1976
that he was unable to pay the wages and the first installment of the
categorisation arrears prompted an almost complete collapse of
managerial control over the workers. On 19 April 1976, the Vice--
President of  DUTU, Mr I.N. Ngala, threatened the estate manager
that if the workers had not received their March wages and their
accrued arrears by 22 April 1976, the union would have no other
choice but to commence industrial action without further notice.40
The Indian managers were extremely desperate as illustrated by their
telex message to the Head Office in London on 21 April 1976:
We feel that the company finances are extremely bad as by evidence
collected so far. The Staff  Representatives and Mr Ngala (vice-
president DUTU) feel otherwise. The present situation on the estate
is extremely dangerous and could cause a strike and anything else
could happen and we feel it impossible for us to do anything. There
is no sign of  any wages/payment for the company. We are not in
any way responsible for this situation of crippling financial condition.
We feel we are wasting our time when we have better work to do
elsewhere. Please be good enough to give us our terminal benefits
and send us home to India in view of this grave situation you have
put us in for no fault of  ours. We will have no other choice but to
hold you responsible for us.41
The union’s deadline of  22 April 1976 arrived without the workers
having been paid. The workers went on strike. The party president
in the Wimbum area pleaded with the Staff Representatives to wait
and see what the company would do about payment and ask the
workers to resume work for the meantime. After long deliberations,
the Staff Representatives finally agreed.
The workers, however, disapproved of the Staff Representatives’
consent. The next day, 23 April, they started a ‘go-slow’ and simply
ignored the Provincial Inspector of  Labour’s admonishments to
discontinue their action. On 28 April, the estate manager issued a
circular letter which reproduced a telex message from the company
chairman ordering a lockout of  workers:
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The chairman says the workers should be sympathetic with
management in the present financial situation. If go-slow tactics still
continue, the manager should stop all works and ask the workers to
go home and wait till matters improve. Under these circumstances,
I wish to point out that 29 April will be the last day of plucking,
followed by weeding on 30 April. From 1st May 1976 until further
notice workers will not be offered work, except essential services.42
On 4 May, the Governor of  the North West Province decided to
intervene in the explosive situation on the estate. In his address to
the workers, he strongly condemned their militancy in the crisis
facing the estate:
In the face of this crisis you are required to adopt a proper attitude
until things get normalised. You should think of  your long-term
interests. Your actions, including demand of  payment of
categorisation arrears in financial crisis, fringe benefits, and go-slow
strike means forcing the estate to close and this is deemed by
government as a sabotage. You should be patriotic, have a co-
operative spirit and have faith in the representatives of government.
What I expect is the development of a proper understanding between
workers and management. From the reports I have received it seems
that you rather want to dictate to management.43
He asked the workers to resume work immediately and to pluck
more than the daily task of 17 kg, while he would take care of their
problems. The vice-president of  DUTU, Mr I.N. Ngala, and the
Staff Representatives promised him that the workers would pluck
at least 40 kg a day. After the departure of  the Governor, however,
a number of workers proceeded with their go-slow action and even
threatened anybody who refused to participate in their action.
No action was ever taken by the Governor to solve the workers’
problems. Their problems became aggravated when the management
proved incapable of  paying their monthly wages. They lost patience and
pressured the union leadership and Staff Representatives to take action.
On 13 September the DUAW Executive and the Staff  Representatives
informed the Governor of  their intention to call out a strike:
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We have the honour to bring to your humble attention the hopeless
situation of  Ndu Tea Estate workers resulting from non-payment
of their legal salaries for about 4 months now as well as the arrears
of  categorisation. You promised to intervene on 4 May 1976 if
given time by the workers. The teas which the company was
complaining as being unsold produce in Douala have all been sold;
yet, the workers cannot be paid. We wish to state here categorically
that if by 30 September 1976 our monies are not paid, we will be
left with no alternative than to resort to industrial action.44
On 1 October 1976 a strike commenced which would be the largest
and undoubtedly the most significant in the estate’s history. It lasted
no less than 49 days. Ndu workers could hold out because they
could survive on their food farms and other activities in the local
community. The strike eventually led to the dramatic withdrawal
of  EAC from the estate. At a mass meeting on 18 November, the
Governor of  the North West Province announced to the workers
that the government had decided to buy the estate at a price of
FCFA 400 million and to hand it over to the CDC from 1 January
1977. The workers were happy with the decision taken by the
government. They called off the strike and resumed work on 19
November. One of  the most important clauses in the Heads of
Agreement signed between the EAC and the Cameroonian
government was Clause 5, which stipulated that
the estate is being sold on a going concern basis and accordingly the
employment contracts of all the workers are deemed to be
continuous and unbroken. The Vendor hereby agrees to indemnify
the Purchaser for any claim arising out of  workers’ service with the
Vendor up to the date of  take-over.45
This clause assured the workers that the CDC would employ them
and pay all the wages and arrears due them.
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(b) The period of CDC control, 1977·1991
On 1 January 1977, the CDC took over the management of the
estate from the EAC. This was the first time that the CDC had
extended its activities into the North West Province. Mr E.A.
Eloundou, who had been managing the Tole Estate for five years,
was appointed manager of the Ndu Estate. He was the first
Cameroonian to occupy this post.
The CDC management immediately tried to reassert control over
the workers, which had been seriously undermined during the late
EAC period. It hoped to achieve this in two ways. First, it promised
to uphold all contractual rights the workers had enjoyed during the
EAC period. And second, it was determined to implement on the
Ndu Estate the disciplinary measures that prevailed on other CDC
estates. This is evident from the CDC General Manager’s speech
during the handing-over ceremony:
CDC has taken over this estate with all its personnel. Your contractual
rights under the management of Estates and Agency Company Ltd
will be protected, and paid as they fall due. Arrears of pay as well as
accrued leave will be calculated and notified to each worker and
eventually these rights will be paid or leave granted as the case may
be. Your conditions of  service are continued and you are now part
of the CDC personnel. CDC has over 15,000 employees in the
South West Province. In order to employ and utilise with efficiency
such large labour force, orderly conduct by workers without
exception is indispensable. Hence the great importance that we attach
to discipline. CDC does not countenance indiscipline and I would
like to receive early reports that you are as disciplined as the rest of
CDC workers.46
After he had taken office, Mr Eloundou started to examine the
contractual rights that the workers had enjoyed during the EAC period.
During the Inaugural Meeting of the Estate Consultative Committee
(ECC) on 8 March 1977, he asked the Staff Representatives whether
the Indian management had withdrawn any established rights from
the workers during the crisis. The Staff  Representatives then
mentioned certain bonuses and gratuities (96 hours) for each year of
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service. They also claimed entitlement to the wages lost during the
49 days’ strike in 1976 (see below) and accrued overtime for
December 1976.47 They referred to the existence of certain credit
facilities during the EAC period which enabled workers to buy
building materials, kerosene, palm oil, tea, and other items. And
finally, they insisted that the CDC should fulfill some promises made
by the EAC management, in particular the purchase of  sufficient
drugs for the health centre, the conversion of  the health centre into a
hospital, and the provision of  transport facilities to workers.48 The
estate manager assured them that the CDC Head Office would
investigate their claims and pay the accrued rights.
Apparently, some workers had no faith in the estate manager’s
assurance. On 15 April 1977 a group of eight workers sent a letter
to the estate manager informing him that they were going on strike
until they were paid their accrued rights and benefits. Without
consulting the union executive and Staff Representatives, the estate
manager handed over the letter to the police. Some of the workers
who had signed the letter were arrested. This aggravated the situation
and the workers went on a solidarity strike on 18 April. In a meeting
in the manager’s office, attended by management representatives,
the Divisional Inspector of Labour, the Vice-President of DUTU
and the Staff Representatives, the strike was declared illegal and
an immediate return to work was demanded because the
management was already handling the issue. The majority of the
workers, who had rallied outside the manager’s office, ignored all
pleas to call off the strike and prevented anybody who was willing
to resume work from doing so. Two of  the strikebreakers were
severely beaten up and had to be taken to hospital for treatment.
To avert further violence, the estate manager ordered the workers
to go home and report for work on 20 April. Any worker not turning
up for work that day would be considered to have broken his
employment contract.49
On 20 April most workers returned to work. The organisers of
the strike were called to account for their action. They explained that
they had been annoyed at the continual postponement of payment
of  their accrued rights. By the time they realised that they had not
followed the correct procedures for settlement of a labour dispute,
they could no longer stop the workers from taking part in an ‘illegal’
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action. The management showed no leniency and dismissed them
on the spot. Afterwards it also summarily dismissed the 79 workers
who had not reported for duty that morning. Obviously, these harsh
disciplinary measures were meant as a deterrent to the workers. It
was clear that the CDC management was not going to tolerate any
further ‘unbridled’ militant action on their part.
This experience did not discourage the workers from making
some more dubious claims. In March the Staff  Representatives had
demanded that workers be paid for the 49 days they struck in 1976,
as they had then followed all procedures for calling out a legal strike
(see above). On this occasion, the estate manager told them he was
in no position to judge whether that strike was legal and advised
them to refer the matter to the Labour Inspectorate. On 12 May
1977, the Provincial Inspector of  Labour ruled that the workers
were not entitled to payment for the 49 days they were on strike, as
the strike was illegal. The Staff Representatives and DUTU
leadership were furious. They accused the Provincial Inspector of
being responsible for the strike himself and threatened to take the
matter to court. They alleged he had been bribed by the management
to disregard the correct procedures for settlement of the protracted
dispute on payment of  categorised wages and accrued arrears, and
that this had eventually led the workers to strike.50 The case never
came up for hearing, for the Provincial Inspector’s decision on the
illegality of the strike was upheld by the Minister of Labour on 26
June 1978. The CDC management then refused to pay the workers
for the 49 strike days.
Despite the introduction of new disciplinary measures, the CDC
management continued to experience difficulties in controlling the
workers. A number of  vehement conflicts occurred between the
management and the workers.
One conflict developed right after the CDC takeover when the
management changed the task and bonus system, without consulting
the Staff  Representatives. Since 1970 the plucking norm on the
Ndu Estate had been 17 kg of green leaves and the incentive bonus
FCFA 10 for every kilogramme plucked above the basic task (see
Table 7.5). The CDC management decided to introduce on the Ndu
Estate the same task and bonus system as existed on the Tole Estate
(see Table 6.1). Consequently, the task on the Ndu Estate was raised
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to 18 kg and the incentive bonus reduced to FCFA 7. On 21 June
1977, the Staff Representatives blamed the estate manager for this
unilateral decision, which amounted to a deterioration in workers’
conditions of  service.51 On 25 May 1978, DUTU declared a
collective trade dispute on the issue. The matter dragged on until
13 December 1979 when the Divisional Inspector of Labour
instructed the management to restore the bonus to its original rate,
as it constituted an acquired right, and to pay the accrued arrears.
The management, however, kept postponing payment. Under
constant pressure from the workers, the Staff Representatives issued
an ultimatum to the estate manager on 27 December 1980 stating
that they would call a strike if  the accrued arrears were not included
in the December wages.52 A timely visit of  the Divisional Inspector
of Labour to the estate on 30 December 1980 helped calm down
the workers. The management was summoned once more to do
everything possible to pay the arrears in due time. They were finally
paid in February 1981.53
Another conflict developed in 1977 about the inequality in
remuneration between Ndu workers and other CDC workers. On 2
August 1977 the Staff Representatives complained to the Divisional
Inspector of Labour that the CDC management had introduced the
same conditions of  service and disciplinary measures on the Ndu
Estate as were in existence on other CDC estates, but refused to
extend the ‘zone unique’ policy to the Ndu Estate (see Chapter 7).
As a result, workers on the Ndu Estate (which remained in the
Third Zone of the Primary Sector) were more poorly remunerated
than workers on other CDC estates (placed in the Second Zone of
the Primary Sector). Ndu workers, of course, strongly resented this
wage differential:
On the take-over of the estate by the CDC, we realised that there
exists a policy of paying all CDC workers on one wage zone known
as Zone Unique. We have been shocked by the fact that when our
union demanded the application of  the Zone Unique Policy, the
answer was negative.
It should be noted that when the CDC took over the estate various
tasks which were negotiated between management of  the former
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company, union and Labour Department were abolished, certain
acquired rights and facilities were seized from us.
When we asked why all these were happening to us, we were told
that whatever system Tole Tea Estate is following, we should also
do so. We then obeyed all these for the fact that whatever facilities
they are enjoying we will also enjoy some.
It now seems as if they will only want us to follow their work
policy and when it comes to something which we will benefit from
it, this will be refused. If this is how we should be treated, then we
think that there is nothing like ‘Social Justice’.
We would like people to know that Ndu Estate workers are a set
of people who are prepared to work hard for a master if he shows
a sign of social justice. When we receive a new master, we usually
remove our caps and worship him. We can continue to make you
gain for our life being. But if  you make us put our hats back on our
heads, then we are no longer prepared to remove them for you.54
In reply, the Divisional Inspector of  Labour explained to the Staff
Representatives that the CDC management was not empowered to
employ the ‘zone unique’ policy to the Ndu Tea Estate. The Minister
of Labour, however, could authorise a company to apply a single
minimum wage to all its establishments situated in different wage
zones. Ndu workers should therefore patiently await the Minister’s
decision. On 21 March 1978, the Staff Representatives complained
to the CDC Administrative Personnel Controller that even workers
who had been transferred by the corporation from the Ndu Estate
to other CDC estates did not enjoy the benefits of the ‘zone unique’
policy.55
No further correspondence on the issue was forthcoming from
the Ministry of Labour and the CDC Head Office. The workers
then pressured the vice-president of  DUTU, Mr I.N. Ngala, to declare
a collective trade dispute on 19 May.56 The Divisional Inspector of
Labour, however, immediately warned the vice-president that he
could not call a strike, as the matter was already under consideration.
As we have seen, it was not until 1987 that the Minister of Labour
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approved of the application of the ‘zone unique’ policy to the Ndu
Estate, in return for workers’ acceptance of an increase in task
work from 26 kg to 32 kg of  green leaves.
Another conflict developed after the CDC takeover of the estate
when the management began to transfer workers on a large scale.
As the Ndu workers maintained close links with their local
community, most of  them, particularly the older ones, looked upon
a transfer to other CDC estates as a severe punishment by the
management. It directly threatened their family life and the
investments they had made in the local community with the money
earned on the estate. This is clear from the following case:
I object to the proposal by the CDC management to transfer me
for the following reasons. I started working with the estate in April
1957 and have now risen to the rank of a Senior Field Overseer and
have held this position since 1972. I am 47 years old and have a
huge family - two wives and nine children; five children are in primary
school, one in secondary school at Nso, two under school age and
one above twenty-one. It would be inconvenient for me to be moving
with this huge family, up and down the country. I have an old mother
who is entirely dependent on me as I am the only son. I maintain a
livestock farm of  cattle at Ndu (about 50 heads) and this farm
needs constant attention by me.57
Ndu workers were often transferred to non-tea estates, where they
soon got dismissed because they were unable to cope with the
unfamiliar work. One well-known predicament of some workers
who were transferred to coastal estates frightened their previous
colleagues on the Ndu Estate:
• Mr A.S. Nfor transferred to Bota and terminated;
• Mr Cletus Kwiyup transferred to Tole and terminated;
• Mr Noah Ngarka transferred to Tombel where he died;
• Mr Emmanuel Ngwani collapsed on receiving a transfer note to
proceed to Dschang and has since lost his job;
• Mr Manases Taji transferred to Tombel where he was beaten by
workers and is now lame;
• Mr Zacheus Ngawyi transferred to Mukonje and terminated
when he asked for his rights;
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• Thirteen headmen transferred to various estates in the South West
Province and after   several send-off  parties at Ndu, terminated
and re-instated as new labour.58
Little wonder, then, that Staff Representatives were wont to accuse
the CDC of implementing a policy of ‘transfer to eliminate’.
Among the transferred workers there were also a number of Staff
Representatives and trade union officials. Staff  Representatives were
sometimes transferred without the management having sought prior
authorisation from the Labour Inspector, as the Labour Code
requires. It has been a persistent policy of  the CDC management to
transfer or dismiss militant union leaders and Staff Representatives
in order to cripple the union (Konings 1993). On 16 August 1982,
the DUAW Executive and Staff  Representatives made the following
complaint to the CDC General Manager:
Mr Joseph B. Sabgu has been transferred to Missellele Rubber instead
of  Tole Tea. There seems to be no doubt that the corporation is
carrying out a systematic exercise, the intention of which is to
amputate the strength of the union and persecute trade union leaders
in this Division. CDC transfers are only directed at trade union
leaders and Staff Representatives and the following are among those
of  the victims: Messrs E.N. Tamnjong, W.C. Felixson, and late S.K.
Nduwa. This is creating serious industrial tension on the estate. We
strongly wish to advise that the Trade Union has already declared a
trade dispute and you know that the procedure for transferring a
Staff  Representative has not been fulfilled in this new transfer.59
The union leaders and Staff Representatives usually sought the
assistance of the Labour Inspectorate. This sometimes had the
desired result. On 5 September 1981, for instance, the Divisional
Inspector of Labour refused to authorise the transfer of Mr Samuel
Nduwa, a long-time union leader and Staff Representative (see
above), since the management had failed to provide convincing
reasons for his transfer.
During the period 1981-1982 a vehement conflict erupted
between management and a small group of senior workers on
established rights. The estate manager suddenly suspended certain
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benefits that the group had previously enjoyed, particularly the
supplying of water, firewood and kerosene. The group lodged a
complaint with the Divisional Inspector of Labour at Nkambe, but
the latter’s intervention was unsuccessful. On 12 April 1982, the
president of  DUTU, Mr I.N. Ngala, accused the estate manager of
having violated the Collective Agreement’s provisions on acquired
benefits, and went on to declare a trade dispute. The Divisional
Inspector of Labour eventually proposed that the Minister of Labour
appoint a Joint Interpretation and Conciliation Committee to handle
the dispute.60 The Minister, however, once again delayed taking any
decision. The issue has hence never been resolved satisfactorily.
Interestingly, soon after the estate manager started to employ
permanent female workers, a dispute arose between the women
and the managerial staff  in the West section of  the estate about
pro-rata payments for ‘uncompleted and unsatisfactory’ work
performance. On 20 August 1983, they protested in a very rowdy
way against this treatment and then left the fields. Both management
and Staff Representatives condemned this ‘mob action’, but they
agreed that the women should be disciplined rather than dismissed
for their ‘illegal’ strike action ‘because of their ignorance of the
Labour Code and Internal Regulations’.61
By the end of 1985 a more profound conflict had developed
between the total estate labour force and a few Cameroonian
managerial staff  members. It arose from the fact that the
Cameroonian assistant manager, Mr L.H. Abety, was plotting the
overthrow of  the British estate manager, Mr R.J. Murray (see Chapter
8). Abety and some of his collaborators among the managerial staff
were systematically obstructing Mr Murray’s production programme
and this resulted in a considerable decline in output. As a result, Mr
Murray had fallen ill and was granted sick leave by the CDC General
Manager for treatment in Britain. On 31 December 1985 he handed
over the administration of  the estate to his assistant, Mr Abety.
The workers were not happy with this transfer of  power. Mr Abety
was hated for his extreme authoritarianism, his rigidity, his severe
sanctions for minor offences, and his constant pro-rata payments.
Mr Murray, on the other hand, was held in high esteem. He knew
how to deal with all categories of workers, and moreover he had
become very popular among the local population after he initiated
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a scheme of supplying water to the villages in the neighbourhood
of the estate. Mr Abety had once tried to stop this scheme by
complaining to the CDC General Manager that it was not a budget
item. This had stirred up bad feelings among the workers and the
local population. The union president, Mr I.N. Ngala, received a
pile of letters from the workers in the course of 1985 threatening
strike action if  Mr Abety and his collaborators continued to obstruct
Mr Murray’s instructions.
Immediately after Mr Abety’s takeover of  the estate management
on 31 December 1985, the workers became restive and began
planning strike action. As the situation became critical, the union
organised a meeting on 3 January 1986 attended by the chief of
Ndu, Mr Murray, Mr Abety, and the Staff  Representatives. During
this meeting the union president and Staff Representatives blamed
Mr Abety and his collaborators for the explosive situation on the
estate. Mr Murray informed the meeting that he had decided to
cancel his journey to Britain under pressure from the workers and
that he had retaken full responsibility for the estate’s administration,
despite fierce opposition on the part of  Mr Abety. It soon became
clear that no settlement of the conflict could be arrived at during
this meeting. The union president then proposed to request the CDC
General Manager’s intervention.62
The next day the Divisional Inspector of Labour received word
that the estate workers were announcing a strike on the issue. He
went to the estate and arranged for a joint meeting with the
management and the Staff  Representatives on 6 January, with a
view to averting the impending strike action. However, on 5 January
Mr Murray committed suicide.
In the early morning of 6 January 1986 all the workers, their
wives and children, and even sympathisers from neighbouring villages
assembled in front of the estate office, sitting in silence. They
declared a day of  mourning for Mr Murray. They informed the
Divisional Inspector of Labour that they were going on strike the
following day if Mr Abety was still on the estate, since he was
responsible (through some magical means) for Mr Murray’s death.
The Divisional Inspector was able to convince Mr Abety that he
had better leave the estate immediately for his own safety. When
the workers heard he was gone, they rejoiced and promised to resume
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work on 8 January. After this incident, the CDC General Manager
came to the estate where he had a meeting with the entire labour
force. Another expatriate was appointed estate manager and the
workers seemed quite satisfied with the situation.63
In the economic crisis the contradictions between the rank and
file and the union leaders/Staff Representatives came increasingly
to the fore. On 3 July 1987, the DUAW president, Mr Johnson Tanto
Massa, agreed with the CDC management upon an increase of task
work from 26 kg to 32 kg of green leaves, in return for the application
of  the ‘zone unique’ policy to the Ndu Estate. When he informed the
Staff  Representatives of  this agreement on 8 July, they remarked
that the application of the ‘zone unique’ policy did not compensate
the workers for the disproportionately high increase in task work.
Nonetheless, they finally agreed to implement the new task for the
time being on condition that the union would appeal to the CDC
General Manager for a reduction in task.64
The workers protested against this agreement in various ways.
They refused to re-elect Mr Johnson Tanto Massa president during
the DUAW executive elections shortly afterwards. In addition, they
started a go-slow in November, resulting in all of them being paid
pro-rata. The estate manager, accompanied by the DUAW president
and two newly elected Staff Representatives, then went around the
fields and addressed the pluckers. The pluckers finally agreed to
raise output after the manager had promised to allow some of their
representatives to visit the other CDC tea estates to investigate
whether their colleagues on these estates were also carrying out a
32 kg task.65
During a mass meeting on 16 September 1987 a team of
management and union representatives commissioned by the CDC
General Manager informed the workers that the corporation was
incurring huge losses because of  the deteriorating terms of  trade. It
therefore proposed a series of austerity measures to combat the
economic crisis, including a compulsory savings scheme. The
workers rejected these proposals outright.66
In December 1989, the newly elected president of  DUAW, Mr
G.N. Majam, agreed in the CDC Head Office at Limbe-Bota to the
introduction of a compulsory savings scheme and a drastic cut in
workers’ fringe benefits (see Chapters 3 and 7). On his return, he
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informed the Staff  Representatives of  these decisions. They strongly
disapproved and refused to communicate them to the workers. When
Mr Majam himself tried to address the workers, he barely escaped
being beaten up by the angry mob. Because of  Majam’s utter failure
to obtain the workers’ consent, the CDC General Manager himself,
together with some union and management representatives, had to
come to the estate to seek their co-operation. In a mass meeting,
the visiting team stressed that, in view of  the corporation’s
precarious financial position, non-acceptance of the drastic measures
would inevitably lead to the closure of the estate.67 This left the
workers with no other choice but to comply.
From the beginning of the 1990s the management has persistently
refused to consult the Staff  Representatives. It kept telling them
that increase in labour productivity was more important during the
economic crisis than the representation of  workers’ interests. It
wanted to do business only with the DUAW president, Mr Majam,
who was generally believed to have been ‘bought over’ by the
management. After his painful confrontations with the workers, Mr
Majam tried to avoid direct contact with them and to control them
through the Staff  Representatives. He ordered Staff  Representatives
to discipline any worker who was not ‘co-operative’ and to report
him/her to the management. He could still count on a few followers
among the Staff Representatives, whom he allegedly encouraged
to spy on their colleagues. This created a lot of  friction within the
team of Staff Representatives and between the team of Staff
Representatives and the workers.68 The workers no longer had
confidence in their union leaders and Staff  Representatives.
The workers went on strike on 4 January 1991 without informing
the Staff  Representatives and the union leadership. After the severe
cuts in their income, they were angry that their family allowances
had not been paid for 18 months and that they had not enjoyed
Christmas advances as had their colleagues on other CDC estates.
On 5 January, the Divisional Inspector of  Labour tried to settle
the dispute. He organised a meeting with the workers, but they
refused to attend. Only a few Staff  Representatives and supervisory
staff  members turned up. On 7 January, Staff  Representatives
organised a new meeting attended by the Senior Divisional Officer
(SDO), the Divisional Inspector of Labour, the chief of Ndu, and
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the supervisory and managerial staff. Very few workers were in
attendance. In his speech, the SDO chastised the workers for going
on strike during the economic crisis:
Concerning the Ndu Tea Estate it should be considered by the
workers as their property and milking cow from where they earned
their living. In this wise, he cautioned the workers to treat the estate
with care whatever circumstances notwithstanding. He questioned
whether it was appropriate to burn the estate because of reclamations
that were not worth the sum total of the returns obtained by the
entire workers from it. …
Making reference to the council union workers as well as the Mbiyeh
Co-operative workers (who had been for up to 12 months without
salaries) the Administration castigated the attempts of the workers
to cripple the CDC, a corporation that provided for their salaries
every month.
He urged the workers to return to work, as their grievances had
already been transmitted to the appropriate quarters. The Staff
Representatives stated that they could not guarantee a speedy
resumption of work, for they did not enjoy the workers’ confidence
and therefore had no control over them. The chief of Ndu then
promised the administration that he would order the workers to
return to work the next day, 8 January. The workers indeed came to
the estate on that day, but they left by 9 a.m. Only after payment of
family allowances were paid on 9 January did they finally resume
work.69
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that Ndu male pluckers,
like the Tole female pluckers, have developed a ‘trade union
consciousness’. Though the local chief and estate management
initially tried to oppose development of trade unionism on the Ndu
Estate, male pluckers gradually came to understand the importance
of  trade union organisation for defending their interests. While, like
the Tole female pluckers, they have never competed for office, they
do seem to have displayed a higher degree of participation in the
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day-to--day affairs of  the union than Tole female pluckers. This has
enabled them to exercise a higher degree of  control over the union’s
representation of  their interests than the Tole female pluckers.
Like the latter, Ndu male pluckers have never supported the
union unconditionally. When it became seriously weakened by its
subordination to the state, they started to lose confidence in the
leadership and Staff Representatives, and reverted more and more
to independent collective action. Their degree of militancy during
Indian control over the estate (1972-1977) is probably
unprecedented in the history of state-controlled unionism in
Cameroon. The economic crisis, however, left little room for
collective action, and this undoubtedly resulted in an increase of
male pluckers’ informal actions.
Notes
  1. See Letter of  Senior Labour Officer to Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General
Secretary of  NEWU, dated 30 September 1958, in File CUPIAW 1,
Formation and Registration of  NEWU.
  2. Constitution of  NEWU, in ibid.
  3. See Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  CUPIAW, to
the Delegate of Labour, Buea, dated 30 April 1971, in File MTLS/
WCD/BU.95/S.6, Complaints - Ndu Tea Estate.
  4. See Letter of  Mr J.M.H. Barrable, Estate Manager, to General Secretary
of  NEWU, dated 21 October 1961, in File CUPIAW 3, Executive
Committee.
  5. Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  NEWU, to Estate
Manager, Ndu Tea Estate, dated 8 October 1962, in File CUPIAW 7,
Joint Consultative Committee Members’ Meetings and Outcome.
  6. See Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  NEWU, to
Senior Labour Officer, Buea, dated 22 October 1962, in ibid.
  7. See Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  NEWU, to
Estate Manager, Ndu Tea Estate, dated 6 November 1962, in ibid.
  8. See Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive Committee of NEWU
held in Mr Isiah’s House on 10 August 1958, in File CUPIAW 1,
Formation and Registration of  NEWU.
229
Chapter 9: Male workers and trade unionism
  9. See Minutes of General Meeting of the NEWU held at Ndu on 15
October 1961, in File DUAW D/M 10, Working Conditions, Claims,
Wages and Wage Structure.
10. Statement of General Secretary of NEWU at the Inaugural Meeting
of  the Joint Consultative Committee on 6 April 1962, in File CUPIAW
7, Joint Consultative Committee.
11. Statement of the General Secretary of NEWU on 20 July 1962, in
File MTPS/WCD/BU.99, CUPIAW.
12. See Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  NEWU, to
Estate Manager, Ndu Tea Estate, dated 30 August 1963, in File
CUPIAW 3, Executive Committee.
13. See Letter of  General Secretary of  CUPIAW to Registrar of  Trade
Unions, dated 17 July 1968, in File MTPS/WCD/BU.99, CUPIAW.
14. Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson to All Field Supervisors, Ndu Tea Estate,
dated 12 September 1972, in File CUPIAW 52, Cameroon Labour
Congress, NUCW.
15. Resolutions taken in a Joint Meeting of the Staff Representatives and
Executive Members held in the Ndu Estate Health Centre on 25
February 1976, in File CUPIAW 38, Staff  Representative Elections
and Other Matters.
16. Keynote Address by Mr I.N. Ngala, President of  DUTU D/M on
the Occasion of  the Extraordinary Congress of  the Trade Union
Movement of Donga-Mantung on 6 March 1987, in File MTPS/
DILSI/NK/5, Vol. I, Divisional Union of  Trade Unions, Donga-
Mantung.
17. See Letter of  Mr A.B. Njerim, Administrative Secretary of  DUTU,
to Organising Secretary of CTUC, dated 26 December 1987, in ibid.;
and Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive Committee of the DUTU
D/M summoned by the SDO, Nkambe, to resolve the disparities in
the DUTU D/M, dated 12 October 1987, in ibid.
18. See Statement on the Issue of  the Leadership in the Trade Union
Movement in Donga-Mantung Division by DUAW Executive on 11
October 1987, in File DUTU D/M 2, Divisional Trade Union Bureau
(Executive Meetings).
19. Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  NEWU, to Mr
John Arbuthnot, MP, Chairman of  EAC, London, dated 13 April
1962, in File NEWU 18/1, Trade Disputes.
230
Gender and Plantation Labour in Africa
20. Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  NEWU, to Mr
J.M.H. Barrable, Ndu Estate Manager, dated 18 June 1962, in ibid.
21. See Circular by Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  NEWU, in
the Matter of  a Trade Dispute, dated 18 June 1962, in ibid. See also
Memorandum of  Agreement in the Trade Dispute between the Ndu
Tea Estate and the Estate Workers’ Union, in BNA, File Qe (1958) 1,
Trade Disputes.
22. See Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  NEWU, to
His Highness the Chief of Ndu, dated 22 June 1962, in ibid.
23. See Letter of  Mr J.M.H. Barrable, Estate Manager, to General Secretary
of  NEWU, dated 28 June 1962, in ibid.
24. See for these trade disputes and strike threats, File BU.99 1b/30, Vol.
II, CUPIAW.
25. See Letter of  Mr E.Y.K. Barthson, General Secretary of  CUPIAW, to
the Manager, Ndu Tea Estate, dated 16 May 1966, in ibid. The
memorandum can be found in File MTPS/WCD/BU.99, CUPIAW.
26. See Letter of  General Secretary of  CUPIAW to All Workers of  Ndu
Estate, dated 5 May 1966, in File BU.99 1b/30, Vol. II, CUPIAW.
27. See Report on Trade Dispute at Ndu Tea Estate Presented to the
Secretary-General of  the Ministry of  Labour, Yaoundé, by the Delegate
and Regional Inspector of  Labour, West Cameroon, on 13 July 1970,
in ibid.; and Minutes of  Tripartite Meeting held in the Office of  the
Manager, Ndu Tea Estate, on 22 January 1970, in ibid.
28. Minutes of  Tripartite Meeting held in the Office of  the Manager,
Ndu Tea Estate, on 22 January 1970, in ibid.
29. See Mémorandum sur les implications d’une éventuelle fermeture du
complexe de thé de Ndu: Une analyse du problème et une suite de
propositions, in File NEWU 18/1, Trade Disputes.
30. Memo on some aspects of  conditions of  service, promotions and
upgrading of workers and certain aspects of social and economic
development at the Ndu Tea Estate and the expansion of  company
activities on Ndu Tea Estate, presented to the Director of  the Ndu
Tea Estate, Mr V.K. Reddy, by DUAW D/M on 9 February 1974, in
ibid.
31. Memo of  Mr V.K. Reddy, Director of  EAC, to Mr E.Y.K. Barthson,
dated 27 February 1974, in ibid.
231
Chapter 9: Male workers and trade unionism
32. Memo of some aspects of grievances and frustration presented by
the Ndu Tea Estate Staff  Representatives to a Commission of  Enquiry
appointed to probe the affairs of  the Ndu Tea Estate on 11 September
1975, in ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Report on Intended Strike Action by the Workers of  Ndu Tea Estate,
in File MTPS/DILSI/NK/8, Ndu Tea Estate - Collective Trade
Disputes.
35. See Minutes of the Junior Cameroonian Staff Meeting held at the
Ndu Estate Health Centre on 8 January 1976, in ibid.
36. Petition of  the Workers of  Kugha Section, East Division, Ndu Estate,
to Estate Manager, Ndu Tea Estate, dated 13 January 1976, in ibid.
37. See Report of  the State of  Unrest amongst the Workers of  Ndu Tea
Estate, by Mrs A.Tantoh, Divisional Inspector of  Labour, Nkambe,
dated 17 January 1976, in ibid.
38. Resolutions taken in a Joint Meeting of the Staff Representatives and
DUAW Executive Members held in the Ndu Estate Health Centre on
25 February 1976, in File CUPIAW 38, Staff  Representative Elections
and Other Matters.
39. Abstract of a Memo Presented to the Government by the Staff
Representatives and Executive Members of  the NUCW, Donga-
Mantung Division, on 2 March 1976, in File NEWU 18/1, Trade
Disputes.
40. See Letter of  Mr I.N. Ngala, Vice-President of  DUTU D/M, to
Estate Manager, Ndu Tea Estate, dated 19 April 1976, in ibid.
41. Telex Message from Ndu Estate Management to EAC Head Office,
London, dated 21 April 1976, in File MTPS/DILSI/NK/8, Ndu
Tea Estate - Collective Trade Disputes.
42. Circular no. 26 from Estate Manager to All Notice Boards, Ndu Tea
Estate, dated 28 April 1976, in ibid.
43. Report on Address to Ndu Tea Estate Workers by the Governor,
North West Province, dated 4 May 1976, in ibid.
44. See Letter of  Staff  Representatives and DUAW Executive to
Governor, North West Province, dated 13 September 1976, in ibid.
232
Gender and Plantation Labour in Africa
45. Heads of  Agreement between EAC Ltd (Vendor) and the Government
of the United Republic of Cameroon (Purchaser) concerning the sale
of  the Ndu Tea Estate, signed at London on 19 November 1976, in
File MTLS/DILSI/NK/17, Ndu Tea Estate - General
Correspondence.
46. Speech by the General Manager of CDC on the occasion of the
handing-over ceremony of  Ndu Tea Estate on 1 January 1977, in File
NEWU 18/1, Trade Disputes.
47. See Minutes of  the Inaugural Consultative Meeting of  the Ndu Tea
Estate held at the Estate Manager’s Office on 8 March 1977, in File
DUTU D/M 15, Vol. II, Staff  Representative Elections and Other
Matters Connected Therewith.
48. See Welcome Address Presented by the Workers of  the Ndu Tea
Estate to the New CDC Management on 4 April 1977, in File MTLS/
DILSI/NK/17, Ndu Tea Estate - General Correspondence.
49. Report of  CDC Ndu Estate on Strike, 18-19 April 1977, by Mr G.N.
Katu, Labour Controller, in File MTPS/DILSI/NK/8, Ndu Tea
Estate  - Collective Trade Disputes.
50. See Letter of  Mr G.F. Layu, Barrister and Solicitor, to the Provincial
Inspector of Labour, Bamenda, dated 7 July 1977, in File NEWU
18/1, Trade Disputes.
51. See Minutes of ECC Meeting held on 21 June 1977 in the Estate
Manager’s Office, in CDC Ndu Tea Estate, Minutes of  ECC Meetings,
1977-91.
52. Minutes of  a Meeting with the Labour Delegate held at the Ndu Tea
Estate Office on 30 December 1980, in File DUTU D/M 15, Vol. II,
Staff Representative Elections and Other Matters Connected Therewith.
53. See File MTPS/NWP/DILSI/NK/28, Vol. I, Quarterly and Annual
Activity Reports (General).
54. See Letter of  Staff  Representatives, Ndu Tea Estate, to Divisional
Inspector of Labour, Nkambe, dated 2 August 1977, in File MTPS/
DILSI/NK/8, Ndu Tea Estate - Collective Trade Disputes.
55. See Report of  Collective Trade Dispute (CDC Zone Unique Policy),
dated 7 June 1978, in ibid.
56. See Letter of  Mr I.N. Ngala, Vice-President of  DUTU D/M, to
Divisional Inspector of Labour, Nkambe, dated 19 May 1978, in File
NEWU 18/1, Trade Disputes.
233
Chapter 9: Male workers and trade unionism
57. Investigative interview conducted at the CDC Ndu Estate concerning
the transfer of  Samuel Nduwa, Permanent Staff  Representative of
the 2nd Electoral College, in Float File, Vol. II, DILSI, Nkambe.
58. See Letter of  Staff  Representatives, Ndu Tea Estate, to Divisional
Inspector of Labour, Nkambe, dated 15 September 1980, in File
NEWU 18/1, Trade Disputes.
59. Letter of  Trade Union Leaders and Staff  Representatives DUAW
D/M, to General Manager of CDC, dated 16 August 1982, in File
DUTU D/M 15, Vol. II, Staff  Representative Elections and Other
Matters Connected Therewith.
60. See Circumstantial Report on the Declaration of  a Trade Dispute
over the Withdrawal of Acquired Benefits, Presented to the Minister
of  Labour, Yaoundé, by the Divisional Inspector of  Labour, Nkambe,
on 2 June 1982, in File MTLS/DILSI/NK/17, Ndu Tea Estate -
General Correspondence.
61. See Minutes of ECC Meetings on 23 August 1983 and 2 December
1982, in CDC Ndu Tea Estate, Minutes of  ECC Meetings, 1977-91.
62. See Minutes of an Important Meeting held in the Staff Club on 3
January 1986, in File NEWU 18/1, Trade Disputes.
63. Circumstantial Report on Social Climate at the CDC Ndu Tea Estate,
Presented to the Minister of  Labour, Yaoundé, by the Divisional
Inspector of labour, Nkambe, on 24 January 1986, in File MTPS/
NWP/DISLI/NK/28, Vol. I, Quarterly and Annual Activity Reports
(General).
64. Minutes of a Meeting held with Cat. 7-12 Staff and Staff
Representatives on 8 July 1987, in File MTPS/DILSI/NK/5, Vol. I,
DUTU D/M.
65. See Letter of  Estate Manager, Ndu Tea Estate, to Deputy General
Manager of CDC, Bota, dated 17 November 1987, in File MTPS/
DILSI/NK/45, Vol. I, Elections of  Staff  Representatives.
66. See Quarterly Report, July-September 1987, in Float File A, Continue,
Vol. III, DILSI, Nkambe.
67. Minutes of Staff Representatives’ Meetings on 23 December 1989
and 2 January 1990, in CDC Ndu Tea Estate, Record of  Minutes of
Staff Representatives’ Preparatory Meetings, 1981-91.
234
Gender and Plantation Labour in Africa
68. Minutes of Staff Representatives’ Preparatory Meeting held on 5
November 1990, in ibid.
69 Circumstantial Report on the ‘Reduction of Production’ Strike at the
CDC Ndu Tea Estate from 3-8 January 1991, Presented to the Minister
of  Labour, Yaoundé, by Divisional Inspector of  Labour, Nkambe,
on 9 January 1991, in File MTPS/DILSI/NK/8, Ndu Tea Estate -
Collective Trade Disputes.
235
Part III
The Cameroon Tea Estates
236
237
10
Privatisation and labour militancy: The case
of  Cameroon’s tea estates
Introduction
Privatisation is an essential part of  an overall neo-liberal reform
package aimed at creating transparency and accountability in the
management of national affairs as well as a favourable environment
for opening up African economies to market forces and private-
sector development (World Bank 1989, 1992; Sandbrook 2000).
Privatisation calls for a  re-evaluation of relations between the
public and private sectors in Africa. Under pressure from
international donors, governments have been urged to reduce state
ownership and enhance private-sector development. International
donors tend to attribute the massive growth of state enterprises
since independence and their generally poor performance to the
bad governance of  Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes. They claim
that statist conceptions of development have resulted in a
widespread politicisation of economic decision-making and rent-
seeking behaviour among the parasitic political elite (World Bank
1997; Olukoshi 1998; van de Walle 2001). Privatisation would help
cut public-sector inefficiency and waste, solve the problem of rising
budgetary deficits, stimulate private-sector development, attract
more investment and new technology, and revive economic growth.
There is a growing body of literature on privatisation that
discusses the mixed results these practices have had in Africa and
the serious problems and controversy they have encountered (cf.
Mkandawire 1994; Bennell 1997; Campbell White & Bhatia 1998;
Tangri 1999; van de Walle 2001; Pitcher 2002; Rakner 2003).
Privatisation problems in Africa are attributed not only to technical
and financial constraints but also to the fact that privatisation did
not offer the break with the previous dynamics of the post-colonial
state that the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors had
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expected. Cameroon is a clear example of the failure of privatisation
to free the parastatal sector of government neo-patrimonial logic (van
de Walle 1994; Walker 1998; Konings 2003b, 2007). There is
considerable evidence that the Biya regime was initially extremely
reluctant to sell state-owned enterprises, which it saw as a threat to
its patronage politics and the maintenance and consolidation of its
power. It was only later that it was prepared to speed up the programme
of privatisation. In addition to persistent pressure from international
donors, the regime realised that privatisation itself did not necessarily
foreclose rent-seeking opportunities for the parasitic bureaucratic and
political elite. Indeed, some members benefited from it. For politicians
responsible for the privatisation process, privatisation measures have
frequently been an opportunity for corrupt practices. Divestiture has
not been a transparent process and, in return for the payment of
substantial kickbacks, public enterprises have been sold at prices far
below their true value amid reports of  embezzlement of  the proceeds.
Moreover, privatisation has not excluded members of the bureaucratic
and political elite from occupying top positions in former state-owned
enterprises. Some have been re-appointed and others have been newly
recruited (Konings 2007).
The problems of privatisation in Africa are seen by some as also
being due to the fierce opposition of civil-society organisations (cf.
Olukoshi 1998; Beckman & Sachikonye 2001; Konings 2003a,
2003b, 2009b). Although World Bank studies have recommended
the involvement of  civil society in neo-liberal economic reforms,
arguing that their participation in policy making would ensure
ownership, credibility and sustainability of  the reform process (World
Bank 1992, 1995; Rakner 2001), there is ample evidence that civil-
society organisations tend to be excluded from the decision-making
process because of  their expected resistance to the allegedly harmful
effects of externally imposed privatisation schemes on their
members. Academics, students and ethno-regional movements have
vehemently denounced the sale of national and regional patrimony
to western multinationals and nationals closely connected with
African regimes (Tangri 1999; Konings 2003b, 2007). They and
various indigenous business groups have criticised the prominent
role of foreign companies in the privatisation process as a
‘recolonisation of Africa’. Consumer groups have often protested
against the poor and/or expensive services delivered by newly
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privatised enterprises. Undoubtedly, the most public, persistent and
organised opposition to privatisation in Africa has come from the
labour movement. Trade unions have, on occasion, succeeded in
blocking or slowing down the privatisation of specific enterprises
or influencing negotiations for a privatisation agreement. At other
times and in response to external pressures, governments have simply
brushed union opposition aside, leaving a legacy of  anger and
political tension (Beckman & Sachikonye 2001; Konings 2006).
Remarkably, hardly any detailed studies have been published on
the responses of  African workers to privatisation in West-Central
Africa.1 This is all the more surprising because privatisations of
large, strategic public enterprises in Cameroon and other African
countries have often been followed by militant protests by workers
against massive lay-offs and deteriorating conditions of  service.
This chapter discusses how the privatisation of  the CDC’s tea
estates generated not only persistent regional protest but also
protracted strikes by estate workers. I focus on workers in the two
privatised tea estates in Anglophone Cameroon, namely the Tole
Tea Estate and the Ndu Tea Estate.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first provides evidence
that the announced privatisation of the CDC tea estates in October
2002 was fiercely opposed by Anglophone and other ethno-regional
organisations, in particular the Bakweri Land Claims Committee
(BLCC), all the more so because it turned out to be engineered by a
few well-connected members of the regional elite who were
conniving with the Cameroonian state. The second part describes
the growing militancy of  Tole and Ndu workers following a dramatic
deterioration in their conditions of  service in the aftermath of  the
privatisation of  their estates.
The privatisation of the CDC tea estates
Attempts to privatise the CDC have been vehemently opposed by
Anglophone and South West associations as well as by other regional
civil-society organisations.2 The most important was the Fako
Agricultural Workers Union (FAWU), which is responsible for the
representation and defence of CDC workers in Fako Division. Its
president, Cornelius Vewessee, is one of  the most prominent union
leaders in Cameroon, having played a significant part in achieving a
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large measure of union autonomy in 1992 (see Chapter 5). He insisted
that the CDC could not be privatised without consulting the FAWU,
arguing that CDC workers had made personal sacrifices during the
economic crisis to assist the corporation’s recovery. Moreover, he
said the union would resist any mass lay-offs and/or deterioration in
workers’ conditions of  service as a result of  privatisation. And finally,
the Anglophone press severely criticised the announced privatisation:
it has long defended the Anglophone cause and informed the
Anglophone population of the issues at stake.
The united Anglophone front was able to prevent the
implementation of  the corporation’s privatisation for some time.
However to the consternation of Anglophones in general and the
Bakweri in particular, it was announced in October 2002 that the
CDC tea estates had been sold to a South African consortium,
Brobon Finex PTY Ltd. Brobon Finex would run the tea sector,
including the Tole Tea Estate in the Bakweri area, under the name
of  Cameroon Tea Estates (CTE).
The privatisation agreement between the Cameroonian
government and Brobon Finex was on the following terms. The
Cameroonian government was to hand over 65% of its shares to
Brobon Finex which, in turn, would sell 5% of its shares to its
personnel. Brobon Finex was to expand tea production area from
about 1,500 to 3,000 ha in fifteen years and invest about FCFA 8
billion over the following ten years. It would also reimburse the
FCFA 1.1 billion owed by the CDC tea estates. In addition, it agreed
not to lay off any workers, improve existing health, education and
accommodation facilities, and continue buying produce from local
contract farmers. Finally, and conforming to the government’s
privatisation policy of agro-industrial enterprises, land would be
excluded from the transaction.
At the signing of the agreement on 18 October 2002, the
Executive Chairman of  Brobon Finex, Derrick Garvie, declared
that his company would demonstrate within a few years that the
government’s act of  confidence had not been misplaced and that
no effort or expense would be spared in developing Cameroon’s tea
sector. He guaranteed the jobs of  the existing labour force, adding
that more workers would be recruited as a result of  plans for
expansion.3
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The BLCC expressed its bewilderment at the sale of  the CDC
tea estates without any consultation or compensation of the
landowners in spite of previous deliberations between the committee
and the government. The Anglophone secessionist movement, the
Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), claimed that the
Francophone-dominated state had no locus standi to privatise, sell
or transfer CDC tea estates located within the territorial boundaries
of Anglophone Cameroon to South Africans or any other person
(Konings 2003b). In March 2000, the unions had warned the
government that the 1992 Labour Code provided that workers would
be consulted in the event of privatisation as to whether they would
prefer to be paid off before negotiating new contracts with the new
employer.4
The privatisation of the CDC tea estates soon became a national
scandal when it emerged that a handful of politically well-connected
elites were going to benefit at the expense of the public treasury
and the native landowners. From his comments, it became clear
that this privatisation was masterminded by John Niba Ngu, a former
CDC general manager and minister of agriculture, who is known to
be a close friend of President Biya. He used both his technical
knowledge and his many connections within the regime’s highest
levels to design the privatisation of  the CDC tea estates. While
experts had estimated the value of the three tea estates at between
FCFA 5 billion and FCFA 10 billion, Ngu managed to bring the
price down to FCFA 1.5 billion. Less than three months later, the
CTE sold stocks worth FCFA 4.6 billion. In return for his excellent
services, the Board of  Brobon Finex appointed Ngu as general
manager on a monthly salary and benefits amounting to FCFA 4
million. According to Ngu, they allocated him 5% of  the CTE’s
share capital, although this was later contested by the Board of
Brobon Finex.
There were also growing doubts about Brobon Finex’s takeover
when it became clear that the real owner of the CTE was Alhadji
Baba Ahmadou Danpullo, an extremely wealthy Mbororo from the
North West Province of  Anglophone Cameroon who was apparently
using Brobon Finex as a front. He is a well-known cattle rancher
and businessman in Cameroon with an international network
stretching as far as South Africa and also a member of the central
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committee of  the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic
Movement (CPDM). Interestingly, Danpullo had previously been
involved in another privatisation scandal in Cameroon, namely an
attempt to sell the Société de Développement du Coton (SODECOTON),
a huge parastatal in Northern Cameroon, which was on the same
privatisation list as the CDC in 1994. Danpullo was among the small
group of politically well-connected elite, most of them originating
from Northern Cameroon, who managed to buy the company at a
giveaway price. The deal was eventually cancelled by the government
following a popular outcry and the intervention of  external donors,
in particular France and the World Bank (Takougang & Krieger 1998:
169-80). Apparently, Danpullo had put John Niba Ngu, who was
looking for a South African financier for his privatisation scheme for
the CDC tea estates, in contact with Brobon Finex. Although he was
not a signatory to the convention between the Cameroonian
government and Brobon Finex, he paid the money for the takeover
of the CDC tea estates to the public treasurer, and has since been
engaged in other financial transactions on behalf of the CTE.
Investigations by the BLCC in South Africa found that Brobon
Finex existed in name only and had no office premises. Its chairman,
Derrick Garvie, was indeed known in South African business circles
but not in connection with Brobon Finex. This raised suspicions that
Brobon Finex was merely a straw company. Some of  my informants
alleged that Danpullo made use of  the Brobon Finex construction
because it improved his chance of acquiring the tea estates, being
well aware that the government would be inclined to sell large, strategic
state enterprises to foreign companies. It enabled him to whitewash
part of his ill-gotten capital. After initially being designated by the
Brobon Finex Board as a major shareholder, he gradually started to
act as chairman of  the CTE Board, as the South African Brobon
Finex board members became less visible in Cameroon.
In January 2003, the BLCC threatened to sue Brobon Finex in
South Africa for trespassing on Bakweri property without the prior
consent of  its owners. In addition, it called upon the government to
revoke the controversial privatisation of the CDC tea estates and
to open meaningful discussions with the BLCC with a view to
achieving an equitable resolution of the Bakweri land problem.5
Amid growing evidence of financial malpractice, President Biya
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instructed the prime minister and the security forces to investigate
the matter. The outcome of  these investigations has never been
made public but it is widely believed that Danpullo had been using
his political network to help settle the matter and been engaged in
bribing investigators. Moreover, it would appear that President Biya
himself has serious allegations to answer about personally
authorising the transfer of  the CDC tea estates to his friends.
What is more relevant to our discussion here is that the
controversial privatisation scheme was going to have nefarious
consequences for the Tole and Ndu Tea estate workers whose living
and working conditions had already been badly affected by the
economic recession prior to privatisation. This gave rise to an
unprecedented degree of  labour militancy on both estates.
Growing labour militancy on the Tole Tea Estate
Neither the government nor the CDC’s management had felt it
necessary to inform the Tole Tea Estate workers of  the planned
privatisation of their estate so they only came to learn of it through
the media. Being aware that privatisations in Cameroon had usually
led to retrenchments and a deterioration in workers’ conditions of
service, they were worried about their future despite assurances
given by the new owners on the signing of the privatisation
agreement that the existing labour force and their conditions of
service would be maintained. Shortly after the estate’s privatisation
on 18 October 2002, one of the women pluckers expressed the
workers’ widespread anxieties as follows:
I am not sure whether we are going to enjoy similar conditions as
under the CDC. I am rather afraid that we are going to suffer when
the new owners have installed themselves. Nobody appears to be
willing to enlighten us on the effects of privatisation and our new
status. One simply asks us to wait.6
The workers were even more alarmed when the ‘real’ owner of  the
CTE, Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo, decided in November 2002
to transfer 23 managerial staff from his business enterprises in
Douala to his new company, probably because he thought they would
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be more loyal than former CDC staff  members. His decision created
serious problems on the estate. First, these newly appointed
managers were Francophones who all had difficulty communicating
with the Anglophone estate managers and workers. And given the
deepening Anglophone-Francophone divide in the country (Konings
& Nyamnjoh 2003), it was hardly surprising that their appointment
was generally seen on the estate as a highly provocative attempt to
establish Francophone domination of  a former Anglophone
enterprise. As one of these Francophone managers put it:
The Francophones are looked upon here as invaders. The
Anglophones have not digested the fact that the tea sector of the
CDC has come under the control of  French-speaking Cameroonians.
One has therefore the impression that they will do everything to
chase us from the company.7
Second, although lacking any experience in tea production, these
newly appointed managers rapidly usurped the functions of the
former CDC managerial staff  and lorded over them and the workers.
This behaviour fuelled existing tensions and feelings of solidarity
and militancy among the workers. Without the first CTE general
manager’s knowledge, these Francophone managers engaged in
dubious financial transactions that resulted in a lack of funds to
improve estate facilities and workers’ conditions of  service. Their
lack of experience and frequent clashes with Anglophone managers
and workers soon led to a serious drop in tea production.
From 29 December 2002 to 4 January 2003, the estate workers
staged a first strike against the new CTE management.8 They asserted
that their conditions of  service had declined following privatisation.
Their social-security contributions had not been transferred to the
National Social Security Fund since 1996, medical care was not
being provided, ambulances and factory tractors had broken down,
sceptic tanks were not being emptied, and wages for November
2002 had not yet been paid to all the field workers. Many workers
also protested at the sudden dismissal on 4 January 2003 of the
CTE’s general manager, John Niba Ngu, and his replacement by his
Francophone deputy general manager, Mahamat Alamine Mey. While
the Board of Brobon Finex insisted that Ngu had been fired because
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of his unilateral decision to dismiss all the newly hired,
inexperienced and unpopular Francophone managers, the workers
claimed that he had been fired because of his plans to improve
their conditions of  service. At a meeting with some of  the Brobon
Finex board members on the same day, their Staff  Representatives
were told not to meddle in the sacking of  their former general
manager and to ensure workers returned to work, while the CTE
management looked into all their problems. The board members
ordered the immediate payment of any salary arrears and made the
following promises: the CTE would increase workers’ salaries by
April 2003, raise their conditions of  service to the standards
prevailing on the tea estates in Kenya and elsewhere, and provide
them with toilet and medical facilities as well as protective clothing
and boots. A few days later, the new CTE general manager, Mahamat
Alamine Mey, signed a protocol agreement with the President of
the FAWU, Cornelius Vewessee, reassuring workers that all their
acquired rights would be honoured.
On 17 June 2003, estate workers staged another strike in protest
at what they termed ‘poor working conditions and humanitarian
neglect’.9 They felt particularly aggrieved by the abrupt cancellation
of certain allowances and bonuses they had been enjoying under
the CDC and the regular lack of medical facilities on the estate.
Although an amount of  FCFA 650 was deducted from their monthly
wages for medical care, they were forced to go to the CDC hospitals
where they were charged the same as other non-CDC personnel.
Apparently representing the feelings of most estate workers, a 52-
year-old widowed tea plucker lamented the fact that:
The abolition of several allowances has drastically reduced my
income. My monthly wage has dropped from FCFA 40,000 to
FCFA 22,000. I am not even sure if  I will get this little amount. They
are always finding pretexts to cut my present wage. One speaks of
taxes to be paid, absenteeism, indiscipline and so on. At present, I
am torn between resigning and revolt. I would like to leave but I
wonder how I could raise my children if  I did so.10
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Despite growing discontent among the workers, the chairman of
Brobon Finex, Derrick Garvie, still presented an optimistic picture
of  the company’s future during the celebrations to mark the first
anniversary of the CTE on 18 October 2003. He again stressed
that one of the principal managerial objectives was ‘to make CTE
a clear example of the success story of privatisations’.11
Soon after these celebrations, the CTE management implemented
a controversial reorganisation in December 2003. Staff
Representatives pointed out how a number of the proposed measures
went against the 1992 deregulated Labour Code, and they attributed
the absence of  any state intervention in the matter to the close
links between top government officials and Alhadji Baba Ahmadou
Danpullo. The reorganisation started with a 50% slash in workers’
salaries and the withdrawal of  any remaining allowances. When
workers reacted to this dramatic decline in their income by resorting
to protracted strike action on 8 January 2004, management used
this illegal strike as a pretext for implementing two further measures.
It immediately dismissed 268 workers without paying their severance
pay, and started recruiting new workers from outside Anglophone
Cameroon. Among those dismissed were a number of Staff
Representatives. The CTE’s management simply refused to seek
authorisation for their dismissal from the Ministry of Labour as
required in the Labour Code. It then changed almost the entire labour
force – with the exception of  90 workers – from being permanent
workers into casual and temporary workers. These measures were
accompanied by the introduction of a labour regime that became
more and more despotic (Burawoy 1985), the banning of trade
unionism on the estate and the bypassing of  Staff  Representatives.
Furious about these measures, workers continued to strike until
5 February 2004 when the Minister of  Labour, Prof. Robert Nkili,
decided to intervene. Immediately after his mediation and the
settlement of the dispute, it became evident that management was
unwilling to respect his instructions about refraining from ‘wrongful
terminations of  contracts and unacceptable wages and terms of
employment’. It started introducing new reorganisation measures
that led to a further deterioration in workers’ conditions of  service.
It also notified tea pluckers that their daily task would be increased
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to 32 kg in the slack season and 45 kg in the peak season. The
workers then decided to stay away from work on 10 February. And
in retaliation, management announced an additional cut in wages.
Given these developments, the living and working conditions
on the estate became so deplorable that workers started complaining
that ‘the takeover of the tea estate by Brobon Finex had re-
introduced slavery in this part of the country’.12 While CTE
management was celebrating the company’s second anniversary on
23 October 2004, workers circulated tracts in which they called for
the return of John Niba Ngu as general manager to save the company
from total collapse. They deplored their loss of benefits and the
social amenities they had enjoyed under the CDC, the fall in the
quality of their tea, and the abandonment of certain sections of
the plantation which, they said, had fallen into disuse.13
During the course of 2005, workers became increasingly desperate.
They regularly appealed to the government to return the estate to the
CDC, stressing that Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo was focusing
his attention and capital on his newly constructed 4,000-hectare tea
estate in Ndawara in the North West Province which, he boasted,
was making use of  the latest technology (see Chapter 2). Irrespective
of its 35% stake in the CTE, the government remained silent,
apparently unconcerned about the decrease in tea production and
workers’ declining conditions of  service. Feeling abandoned by the
government, workers gradually lost faith in any future improvement
in their predicament under CTE management. Significantly, while
many appeared to no longer be interested in keeping their jobs at any
costs, they did not want to resign before all they were owed had been
paid out since this would enable them to repay their debts and invest
in a new future.14 Their growing realisation of a common interest in
fighting for their accrued rights became a source of  solidarity. This
was clearly manifest in 2006 when a protracted strike – probably the
longest in Cameroon’s labour history – paralysed all the estate’s
activities for almost an entire year.
On 18 January 2006, the workers held a short strike as a warning.
They had been informed that the Minister of  Labour would be
coming on a working visit to Buea and the next day they intercepted
him and informed him that the sale of  their estate to Brobon Finex
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had not been a good move. They had been exposed to untold
hardships following privatisation, and were unable even to send
their children to school. The minister replied that he had refrained
from any earlier intervention on their behalf  because he had expected
their problems to be solved at the company level. He asked them to
go back to work while he tried to solve their problems by meeting
Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni with a view to reconsidering the
privatisation of  the CDC tea estates.15
Nothing more was heard of the minister after he left Buea and
on 26 February 2006 workers announced that they had no other
choice than to go on strike due to ‘the inhuman working conditions
we are subjected to by the CTE management’. They stressed that
they would not resume work until they had been paid the following
benefits:
severance payment from CDC to date; accrued leave allowances
from 2003 to 2006; good separation bonuses, [their] own 5 per
cent shares in the CTE as spelt out in the privatisation agreement;
[their] social insurance dues; [their] credit union contributions which
were never transferred by the CTE to the credit union; and balances
owed to retrenched workers since January 2004.16
By the start of this strike, a new spokesman for the workers, Blasius
Mosoke, had emerged who acted in close cooperation with existing
Staff  Representatives. He was not a worker but a manager, being
one of  the estate’s field assistants. He told me that two major factors
were responsible for his siding with the workers during the strike.
First, like the workers, he felt he had been badly treated by the
newly recruited Francophone managers after privatisation. His
relationship with the CTE’s management had become particularly
strained after he refused to provide the names of the workers
involved in the first strike in 2006. Just like them, he had considered
resigning after receiving his severance pay. Second, he felt obliged
to fight not only for himself but also for the workers because he
thought that the core of  the estate’s labour force was predominantly
made up of poorly educated women who were incapable of
representing their own interests effectively.17
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At a crisis meeting in Limbe on 29 March that was attended by
representatives of the regional administration, management and
workers, the newly appointed French general manager of the CTE,
Jean-Pierre Croze, disclosed that he intended to close the estate for
three months during the ongoing strike to replace the machines in
the tea factory at a cost of  approximately FCFA 3.5 billion. He
then offered the workers FCFA 14.9 million that, he said,
represented part of  their accrued benefits. Staff  representatives
rejected his offer, however, saying that the workers would prefer
the immediate payment of  all their benefits.18
Not long after this meeting, on 8 April, the strikers started
blockading the Tole to Sasse road. This had the intended
consequence of forestalling the reopening of some local elitist
colleges after the Easter holidays. The workers’ argument was simple:
if they prevented students from going to school, their parents, who
belonged to the cream of the Cameroonian elite, would be likely to
bring pressure to bear on the government to meet their demands.19
Indeed, on 12 April, the Minister of Labour organised another crisis
meeting in Buea but in spite of heated discussions, he failed to
persuade workers’ representatives to accept the CTE management’s
initial offer of  FCFA 14.9 million (with the remainder of  their
accrued benefits being paid progressively). However in the end, he
reached a compromise with both parties agreeing that all the accrued
benefits would be paid out three months later. In the meantime,
each party would calculate the total amount and then compare their
findings with the payment coming in July.20
After this agreement, three significant events occurred. First,
there was an attempt by CTE owners to continue selling tea stocks
during the strike and in the night of 25 April, soldiers tried to remove
bags of  processed tea from the estate’s factory. It soon transpired
that Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo had hired these soldiers to
transport the tea to one of his lorries that was parked in Buea.
Defying warning shots, incensed workers attacked the soldiers and
damaged their truck and, in revenge, soldiers tried to arrest Blasius
Mosoke, the estate’s field assistant and the workers’ spokesman.
Workers responded by warning the military that they would not
take it lying down if anything happened to Mosoke.21
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Second, there was an attempt by the Bakweri elite to buy the
estate. Claiming that it was extremely worried about the ongoing crisis
in one of  the region’s most important enterprises, the management
of the Bakweri transport and shipping company Fakoship announced
on 14 July its intention to take over the Tole Tea Estate. However,
this offer was immediately dismissed by the chairman of  Brobon
Finex, Derrick Garvie, who said that ‘as the owner of  the estate,
his company had the sole right to let it go fallow, dismiss workers,
dismantle machines, close it down and sell it without the government
or anybody else interfering in its affairs’.22 Alhadji Baba Ahmadou
Danpullo strongly condemned the offer as being another expression
of  Bakweri opposition to his company. He repeatedly declared that
the crisis on the estate was not due to managerial lapses but to the
political machinations of the Bakweri elite who continued to incite
workers against the management with the aim of  undermining the
company and serving their own interests.23
Third, the most dramatic event was the workers’ decision to
besiege the CDC’s Head Office in Bota-Limbe. They had been
frustrated by the government’s failure to respect the agreement
reached at the crisis meeting on 12 April and while they had made
their own calculations of  their accrued benefits, the three-month
deadline had passed without any government response. On 26 July,
between 500 and 800 men, women and children from the Tole Tea
Estate occupied the CDC’s Head Office, demanding FCFA 2.3
billion in accrued benefits. The FAWU’s president aptly described
the symbolic meaning of their occupation:
The protesters presently camped at the CDC Head Office have not
behaved violently because they have come back to where they were,
to express that the marriage to which they were given, had not been
successful because the new husband seems to have another wife in
Ndawara [referring to Danpullo’s newly created tea estate in that
locality] and is not taking care of them. So they have come back to
their father. CDC is their father.24
Although the provincial governor and the CDC’s general manager
ordered them to leave, the workers resolved to stay until a definitive
solution to their problems had been found. Only the personal
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intervention of  President Biya persuaded the workers to call off
their protest action on 4 August, and Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni
was asked to mediate. He set up an ad-hoc committee composed of
government, management and workers’ representatives that was
presided over by the Minister of Labour in order to calculate the
amount owed to the strikers and ensure its prompt payment.
The committee started work on 7 August. According to its own
calculations, it did not accept the workers’ ‘exorbitant’ demands of
FCFA 2.3 billion and proposed the meagre sum of  FCFA 169 million.
After recalculation, it agreed to a figure of  FCFA 308 million, which
the workers still considered far below their expectations. Payment
was to take place in the subsequent two weeks but was again
postponed. It was only after mounting labour unrest that the regional
administration announced it would make payments on 30 August.
However when the workers gathered outside the offices of the
Provincial Delegation of Labour in Buea to receive their payments,
they were informed that nothing would happen without an accurate
list. In response, the workers went on the rampage in Buea, erecting
road blocks on the main road to Kumba and Douala and tearing
down billboards along the roadside. Clashes between workers and
the police led to 30 workers being taken to hospital and a passer-by
reportedly being hit by a stray bullet.
A few days later, on 2 September, the regional authorities
summoned the workers to collect their payments. Since the
authorities proved unwilling to publish a list of beneficiaries and
the amount each of them would receive, the workers refused to
turn up. There were two reasons why they finally collected the money
they were owed on 11 September. First, their leaders had been
continuously exposed to death threats by the administration, leaving
them with no choice but to comply. Second, the workers’ united
front had been broken after workers at the Tole Credit Union secretly
collected some FCFA 2.2 million.25 Most of  the workers were
embittered because they had been hoodwinked into accepting miserly
sums and they declared that they were no longer prepared to work
on the estate.
A month later, all the workers who had been paid off had –
either voluntarily or forcibly – left the Tole Tea Estate.26 Some
returned to their villages of origin, while others moved to
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neighbouring villages to try to eke out a new existence. Those who
still wanted to work on the estate were told by CTE management
that they had to apply for new contracts. On 1 October, youths
hired by the management on a contract basis started pruning the
overgrown tea bushes. Tea picking was expected to restart in the
course of 2007.
Growing labour militancy on the Ndu Tea Estate
Given the CTE takeover of  all the former CDC tea estates in
October 2002, it is not surprising that the Ndu Tea Estate workers
faced similar problems to the Tole Tea Estate workers after the
controversial privatisation. These included a drastic deterioration
in their living and working conditions, massive lay-offs, frequent
violations of the Labour Code, the replacement of competent
Anglophone managers with inexperienced Francophones and, above
all, constant delays in the payment of the financial benefits that the
former and present owners, the CDC and the CTE respectively,
owed the workers, such as severance pay, termination benefits,
compensation for sums (for social insurance and credit union dues)
deducted from workers’ wages for over the years without interest
and the workers’ 5% share in the company as stipulated in the
privatisation agreement.
Ndu Tea Estate workers used similar tactics to Tole Tea Estate
workers to protest against growing exploitation and subordination in
the labour process. Faced with the banning of  trade unionism on the
estate, they began to resort to informal, collective actions. And when
they realised that the CTE management was not going to keep its
promise of improving their living and working conditions after
privatisation, some workers decided to stop working on the estate.
In 2004 the Ndu workers showed their profound dissatisfaction
with the estate’s privatisation. In February, they began a sit-in. In
response, CTE management sanctioned them in a similar way as
the Tole workers: and almost the entire Ndu labour force was
transformed from having permanent labour status into contract
labour. In presidential elections on 11 October, Ndu workers refused
to support the incumbent president, Paul Biya, holding him jointly
responsible for the estate’s privatisation and its nefarious effects on
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the workers’ living and working conditions. This is evident from a
two-page memorandum that was signed by the local elite and the
chief of Ndu:
The negative influence on voters for the CPDM in Ndu Subdivision,
among others, was the privatisation of the CDC and the irregular
lay-off  of  hundreds of  workers of  the Ndu Tea Estate by the
CTE.27
In March 2005, Ndu workers threatened to go on strike again to
back their grievances. In a petition to the CTE management, they
lamented the fact that they had been reduced to contract workers
under extremely rigid conditions on the grounds that they had
absconded from work during the previous strike. They also decried
the punitive transfer of some Staff Representatives and the allegedly
intentional miscalculations on their pay. They claimed that the
management still owed them wages and leave allowances. Curiously,
instead of addressing their grievances, management threatened to
sanction them for their refusal to use the proper channels for seeking
redress.28
Inspired by the protracted strike on the Tole Tea Estate in the
same year, Ndu workers embarked upon a four-month strike on 28
August 2006, demanding the immediate payment of their financial
dues. They stressed that they had waited long enough, having sent
numerous petitions to the CTE management and the administration
of the Donga-Mantung Division, and announced that they were
now prepared to fight to the bitter end, even if it cost them their
lives. They cut down hundreds of  eucalyptus trees from the CTE
fuel plantation and blocked the Grassfields ring road, bringing traffic
between Bamenda and Nkambe, the capital of Donga-Mantung
Division, to a standstill. They had been informed by reliable sources
that the CTE management was planning to bring in workers from
the Ndawara Tea Estate in the North West Province in an effort to
break their strike and ignore their legitimate demands. Fearing that
the situation might degenerate into violence, the divisional
administration ordered two trucks of  armed soldiers from the
Nkambe barracks who used force in a number of clashes that resulted
in the hospitalisation of  more than 30 workers.29
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Faced with a deteriorating situation, the Senior District Officer
(SDO) for Donga-Mantung Division, Godlive Mboke Ntua, and
the District Officer (DO) for the Ndu Subdivision, John Mkong
Yosimbom, convened a crisis meeting on 1 September. Their
attempts to bring the workers to reason failed as the latter had lost
all confidence in the divisional administration and CTE
management. They then successfully approached Emmanuel
Ngafeeson, the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice in charge
of  the Penitentiary, who was a prominent member of  the local elite
and popular among the masses, being fondly known as the ‘man-at-
the-grassroots’.
The following day, Ngafeeson went from Yaoundé to Tatum, a
village close to Ndu where he was welcomed by the strikers. He
then accompanied them to the CTE Ndu office, a distance of more
than five kilometres, where he subsequently addressed them in their
local languages, appealing to them to calculate all that was owed to
them and to send a delegation to Yaoundé on 4 September to
negotiate with the government and the CTE management.30
During the meeting on 4 September, the Minister of Labour, Prof.
Robert Nkili, tried to solve the problems on the Ndu Tea Estate by
setting up a tripartite committee to calculate workers’ benefits and
define the financial responsibilities of the CTE management and the
government. The committee later proposed an amount of  about FCFA
181 million.31 The workers immediately rejected the offer as being
way below their expectations. They pointed out that the Tole Tea
Estate beneficiaries, who were far fewer in number than they
themselves, had been offered a much higher sum. They also
vehemently disapproved of the fact that only 565 of the 863
permanent and contract workers were on the list for payment. When
the Governor for the North West Province, Koumpa Issa, delivered
the money to Ndu on 5 October, he met stiff resistance from the
workers who simply refused to accept their benefits.32
The divisional administration then called on the Provincial
Delegate of  Labour for the North West Province, Simon Ade Fru,
to mediate in the matter. After a lengthy exchange with the strikers
on 11 October, they were advised to collect the money being offered.
If any of them disagreed with the calculation of his/her personal
benefits, s/he could file a complaint in the law courts.33
255
Chapter 10: Privatisation and labour militancy - The case of  Cameroon’s tea estates
Soon afterwards, one of the principal workers’ spokesmen,
Francis Kolle, went to Yaoundé where he handed over a
memorandum to the Minister of Labour listing what the workers
thought was owed to them. A workers’ committee had calculated
this to be a sum of  over FCFA 2.9 billion.34
In the meantime, it was discovered that seven men and one
woman had betrayed the workers’ cause by secretly collecting their
dues at the Ndu Subdivisional treasury. On 17 October, striking
workers visited the homes of these blacklegs with mock coffins
and crosses, performed burial rites on their door steps and inscribed
‘may your soul rest in peace’ on their doors. They later set fire to
the coffins that contained magic objects, and the workers were
requested to swear an oath over the ashes while vowing not to collect
their money. As a result of  this action, the divisional administration
stated that the strike’s ringleaders were to face trial on charges of
life-threatening behaviour. Subsequently, it intensified its tactics
of intimidation, bringing pressure to bear on them to stop the strike
and accept the amount of financial benefit they had previously
rejected. Their refusal to submit was perceived as an act of
stubbornness, and the administration regularly threatened to call in
troops to crush the strike.35
On 23 November, 16 workers’ representatives, who had been
acting as spokesmen for their colleagues, resigned after the DO for
Ndu Subdivision, John Mkong Yorisombom, banned meetings
between them and the CTE management. Apparently, the DO’s
banning order came in the wake of a meeting between workers’
representatives and CTE management that almost degenerated into
a bloody confrontation.36 A few weeks later, four of them were
arrested and tortured.37
Relations between the strikers and the divisional administration
became more strained when the workers decided to intensify their
strike action until they were paid what they thought rightly belonged
to them. On 28 November, a protest march was organised by the
striking workers, their families and dependents. This was followed
by heavy beehives being brought in to reinforce the road blockade
between Bamenda and Nkambe in an attempt to forestall the
anticipated arrival of some 1,000 workers from the Ndwara and
Djuttitsa tea estates.38
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The next day, the SDO for Donga-Mantung Division, Godlive
Mboke Ntua, issued an ultimatum to the strikers. It was broadcast
several times on Donga-Mantung Community Radio and branded
the workers as a group of recalcitrant fellows who had refused to
be brought to reason and were still confronting the divisional
administration. He urged them to collect their dues before re-
engaging in further negotiations with the CTE management. He
stressed that it was ridiculous to claim, as the workers had previously
done, an amount of  around FCFA 3 billion while the CTE had only
paid FCFA 1.5 billion to purchase the three tea estates.39
The strikers, however, turned a deaf  ear to the SDO’s ultimatum.
While continuing to man their road blockade, they marched in the
night of 29 November to the houses of the CTE estate manager,
Falalou Mohammed, and the Ndu Workers’ Club president, Joseph
Koni, taking both hostage and forcing them to take part in their
nocturnal demonstrations.
Violent clashes took place between the strikers and the forces
of  law and order on 1 and 2 December. The troops first attempted
to protect some eight saw operators who had been charged with
cutting up the eucalyptus trees that had been used by the strikers to
block the ring road. They subsequently attempted to escort
truckloads of  workers from Ndawara and Djuttitsa that were on
the way to the Ndu Tea Estate. Two workers were killed and several
others were injured during these confrontations.40
Following these dramatic developments, the Minister of  Labour
felt once again obliged to intervene to resolve the deepening crisis
on the estate. He organised another tripartite meeting in Yaoundé
on 6 December. After a long and heated debate, it was agreed that
workers would accept that their financial dues had been calculated
in conformity with the labour laws and regulations in force. Any
amounts that were being contested by the workers were to be re-
examined by the SDO for the Donga-Mantung Division, a
representative of the Ministry of Labour and the CTE management.
Since not all the personal financial benefits owed had been wrongly
calculated, workers should begin receiving their dues individually.
Although the usual punishment for illegal strike actions as stipulated
in the Labour Code was the dismissal of the participant(s), the CTE
management agreed to keep on all the workers for the sake of peace.
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The Minister of Labour then requested that all workers resume work
immediately, promising that all outstanding grievances would be
handled within a year.41 While the workers’ representatives voiced
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the meeting, they eventually
felt compelled to agree to it due to the state’s persistent intimidating
tactics, arbitrary arrests, torture and killings. Payment of  the financial
dues started on 29 December.42
It took some time before work resumed on the Ndu Tea Estate
since those workers, who had expressed their willingness to continue
working for the CTE had to wait to sign permanent contracts.
However many strikers refused to resume work because of the
maltreatment they had suffered at the hands of the CTE
management. Others feared going back because of the desecration
inflicted on the estate by the strikers in the form of  sorcery and
witchcraft.
In January 2007, the Ndu elite held their first meeting after the
crisis on the Ndu Tea Estate. They stressed that bringing in workers
from other areas was tantamount to provoking local workers and
held that the chiefs’ right of cleansing and purifying the land could
only be effectively carried out in the presence of the workers who
had desecrated the estate. In addition, they called on the
administrative authorities to release the financial data on the
workers’ payments to facilitate reconciliation and to set up an ad-
hoc committee to review any contested financial data. They
successfully persuaded the divisional administration and the CTE
management to release detainees and withdraw the ‘imported’
workers from the estate. However, the divisional administration
ignored their request to remove the forces of law and order from
the estate in order to ‘facilitate dialogue and enable the workers to
resume work’.43
Conclusion
This study of the privatisation of the CDC estates in Anglophone
Cameroon illustrates how externally imposed privatisation schemes
have often been opposed by African governments, civil-society
organisations and workers alike. Cameroonian government officials
have regularly attempted to postpone and manipulate the
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implementation of schemes that challenge the stabilising and uniting
patronage systems in the weak nation state, undermine their limited
popular legitimacy and provoke ethno-regional and workers’ protests.
Although heavy dependence on western donors for continued
financial assistance eventually forced them to comply, they attempted
to sell state corporations, like the CDC, to foreign companies and
nationals closely allied with the regime at giveaway prices in return
for considerable kickbacks.
Having been excluded from the decision-making process, civil-
society organisations in Anglophone Cameroon strongly contested
attempts to privatise the CDC. Ethno-regional organisations feared
losing control of their ancestral lands and regional economic heritage,
whilst trade unions feared retrenchments and a deterioration in
workers’ conditions of  service.
There is ample evidence that the most militant opposition to the
privatisation of  the CDC estates came from the workers. Chapter 3
explained the main reasons for their remarkable solidarity and
militancy in spite of  their internal divisions. It would be wrong to
conclude that the Tole and Ndu workers’ militant actions against
the privatisation of the CDC derived from their opposition to
privatisation per se. Their leaders told me that workers would support
privatisation if  it was expected to improve the company’s efficiency
and workers’ conditions of  service. They stressed that workers had
become vehemently opposed to the privatisation of the CDC for
the following reasons:
• They disapproved of  the CDC’s privatisation because the CDC
continued to have the reputation of being one of the few
relatively well-managed parastatals. This helps explain their
frequent demands during the disastrous privatisation exercise for
a return to the mother company.
• They strongly condemned the secretive and corrupt nature of
the CDC privatisation as well as the blatant absence of any
consultation of  workers and trade unions in the process.
• Above all, they quickly discovered that the new owners’ promise
to safeguard and even improve workers’ rights and benefits was
not going to be respected. Confronted with unbearable living
and working conditions after privatisation, they gradually lost
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interest in keeping their jobs at any cost and resumed informal
collective actions. Determined to receive all their accrued benefits
before resigning, they engaged in protracted strike actions that
paralysed all the estate’s activities.
In sharp contrast to popular resistance to neo-liberal reforms in
some African countries (cf. Zeilig 2002), Tole and Ndu workers
received little support from civil-society organisations in the region
that claimed to be equally opposed to the privatisation of the CDC,
in particular the trade unions and various Anglophone associations.
Management banned trade unionism from the estates and the
Anglophone associations seemed to be first and foremost
preoccupied with their own specific grievances. Given these
circumstances, the militant actions of  the Tole and Ndu workers
were bound to remain local expressions of anger and outrage.
There was only one notable example in Cameroon of a broader
coalition of  popular forces against privatisation practices. This
occurred after the takeover of La Société Nationale d’Electricité (Sonel)
in 2001 by the American multinational AES-Sirocco, which dismally
failed to keep its promise of  guaranteeing an uninterrupted supply
of  electricity. Various parts of  the country suffered from electricity
rationing and regular power cuts, which resulted in a reduction in
economic output and hardship for consumers. This, together with
excessive increases in the price of electricity and massive lay-offs,
led to strikes and boycotts by workers and numerous demonstrations
and court cases by consumers. Although workers and consumers
eventually failed to achieve the departure of the Americans, they
were able to gain important concessions from the privatised
company, including the recruitment of  new workers, better
conditions of  service, increased investments in regular power
supplies and the replacement of American top managers by
Cameroonians (Konings 2007).
Notes
  1. There are more detailed studies on workers’ responses to privatisation
in the southern part of  Africa. See Larmer (2005, 2007), Pitcher 2002)
and Zeilig (2002).
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  2. For a detailed discussion of   regional civil-society  opposition to the
privatisation of the CDC, see Konings (2011a and b).
  3. See The Herald, 20 October 2002.
  4. See The Post, 8 August 2006.
  5. For all the BLCC actions described in this study, see the BLCC website:
http://www.bakwerilands.org. See also The Herald, 8 and 22 January
2003.
  6. Interview with a woman picker on the Tole Tea Estate, 21 November
2002.
  7. Interview with a Francophone CTE manager at the Tole Tea Estate,
13 December 2002.
  8. Interview with Mathias Anyacheck, Staff  Representative at the Tole
Tea Estate, 29 November 2003. For press reports on this strike, see
The Herald, 6 January 2003 and Le Messager, 9 January 2003.
  9. Interview with Staff  Representatives at the Tole Tea Estate, 29 October
2003. For a report of  this strike, see The Herald, 18 June 2003.
10. Interview with a tea picker at the Tole Tea Estate, 29 October 2003.
11. See The Post, 20 October 2003.
12. The Post, 13 September 2004.
13. The Post, 25 October 2004; The Herald, 1 November 2004.
14. The Post, 13 September 2005.
15.  The Post, 25 January 2006.
16. The Post, 17 March 2007.
17. Interview with Blasius Mosoke at the Tole Tea Estate, 15 March 2006.
See also The Post, 25 September 2006.
18. Le Messager, 30 March 2006; and Cameroon Tribune, 12 April 2006.
19. The Post, 29 April 2006 and 16 August 2006; and Cameroon Tribune, 12
April 2006.
20. The Post, 19 April 2006.
21. The Post, 1 May 2006.
22. The Post, 8 August 2006.
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23. The Post, 8 August and 12 September 2006.
24. The Post, 8 August 2006.
25. The Post, 15 September 2006.
26. The Post, 20 October 2006.
27. Herald Today, 7 November 2004.
28. The Herald, 9-10 March 2005, p. 3.
29. The Post, 30 September 2006.
30. Ibid; and Le Messager, 5 September 2006.
31. Le Messager, 9 October 2006; and The Post, 12 October 2006.
32. The Post, 12 October 2006.
33. The Post, 19 October 2006.
34. Ibid.
35. The Post, 3 November 2006.
36. The Post, 26 November 2006.
37. The Post, 17 December 2006.
38. The Post, 30 November 2006.
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40. Ibid.
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